



Food biotechnologies in Italy: a 
social psychological study. 
 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Social Sciences.  
To be presented with due permission by the Faculty of 
Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki for public 
examination and criticism in the University of Helsinki 







Opponent:       Professor Wolfgang Wagner  
Johannes Kepler University Linz 
 
Custos:  Professor  
Anna-Maija Pirttilä-Backman  





Food biotechnologies in Italy: 















Klaus Helkama, chairperson 









Elena Collavin and 
 Department of Social Psychology 
 University of Helsinki 
 P.O. Box 4 












ISBN 978-952-10-4111-2 (Print) 
ISBN 978-952-10-4112-9 (PDF) 
ISSN 1457-0475 
 
Cover design: Mari Soini 






I thank first of all the persons and institutions who over a four year 
period have contributed data used in this work. I am especially indebted 
to those who benevolently agreed to being recorded and who have 
allowed the data to be used for research. I am very grateful to Anna-
Maija Pirttilä Backman for comments on the work and overarching 
support in good and bad times. My thanks also go to the colleagues who 
gave comments and otherwise helped me during this project: Inari 
Mattsson, Susanna Lähteenoja, Merja Bauters, Monica Pivetti. I am 
grateful to the participants in the Helsinki social psychology graduate 
seminar during the academic year 2004-2005 for their comments on my 
presentations. I warmly acknowledge the colleagues of the PARADYS 
consortium, in particular the project coordinators, Alfons Bora and Heiko 
Hausendorf, and the members of the Italian team Giuseppe Pellegrini and 
Marina Sbisà. This work stems from my participation in the project. 
Licio Collavin has patiently answered many a question of scientific 
nature on genes and biotechnologies; thank you fradi for teaching me 
how to do a transgenesis in your lab. John Haviland has provided me 
with keen advice and racking criticisms. I thank him for both his patience 
and his impatience. I am very much obliged to Margareth Wetherell for 
her several comments and criticisms on the first draft of the thesis. They 
greatly helped me to make improvements on this work. I also wish to 
warmly thank John Moore, Chair of the Department of Linguistics at 
UCSD, for my affiliation as visiting sholar in 2006 and 2007. 
During my doctoral study I have been financially supported by a Marie 
Curie fellowship from the European PhD in Social Representations and 
Communication, by a Helsinki University grant and by a grant from 
Finnish CIMO (Center for International Mobility).  
 





 1 INTRODUCTION .....................................................1 
1.1 TOPIC OF THE STUDY --------------------------------1 
1.2 MAIN FEATURES OF THE STUDY: DISCOURSE 
ANALYTIC APPROACH TO REPRESENTATIONS -----4 
1.3 AIMS OF THE STUDY ------------------------------- 10 
 1.3.1 Theoretical ...........................................................10 
 1.3.2 Methodological ....................................................12 
 1.3.3Empirical ..............................................................12 
1.4 ETHICAL ISSUES------------------------------------ 13 
1.5 AUTHORSHIP --------------------------------------- 14 
 2 NOTES ON DATA AND METHOD......................15 
2.1 DOCUMENTS AND CONVERSATIONS ------------- 15 
2.2 ECLECTIC DATA ------------------------------------ 17 
2.3 DATA: THE BUBBIO DECLARATION -------------- 19 
2.4 THE CATHOLIC CHURCH -------------------------- 20 
2.5 A FIELD TRIAL-------------------------------------- 20 
 3 A REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL    
STUDIES ON BIOTECHNOLOGIES IN EUROPE
......................................................................................21 
3.1 “BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC”
 22 
3.2 THE PUBLIC SPHERE ------------------------------- 23 
3.3 SYMBOLIC COPING--------------------------------- 25 
3.4 IMAGES OF GENES AND NATURE IN EUROPE ---- 27 
3.5 SUMMARY ------------------------------------------ 28 
4 LEGISLATION ON FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGIES
......................................................................................30 
4.1 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EUROPEAN 
LEGISLATION --------------------------------------- 31 
4.2 FIELD TRIALS: -------------------------------------- 31 
4.3 COMMERCIALIZATION OF GM FOOD AND FEED: 32 
4.4 COMMERCIAL FARMING: -------------------------- 32 
4.5 A LEGAL DEFINITION OF GMOS------------------ 32 
4.6 THE WHITE PAPER ON EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE
 34 
4.7 BIOTECHNOLOGIES AS PROGRESS ---------------- 36 
4.8 THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE RIGHTS 
OF THE PUBLIC-------------------------------------- 37 
 4.8. 1The Rio de Janeiro Declaration...........................37 




 4.8.3 The Aarhus Convention....................................... 39 
4.9 THE WHITE PAPER ON FOOD SAFETY ------------ 40 
4.10 LEGISLATION ON FIELD TRIALS AND COMMERCIAL 
USE OF FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGIES. ------------------------- 42 
 4.10.1 Directive 2001/18.............................................. 42 
 4.10.2Legislative Decree 224/2003.............................. 44 
4.11 TRACEABILITY AND LABELLING.----------------- 49 
 4.11.1 EU Regulation N. 1829/2003 and N.1830/2003 49 
 4.11.2 Authorization for introduction into the market . 52 
 4.11.3 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003......................... 52 
4.12 ITALIAN LEGISLATION ----------------------------- 54 
 4.12.1 The Amato Decree............................................. 55 
 4.12.2 The Alemanno memorandum and the declarations 
of Pecoraro Scanio....................................................... 56 
 4.12.3 The Law on coexistence..................................... 57 
 4.12.4 Anti transgenic councils and regions ................ 59 
4.13 CONCLUSIONS -------------------------------------- 62 
 5 THEORETICAL COORDINATES ...................... 64 
5.1 INTRODUCTION------------------------------------- 64 
5.2 THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS --- 65 
5.3 WHAT ARE SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS? -------- 66 
5.4 FUNCTION OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS ------ 69 
5.5 ANCHORING AND OBJECTIFICATION------------- 70 
5.6 THE THINKING SOCIETY --------------------------- 71 
5.7 SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY: F.C. 
BARTLETT---------------------------------------------------- 72 
5.8 PRINCIPLES GENERATING STANDPOINTS: SOCIAL 
REPRESENTATIONS AS IDEOLOGIES ----------------------- 74 
5.9 CRITICISMS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
THEORY ------------------------------------------------------ 78 
 5.9.1 Theoretical vagueness......................................... 79 
 5.9.2 Novelty and Social Representations .................... 80 
 5.9.3. Sacred and profane: the consensual and the reified 
universe ........................................................................ 81 
5.10 SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE 
COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS--------------------------------- 85 
5.11 THE MEANING OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION---- 88 
5.12 FROM INNER STATES TO LINGUISTIC ACTION: 
DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY--------------------------------- 90 
5.13 INTERPRETATIVE REPERTOIRES ------------------ 95 
5.14 CRITICISMS TO DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY ----- 98 
5.15 LIMITATION TO DISCOURSE----------------------101 
5.16 STAKES, IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE -----------102 
VI 
  
5.17 ACTION, COGNITION AND THE REFERENTIAL 
NOTION OF LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION ---------104 
5.18 LOGICAL POSITIVISM-----------------------------104 
5.19 MEANING AS USE: “PHILOSOPHICAL 
RESEARCHES” ----------------------------------------------106 
5.20 INNER STATES -------------------------------------107 
5.21 THE STATUS OF INNER STATES ------------------109 
5.22 DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DIALOGICAL 
VERSION OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY. -----111 
5.23 DISCOURSE AS A TOOL FOR WHAT? -------------114 
5.24 CONCLUSION --------------------------------------116 
 6 HEURISTICS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
DISCOURSE .............................................................120 
6.1 FEATURES OF DISCOURSE ------------------------120 
6.2 THEME ---------------------------------------------127 
6.3 TOPIC-----------------------------------------------128 
6.4 POLARIZATION ------------------------------------130 
6.5 LEXICALIZATION/REFERENCE -------------------131 
6.6 QUALIFICATIONS----------------------------------135 
6.7 CATEGORIZATION---------------------------------136 
6.8 METAPRAGMATIC DESCRIPTIONS ---------------137 
6.9 EVIDENTIALITY -----------------------------------140 
6.10 PRESUPPOSITIONS---------------------------------141 
6.11 CONCLUSION --------------------------------------144 
 7 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ..........................148 
7.1 THE ANTI-TRANSGENIC DECLARATION OF THE 
BUBBIO COUNCIL ------------------------------------------148 
7.2 THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND GMOS: ANALYSIS 
OF FOUR TEXTS ---------------------------------------------153 
 7.2.1 “Dress and keep” ..............................................153 
 7.2.2 “Blessed GMOs” ...............................................158 
.. 7.2.3“Can Biotechnologies really be the solution to the    
problem of food famine?”...........................................164 
 7.2.4 GMO flour desecrates the Eucharist” ...............166 
 7.2.5Conclusion ..........................................................170 
7.3 THE PARADYS RESEARCH------------------------171 
7.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT -------------172 
7.5 DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE
 173 
7.6 EXTRACTS FROM THE DATA:---------------------175 
 7.6.1 The scientist in charge: “Italians are terrified” 175 
7.7 FROM THE PUBLIC DEBATE-----------------------187 




 7.7.2 “A much bigger force”...................................... 192 
 7.7.3 “J’accuse” ........................................................ 198 
 7.7.4 “Nobody knows which effects  
  they can produce” ..................................................... 202 
 7.7.5 “Leukemia, tumors and so on and so forth” ..... 206 
 7.7.6 “I am a citizen”................................................. 208 
 7.7.7 “GMOs are like drugs” .................................... 212 
 7.7.8 “A solution to the problem of world hunger” ... 214 
 7.7.9 “Our underpants are transgenic”..................... 215 
 7.7.10 “We have managed to have antibiotics…” ..... 221 
 7.7.11 Conclusion....................................................... 224 
 8 CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS................ 226 
8.1 THE THREE FOCAL ASPECTS OF THE GMO DEBATE     
IN ITALY--------------------------------------------226 
 8.1.1 Key actors and the Italian battle against GMOs229 
8.2 THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS: SRT, DP AND 
MODES OF REPRESENTING FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGIES IN 
ITALY. 232 
8.3 CONCLUSION --------------------------------------236 
 9 REFERENCES...................................................... 238 
 10 APPENDIX.......................................................... 263 
10.1 LIST OF DATA OF THE FIELD TRIAL --------------263 
10.2 TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS -----------------265 
10.3 THE “ANTI-TRANSGENIC” DECLARATION OF  
BUBBIO COUNCIL, 13 AUGUST 1999---------------------266 
10.4 THE INTRODUCTORY SPEECH OF CARDINAL 
RAFFAELE MARTINO AT THE CONFERENCE: “GMOS: 







1.1 Topic of the study 
This work is concerned with the conflicting representations of genetically 
modified organisms (herein GMOs) that are found in Italian society. It 
appears that health and environment issues, deeply rooted fears, moral 
concerns and cultural values all play a part in the heated debate over the 
growth and commercialization of genetically modified foodstuff in 
Europe (International Council for science, 2003). In Italy in particular, 
where food has a notoriously prominent role in cultural identity and in 
the economy, we see a surprising convergence in the political agenda of 
both right and left to resist the development, cultivation and import of 
GMOs in the country (Meldolesi, 2003) regardless of the prescriptions of 
European legislation or International agreements (Snidico, 2005). There 
is evidence of widespread concern about the quality and safety of food in 
Italy (Ferretti & Magudda, 2004), and GMOs are associated in the press 
and everyday conversation with food scandals like mad cow disease and 
dioxin-contaminated chicken. Several food industries in Italy have taken 
a resolute stand in the debate and advertise themselves notifying the 
consumer that they refuse to make use of GM ingredients (Tassinari, n.d.; 
Manifesto sulle Biotecnologie, n.d.). Italian local authorities vote to 
declare councils and regions ‘antitransgenici’ (literally ‘anti-
transgenics’).  Results from the 2002 Eurobarometer on Biotechnologies 
show that in Italy support for GM crops decreased by 10% since the 
previous survey while it is more or less stabilized in France and Germany 
and increased in all the other countries (Eurobarometer 58, 2002: 17). 
The same happens with support for GM food: after 1999 most of 
European countries show increased support while Italy shows a marked 
decline. In the broader context of agri-food biotechnologies, “Italy is an 




both GM crops and GM foods from 1996 to 2002”. (Eurobarometer 58, 
2002:18). The most recent Euro-Barometer, released on May 2006, holds 
that in Italy in 2005 34% of the population asserted they support GM 
foods. Support for GM food in Italy was 61% in 1996, 42% in 1999 and 
40% in 2002. (Eurobarometer, 2006,: 21) There is little doubt that for the 
majority of Italians GMOs are negatively received: in various polls over 
the last four years Italians state that GMOs worry them “very much” and 
that they would not purchase such products even if considerably cheaper 
then the non GM equivalent (SWG, 2002). Conversely, we shall not 
forget that there is a minority in Italy that does support GMOs. All these 
attitudes are per se interesting and have been the object of attention in 
recent years in Italy (Allansdottir & Others, 2001). However, little has 
been said about the articulation, the inner logic of these conflicting 
positions in Italy and about the wider sets of values and beliefs they stem 
from. The topic of this study focuses on both the “what” and the “how” 
of these different representations. Which arguments are proposed for 
supporting or criticizing genetically modified foods? This work wants to 
move beyond snapshot attitudes and look at the articulations of refusal 
and support for food biotechnologies in Italy. It starts from the 
assumption that stances toward a complex and unfamiliar item like food 
biotechnologies is influenced by larger sets of normative cognitive 
structures shared by parts of the Italian society. GMOs are here 
considered as a social object which has been constructed by media 
descriptions and interpersonal communications and has been allocated a 
place within a wider, structured and polarized metasystem (Doise, 1992) 
which we can call a system of social representations or an ideology1. My 
assumption is that ideologies are expressed and reproduced in discourse 
and during social interaction. Consequently, discourse and interactions 
are the ideal loci for looking at the dynamics in which ideologies are 
exchanged and modified in society. The assumption of this study is that a 
                                                 
1 I consider ideologies to be the often implicit socially shared principles 
that generate individual standpoints. Ideologies are specifically relevant 
to matters of power relations within society. I discuss the concept of 





micro-level analysis of interaction and discourse is likely to reveal how 
social actors in social situations exchange and reproduce ideologies (van 
Dijk, 1998). The epistemological perspective of this study is 
constructionist. I assume that the social world is the only we have access 
to. I also assume that such world is the product of social practices that are 
both conventional and factual. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Burr, 2003) 
As a consequence, my assumption is that there is not an “objective” 
representation of food biotechnologies somehow more “real” then other 
ones, including the ones offered by the experts in the field. Rather, my 
starting point in this study is that food biotechnologies are a social 
construct, described as something different by the discourse of science, 
that of environmentalism, that of the Catholic Church and so on. 
However, my study is not so much concerned with how each subject 
holds a certain view of food GMOs; rather, I want to look at the 
articulation of knowledge and stance between subjects in the 
communicative process. My focus is on the inter-subjective processes 
through which beliefs and practical epistemologies are displayed and 
rhetorically peddled in interaction. When approaching the topic of 
biotechnology and reading the many mutually contradictory positions on 
the table one soon acquires the sense that factuality and objectivity are 
fundamental in the debate. However, they are fundamental as rhetorical 
ammunition, not as anchors to reality. In the discussion over 
biotechnologies, as with any scientific debate turned into an ideological 
issue, truth and evidence are not aims to reach but tools to win the battle 
of words and deeds. The topic of this work is what people say about food 
biotechnologies and how what they say can be linked to their wider sets 
of beliefs. However, I do not make any assumptions as to internal beliefs 
underlying discourse. It is subjects themselves, who in their arguments 
either implicitly or explicitly appeal to wide-scope points of view. 
Inevitably, when people talk about food biotechnologies they introduce 
and discuss many other items. GMOs are often described as “very 
controversial” and characterized by features like being dangerous, having 
amazing potential, and being a threat to Italian traditional way of farming 




were developed in the first place, who wants them, who created them and 
who profits from them. In any narrative about GMOs, not only GMOs 
but also scientists, multinational companies, green activists and 
politicians are all mentioned and given a part, most often as hero or 
villain. As will be evident, the discussion biotechnology cannot be 
separated from the attribution of character to the many “actors” involved, 
who are identified as interest groups and social categories. One can 
imagine a shared system of knowledge as a multi dimensional matrix 
where objects are assigned places according to an already predetermined 
logic. Nowadays, for different subjects GMOs occupy a certain place in 
their system of knowledge which is linked to a specific view of nature, of 
science and scientists, of what is the right form of government, what 
farming is (and should be), to mention only a few of the many social 
objects that are inextricably linked to the item “GMOs” or “food 
biotechnologies”. GMOs are interesting not so much for their own sake 
but rather for the cloud of interrelated issues they activate and stir. Like 
when one pulls on a single strand in a fishnet all the rest of it begins to 
shift, showing the interconnected structure of the whole, pulling the 
GMOs cord connects to several socially fundamental matters, and thus 
brings to the surface other items that are positioned within structured, 
polarized worldviews. My aim in this work is to open access to those 
worldviews.  
1.2 Main features of the study: discourse 
analytic approach to representations 
 
Social psychology is concerned with how people make sense of the 
world. In this work I consider “making sense” to be an activity that 
depends very heavily on communication (Billig, 1987). Sense-making 
can in fact be a private activity only to a certain extent: we can be alone 
with a book we try to understand but we rely on language - a shared, 
conventional system of signs and meanings - in order to access it. This 





result of the will of another person. We can try on our own to understand 
a natural phenomenon. However we do it on the basis of our stock of 
knowledge about how natural processes work, something we have 
acquired through formal or informal education and that heavily depends 
on the current beliefs within our culture. In sum, we can think alone but 
in order to do so we use tools that are shared by our society and that 
shape the way we think. These tools include language first of all and a 
whole wealth of organized knowledge we take for granted. This 
knowledge is not only structured; it is also polarized, colored with 
ethical, deontic and patemic connotations. Besides, most of the times we 
don’t really have the chance to think on our own; our life is populated by 
other persons who constantly give us a piece of their mind, starting from 
the many experts and reportedly knowledgeable persons who provide 
their viewpoint on mass media to wide audiences, often in a matter of 
fact manner. However, we are not simply at the receiving end of mass 
media input. We are protagonists in discussions where we have to think 
on our feet and arguing is carried out talking and interacting with other 
persons in the course of what Goffman calls a Social Encounter 
(Goffman, 1963, 1967), a slippery and emotionally charged event in 
which every move is a performance which may sooth or frustrate our 
constant need for social reassurance. Epistemic matters are in these cases 
anything but theoretical. They are inevitably mingled with questions of 
social worth, politeness and power. Practical matters also impinge on our 
assessments. As Edwards and Potter put it, “the epistemologies of our 
everyday discourse are organized around adequacy and usefulness rather 
then validity and correctness” (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 16). The 
natural setting for knowledge acquisition and exchange is the social 
environment. Opinions and beliefs are formed through communication in 
the social arena and are inevitably intertwined with the needs and the 
agendas of individuals and of a certain social position. The ordered stock 
of opinions and beliefs shared by a social group are the object of Social 
Representations Theory (herein SRT). SRs have been described by Serge 
Moscovici, founder of the approach, as “cognitive systems with a logic 




about’, ‘images of’ or ‘attitudes towards’ but ‘theories’ or ‘branches of 
knowledge’ in their own right, for the discovery and organization of 
reality”. (Moscovici, 1973: xii, quoted in Augoustinos and Walker, 1995: 
136). Representations can be conceived as visual images and cognitive 
structures in the brains of individuals or, when socially shared, as some 
cognitive entity that group members have in common; in both cases, 
representations rely on ever present verbal communication to be 
expressed, exchanged and modified. The premise of this work is that 
propriety of text – a transcribed conversation, a newspaper article - can 
shed light on the structures and dynamics of shared beliefs. My 
assumption is that communication not only embodies depictions of the 
object of attention; it also reveals the process by which these 
representations are generated and exchanged within society. For this 
reason in order to approach representations of GMOs in Italy I will center 
my attention on the communicative structures of representations. I will 
focus on discourses as the activity in which people exchange informal 
opinions, newspapers present a story, or activists and scientists offer their 
perspective on biotechnologies. These are all concrete ways in which 
socio cognitive processes of categorization, attribution, persuasion, 
stereotyping and prejudice are embodied in text and passed on through 
communication. My approach to language holds that communication 
amounts to social action (Austin, 1975). Communication produces effects 
and consequences in the real world.  Discursive expression of socially 
shared knowledge is a rich source for accessing frameworks of the 
interpretation of social reality. First, I will outline a theory of what 
interpersonal communication is and how it works.  
Communication is an overwhelmingly complex object whose analysis 
needs to take into account such complexity, and consciously approach it 
with the appropriate tools; in my view these tools are those developed by 
disciplines which have long reflected upon the communicative process as 
a social activity and on language as meaningful social behavior.  
The theory of Social Representations provides foundational assumptions 
about the ‘thinking society’, as Moscovici calls it, but in order to access 





socio-linguistic tradition and discourse analysis (Jaworski & Coupland, 
1999; Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001). Within Social Psychology, 
Jonathan Potter, Margaret Wetherell and Derek Edwards have used 
discourse analysis for accessing social phenomena (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992, Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This body of 
studies has been called Discursive Psychology.  
‘Discourse’ is here intended as both a specific form of language use and 
as a specific form of social interaction (van Dijk, 1990: 164). Discourses 
are practices that make up our social world; they are the very building 
blocks of ideologies and socially shared epistemologies.  
My approach is much concerned with the actions accomplished by 
participants with their discourses. Even when a discourse seems to only 
“describe” or “represent” something, - i.e. biotechnologies – I shall 
consider it as action. I assume that description is yet another activity 
which is performed through language (Silverstein, 1976) and that it 
generates consequences for how social reality is produced and 
reproduced. I wanted to understand what discourses do while supplying a 
given representation.  
Discourses can be seen as indexes of the holding of a certain point of 
view. Moreover, discourses can reinforce or undermine a certain view of 
the world; they may function to justify a certain state of affairs or, on the 
other hand, contribute good grounds for changing it (van Dijk, 1995). 
Discourses both reveal ideologies and promote them in situated 
communication settings. A concrete example from something trivial as a 
butter package will make clear how everyday discourses can embody 
incompatible perspectives: 
GMOs which have been approved for the United States market are 
considered to be “substantially equivalent” to their non GM counterparts. 
Substantially equivalent means that the concentrations of toxic, anti-
nutritional and allergenic compounds are in the same range in both the 
parent and the genetically modified variety of a crop (Schauzu, 2000). 
According to the official and legally binding discourse of the Food and 
Drug Administration and of the US competent authorities, there is no 




and a non GM breed because in respect to the relevant chemical and 
physical proprieties those kernels are the same. It follows that it would be 
illogical to label foods containing GMOs as different, because they are 
not different from the other ones in respect to set parameters of relevant 
chemical components: GMOs and non GMOs are just the same. 
However, it is the case that to a certain part of U.S. society it matters 
very much if a food is genetically modified or not, and GMOs are 
considered anything but equivalent to their non GM counterpart. In 
Oregon there has even been a referendum over proposed obligatory 
labeling of GM products, while in Mendocino county (CA) some GMOs 
cannot be grown. Non GM products have a market niche that allows 
them to be priced higher then their normal counterparts (i.e. those that do 
not contain GMOs). There is another discursive representation of GMOs 
opposed the officially legislated position based on substantial 
equivalence, and according to this alternative discourse non GM products 
are different and better then their GM counterpart. Because the two are 
not equivalent it becomes important to know if a product is GM or not. 
The “non genetically modified” stamp works as a value-adding feature 
for a given item. This situation leads to some amusing occurrences when 
on the same food packages both discourses - the legally binding one and 
an opposing one - have to find room. Trader Joe’s grade AA salted butter 
for example is made from pasteurized milk of cows who have not been 
treated with rBST, a genetically modified hormone produced by 
Monsanto which is used to increase milk production. On the butter’s box 
we find a large round stamp that states: “Our cows just say noooo, our 
farmer’s guarantee, MILK *from cows not treated with rBST”. The star 
in the text points the reader to the following statement, placed at the right 
bottom of the box: “No significant difference has been shown between 
milk derived from cows treated with artificial hormones and those not 
treated with artificial hormones”. There seems to be a contradiction here. 
If there is no significant difference then what’s the logic of saying 
“noooo”? and why stamp the ‘noooo’ on the butter box? Clearly here the 
two voices, Trader Joe’s and that of legislation, are forced to share the 





legal discourse, and it must find room on the butter package, otherwise 
Trader Joe might be liable to be sued by Monsanto for implicitly alleging 
that Monsanto’s hormone is bad or dangerous. So, back to the point I 
wanted to make, if there were only a single reality, then it should be one 
way or the other: either the Food and Drug administration is right and the 
hormone is fine to use, or it isn’t and the hormone is dangerous. We 
might take a realistic position, assume that reality is unitary and that 
ultimately we will come to know what this hormone really does to cows 
and to those drinking milk from those cows and if it is safe or harmful. 
We may believe that one of the two discourses is right, or we might say 
that we don’t have enough evidence: we can think that we may not know 
for sure today but that one day we will know which of the two is right. 
However, considering the amount of scientific research being done on 
GMOs in the last 25 years and the fact that the controversies around them 
tend to increase rather than decrease, more scientific data are not likely to 
solve the issue any time soon. The safety of the Monsanto hormone 
always leads to considerations of wider breadth. Safety and risk concerns 
are just one aspect of the multi- faceted GMOs issue. There might be 
other, ethical and environmental reasons to say “noooo” to the GM 
hormone which have nothing to do with whether and how rBST hormone 
is harmful for people who drink the milk of cows treated with it. For the 
rBST hormone, and in general for the GMO debate, issues of “truth” and 
“reality” are essential and omnipresent as rhetorical ammunition within 
conflicting discourses, while they are not interesting as hypostatized 
entities. Truth always serves bigger aims. In this case like in so many 
others, we are likely to pick our preferred version of the story. We tend to 
choose the discourse that suits best our beliefs and that serves best our 
view of the world and our view of ourselves. The matter of choosing one 
discourse over another is anything but theoretical; it has enormous 
consequences in the real world as proven by the ongoing dispute which 
opposes the US and Europe before the WTO (Snidico, 2005) and by 
dramatic events like the refusal of genetically modified grains as food aid 




From my perspective, the study of the food biotechnologies debate 
amounts to the study of the way beliefs develop in society and how 
ideologies shape how people make sense of reality. The complex way in 
which actors construct their theories of something like GMOs is multi-
layered, multi-voiced, action oriented and context dependent. The 
process of constructing and exchanging a given representation is 
dialogical. It is dependent on the recipients as much as on the speakers. It 
can be captured in written texts and in the spam of interactional 
microtime.   
However, my task is not explaining and understanding the mechanisms 
of human social interaction, the orderly way in which people construct 
their world and manage to jointly perform their socially shared life. 
Ethnometodology, Conversation Analysis and Linguistic Anthropology 
have been addressing such issues and found order in the daily enactment 
of social life and linguistic communication.  
My aim is to make use of linguistically oriented perspectives to access 
socially shared representations of a given topic, in natural settings and in 
their full social complexity. 
1.3 Aims of the study 
1.3.1 Theoretical 
The theoretical thrust of my study is to argue for a discourse-based 
study of Social Representations. I claim that both the notion of SRs and 
the analysis of discourse are needed at a theoretical level. SRT provides a 
theory for the reason why ideological positions toward the phenomenon 
of food biotechnologies arise. Discourse analysis provides a theory 
explaining the powerful role of text in the development and exchange of 
representations of food biotechnologies. Discourse analysis also offers 
the tools for analyzing text as social action. I am aware of the ongoing 
debate between the two approaches. I dedicate a considerable part of the 





between exponents of Discursive Psychology and Social Representations 
Theory. My work owes much to the epistemology and the research 
methods of Discursive Psychology. Still, I do not share with DP the same 
programmatic constraint which makes it problematic to move from the 
level of situated discourses to the level of wider social projects and 
ideologies. Moscovici’s reflections are a compelling reminder of the 
cognitive role of ideologies: 
In the societies we inhabit today, personal causality is a right-wing 
explanation and situational causality is a left-wing explanation. Social 
psychology cannot ignore the fact that the world is structured and 
organized according to such a division and that this is a permanent one. 
Indeed, each of us is necessarily compelled to adopt one of these two 
kinds of causality together with the view of the other which it entails.  
 
(Moscovici, 1984: 50) 
 
I hold that “socially situated cognitive representations and processes 
[social perception, communication, attribution, attraction, impression 
management, and intergroup contact] at the same time have an important 
discourse dimension”. (van Dijk, 1990). So discourse analysis can be a 
powerful instrument to reveal the underlying contents, structures and 
strategies of SRs. (Ibidem) 
I espouse an action oriented notion of language use, which derives from 
the works of Malinowsky, (Ogden & Richards, 1989) Wittgenstein 
(1952) and Austin (1975). Within social psychology, Billig, (1987; 
1997), Potter, Wetherell (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and Edwards 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992) have taken on the notion of language as social 
action. This work follows this tradition while keeping alive a notion of 
shared representations, or ideologies, as at least theoretically 







As van Dijk puts it: 
In my opinion, no sound theoretical or explanatory framework can be 
set up for any phenomenon dealt with in social psychology without an 
explicit account of socially shared cognitive representations  
(van Dijk, 1990:165). 
1.3.2 Methodological 
At a methodological level, in order to analyze discourse I have 
selected a number of tools that proved useful in the task of describing 
what is being done in a certain piece of text. I make use of a selection of 
the analytical techniques used by van Dijk in his analysis of ideologies in 
discourse (1995; 1998). This includes analytical units that have particular 
relevance in the expression of ideology-driven stance: topic selection, 
polarization, evidential strategies and lexicalization. I use the notion of 
repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, Wetherell & Potter, 1988) for 
describing the recurrent arguments that appear in the data with their 
corollary of rhetorical styles and keywords. I present long stretches of 
talk in which different representations of food biotechnologies are 
offered. I also make use of the concepts used within the broad area of 
linguistic pragmatics (see Levison, 1983), which have been used for the 
study of ideological discourse (Verschueren, 2002). I also make use of 
the notion of positioning (Davies & Harre’, 1990) which has been 
developed within of post structuralist discourse analysis. Overall, I place 
all these instruments within a theoretical notion of communicative 
meaning as action oriented, intrinsically indexical, and co-constructed by 
participants. (Duranti & Goodwin, 1992; Sacks, 1992; Silverstein, 1976) 
1.3.3 Empirical 
At an empirical level, I wish to contribute a description of the 
articulations of discourses over food biotechnologies in Italy. I look at 
text to see how rhetorically these discourses make up scenarios. I sketch 
a picture not only of GMOs but of lay people, corporations, scientists and 





talk from interviews and naturally occurring conversations fit in larger 
sets of organized and polarized systems of beliefs.  The inner logic of 
these pieces of talk will perhaps be found not at the level of cognitive 
coherence but rather at the level of strategic action (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). Still, strategic action, which can be seen at the micro-level of 
interaction, is a window on the peculiar aspects of the food 
biotechnology debate in Italy. While the arguments in the debate have a 
global dimension, and while they can be found substantially unchanged 
in the discourses of activists, corporations and scientists worldwide, I 
will show that in Italy there are local perspectives linked to its specific 
cultural and social context which so far have not been explored. The 
importance of food culture and the role of the Catholic Church play a 
relevant part in the refrain of many discourses in Italy; as the analysis 
will show they merge in interesting ways with more politically obvious 
ideological stances in the discourses of participants and in the media.  
1.4 Ethical issues 
This study required the participation of human subjects. I asked all 
participants for permission to record. This is the case for both data I 
collected during the Paradys study and for data I collected for my 
dissertation. All persons recorded acknowledged and accepted that data 
were going to be used for academic research. In a few cases some of the 
participants did not agree to being recorded. As a consequence, data from 
those interactions amount exclusively to field notes. Where possible the 
identity of speakers is disguised as subjects are identified as “scientist”, 
“citizen” and similar. Anonymity of participants cannot be always 
guaranteed because of the public nature of the field trial and the debates 
that surrounded it, including press articles and media interviews. In the 
case of responsible scientists, inspectors and administrators, participants 
were interviewed in their official persona. Any comment they made off 





I collected part of the data I analyze here during my participation in an 
international research project funded by the European Union (I describe 
the study in chapter 7). Data related to a case of open air experiment with 
GM plants were collected jointly by my colleague Giuseppe Pellegrini 
and me. In the appendix I provide the detailed list specifying who 
collected the data.  In the Italian Paradys report (Collavin & Pellegrini, 
2004) I discuss fragments from the interviews I conducted and from the 
public debate, which are here analyzed in chapter 7. The table of content 
of the Paradys report makes clear that I am the sole author of those 
analyses. My doctorate research originates in my participation in 
Paradys, however this study constitutes my own separate investigation. 
This is an independent piece of research. The analysis of data in this 
work is entirely mine, as mine are reflections over theory and method. I 






2 NOTES ON DATA AND METHOD 
In this chapter I briefly describe the type of data I analyse. I also clarify 
the research logic behind the methods of data collection.  
2.1 Documents and conversations 
This work focuses on the many discourses about food 
biotechnologies circulating in Italy. To achieve this goal, I have drawn on 
different sort of materials. I have collected an archive of documents. 
These include legislation about biotechnologies at the European, Italian 
and local level; policy papers and international agreements on the 
environment. I have also collected a large archive of mass media, both 
national and local: newspaper and magazine articles, food advertisement, 
web sites of corporations and associations, recordings of television 
programs. Furthermore, I recorded public events on biotechnologies: 
conferences organized by committed anti-GMOs activists, public events 
of the “science for the public” kind, in which biologists illustrate 
biotechnologies for a lay audience, and one ESF (European Science 
Foundation) conference in which scientists debated the interface between 
science and society. I also attended street events against GMOs and on 
those occasions interviewed participants and passers-by. My archive 
amounts to roughly a thousand pieces of data. The vast majority of data 
units are media articles. I have ordered this large and heterogeneous 
archive in digital format using the software ATLAS.ti. This is reference 
material and it constitutes both the backdrop and the foundation for the 
micro-level analysis of text.  
A second part of the study involved an ongoing oper-air experiment 
with GMOs in Italy. I have followed a case in which academic 
researchers were growing pesticide-resistant rice in a field in the north 




member of PARADYS, an international research project funded by the 
European Union. I describe the PARADYS study in paragraph 7.1. A 
detailed list of data pertinent to the case is found in the Appendix. I 
identified the key actors –scientists, inspectors, anti GMO activists, 
politicians, seed dealers - and interviewed them. I collected different 
sorts of data related to the case: official papers between decision-makers 
and researchers and media coverage. I also recorded a public debate on 
the ongoing field trial and interviewed citizens of the village where the 
experiment was taking place, both at the time of the debate and one year 
later. I was able to interview citizens with the help of the village mayor, 
who introduced me to his acquaintances and participated in some of the 
resulting conversations. All these data have been digitized, catalogued, 
and the recordings have been transcribed verbatim. Recordings were 
done in natural setting – the street, someone’s kitchen, the village 
council’s room - and the interviews are unstructured. I let subjects talk 
freely, providing feedback mostly in the form of monosyllabic 
backchanneling and nodding, introducing a new argument only when the 
conversation started to languish (See Briggs, 1986). As a result the 
interviewees not only provided characterizations of GMOs, they 
invariably broadened the perspective: they talked about third-world 
hunger, science education, Italy’s superior food culture and traditions, 
environmental pollution, the bad influence of the United States on the 
rest of the world, rights of citizens, obesity and much more. Left free to 
develop an argument in the direction they wanted, interviewees 
introduced a surprising number of issues as related to GMOs in their 
thought. The interviews with citizens were conducted in groups and 
quickly turned into “conversations”, with turns interactively distributed 
in a spontaneous way (Sacks, Scegloff & Jefferson, 1974) and little 
spoken intervention on my part. Similarly in the public debate 
participants negotiated topics and turns independently of the interest of 
the researchers. Speakers expressed themselves as they deemed 
appropriate for the public situation, fully aware that they were being 
recorded. These data required a broadening of the spectrum of many 





arguments provided a much richer picture than that most social research 
on biotechnologies assumes. Invariably, talk about risk and ‘nature’ soon 
gave way to much wider discussions about the rights of citizens and the 
role in world government of multinational corporations. In order not to 
operate a reduction of this multiplicity, I have chosen not to isolate and 
classify arguments and positions as units. While the notion of repertoire 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987) is used in this work, I do not isolate a number 
of recurring repertoires which all converge on a certain representation of 
food biotechnologies, as research in Discursive Psychology might 
proceed. Rather, I have decided to present a limited number of texts 
trying to keep intact their argumentative structure to expose the inner 
logic of the text as it is woven by participants. This choice is a function 
of data I have selected. The authors of these texts do not share the same 
stakes in the matter of food biotechnologies, and they often propose 
conflicting representations. Scientists, lay people and anti-GMO activists 
largely disagree on food biotechnologies. Reading transcripts, one can 
see how conflict is enacted, and how different representations of GMOs 
play against each other.  
2.2 Eclectic data 
In addition to verbal interactions like conversations and interviews, I also 
make use of written texts. I am aware that the eclectic nature of the data I 
discuss might produce some perplexity. The different types of linguistic 
productions I consider belong to disparate genres: they differ in the kind 
of actor that produces them: some are individuals while others are 
institutions. They differ in their functions: some are legally binding 
provisions, some are informal chatting. They also differ in the context of 
their production and in scope. What they have in common is that they all 
‘tell a story’ about food GMOs even if they do so in very different 
contexts. I do not try to comparing those data, nor to assess how they 
impact society’s views of GMOs. Rather, I treat all of them as instances 




which a certain version is offered is of great significance. Comments 
made by a minister on prime-time television are likely to have more 
consequence than those made by lay people in their living rooms. 
However, the comments made on and off the record by scientists, 
activists and lay people are as interesting for understanding the 
phenomenon as publicly voiced opinions on the matter. My concern is 
not statistical: this work does not aim to establish which socio-
demographic sector of Italians would agree with any of the many stories 
about GMOs that we find in the data. Some stake-bound recurrent 
arguments do appear. The Italian web sites of the developers of food 
biotechnologies and those of Italian green associations propound 
consistently conflicting views of GMOs. The Italian web sites of 
Monsanto, Syngenta and Novartis offer a view of GMOs which 
associates them with safety, progress, improvement of agricultural 
practices, protection of the environment and economic growth for 
farmers around the world. By contrast, a survey of Italian Greenpeace 
and V.A.S. (Verdi Ambiente e società) web sites offers a different and 
equally coherent account of GMOs: they are dangerous for humans and 
for the environment, likely to produce irreversible disasters of worldwide 
scale. According to these web sites GMOs have proven to produce 
allergic reactions, reduce biodiversity and have made farmers poorer all 
over the world. GMOs are the product of corporations’ search for profit. 
They enrich few while they damage everybody else in the name of a 
distorted view of progress. These discourses appeal to a clear set of 
homogeneous values. We have a “corporate” and a “green activist” 
account of food biotechnologies. There is little need for a detailed 
academic study in order to describe them: they are neat, predictable and 
readily available. More interestingly, these engaged, neatly antagonistic 
official versions of the story are not the only ones on the scene. In fact, 
their staged and official nature makes them less important for accessing 
the process of argument construction. We may consider the stereotyped 
descriptions of GMOs available on official web sites as pieces in a 
museum or an armory, the reservoir of crystallized argumentative 





GMOs. Every time GMOs are topic of conversation, participants rely on 
their beliefs and attitudes to make claims. They use arguments taken 
from different sources to make their points. The official versions of 
industries and the official versions of green activists offer strains of 
arguments that are chosen and creatively deployed in the course of a 
conversation to further ones point. I am concerned with the set of 
arguments used to support one particular version and with how those 
arguments are used during interaction. My starting assumption is that 
language is used to construct a version of the social world; all these 
discourses are versions, accounts of what GMOs are and largely they 
give arguments for what one should think about them. My research 
question focuses on the different accounts I have found in the data also as 
a window on a wider sets of values and beliefs that are called upon by 
different actors in order to sustain those versions. For this reason, a 
newspaper article read by thousands is as interesting as a chat with a 
village citizen that has just found out about experiments with GM rice in 
the neighborhood.  
The tools for the analysis I use are fit for both written and spoken 
language. The questions I pose to the data can be fruitfully asked to any 
piece of language-dependent communication. What all these texts have in 
common is that they all represent food biotechnologies. The theoretical 
and methodological grounds for treating such disparate pieces of text lie 
in the standpoint that sees language as a social phenomenon and verbal 
communication as a specific kind of social action.  
2.3 Data: The Bubbio declaration 
Bubbio is a village in the north west of Italy. Bubbio’s council was 
the first to issue an official declaration against GMOs and thus became 
the first of the many comuni antitransgenici (anti-transgenic councils) in 
Italy. I analyze the declaration because this official document from a 
local authority embodies several of the key arguments against GMOs 




2.4 The Catholic Church 
Because of the role the Catholic Church plays in politics and public 
opinion in Italy I deemed it essential to look into Vatican positions with 
respect to food biotechnologies and reactions to them in the media. I 
analyze four texts related to the Church’s position. The four texts were 
selected from my database of several hundred documents relevant to 
GMOs in Italy. 
2.5 A field trial 
I analyze fragments of the transcripts of a public encounter, a 
fragment from an interview with a scientist and from multi party 
conversations. The data all relate to one experiment in which transgenic 
rice was cultivated in a field near an Italian village. The voices of 
participants offer different perspectives played against each other, often 






3 A REVIEW OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES ON 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES IN EUROPE. 
Scholars in the social sciences have been interested in biotechnologies 
since their first appearing in the public arena. With the exception of the 
U.K., in Europe media coverage on any aspect of biotechnologies was 
rare until the 1990s (Gutteling & Others, 2002:102).  However, by 1996 
biotechnologies had begun to spark world-wide controversy and 
occupied a prominent place in European media, including  in Italy 
(Lassen & others, 2002: 305). By that time social scientists were already 
looking at how society was dealing with the challenges of 
biotechnologies (Bauer, Gaskell & Durant, 1994). First looks at the 
specific Italian situation came a little later (Allansdottir, Pammolli & 
Bagnara, 1998). Today there are countless studies and publications in the 
area of public policy, sociology, media studies and social psychology 
which center on biotechnologies. The academic journal “New Genetics 
and society” is entirely dedicated to the topic seen from the perspective 
of the social sciences. Academic studies are joined by a number of policy 
experiments - the Danish Consensus Conference on biotechnologies of 
1999 and the Dutch ‘mock trial’ of 2000, for example - and by large scale 
public consultations like the one carried out in 2003 in the U.K. under the 
catchy name “GM Nation?”. Consultations and mock trials look into 
public attitudes to identify key issues and develop ‘good practices’ for 
the resolution of techno-scientific conflicts. Such institutional efforts are 
inspired by the recognition that biotechnologies pose the question of how 
to govern techno-scientific advancements in democratic ways. Usually 
consultations are a first step.  They set out to monitor public opinions, to 
explore participative strategies for solving policy conflicts, and to 
improve decisions. Studies of social aspects of biotechnologies focus on 




science ethics, trust in institutions and governance of techno-scientific 
advancements (see Wynne, 1995, Edwards, 2002; Bucchi & Neresini, 
2004). 
3.1 “Biotechnology and the European 
Public” 
In Europe, the most exhaustive social psychological empirical 
research on public perceptions of biotechnologies was carried out under 
the umbrella of a four year multinational and multidisciplinary study. 
‘Biotechnology and the European public’ was funded by the European 
Union, by various European national institutions and by Canada. It has 
produced two collective books (Durant, Bauer & Gaskell, 1998 and 
Bauer & Gaskell, 2002a) and numerous other academic publications. 
Eighteen nations were involved in the study. The project monitored and 
interpreted the reception of modern biotechnology in Europe, with some 
comparative studies conducted in Canada and the USA. Given the broad 
scope and importance of the research for this thesis I shall sketch its basic 
features and main results. The project offers a wide longitudinal study 
which involved dozens of researchers who studied their national situation 
and collected comparable data for four years within the unifying frame 
designed by John Durant, Martin Bauer and George Gaskell. The study is 
based on a model of the reception of new technologies based on the 
interaction between two main forces. On the one hand there is an active 
party, which is involved in the production and diffusion of the 
technology or actively committed against it. This is what authors call the 
“biotechnology movement”. On the other hand there is the social stage 
where claims and pressures of both parties are played out for the public. 
The social arena is the arena where the actions of producers and critics of 
biotechnology come into play, with resulting  echoes and reverberations. 
The “biotechnology movement” struggles to convert a particular 
representation of the phenomenon into society’s “received view”. 





main protagonists of the biotechnology movement. Instead, the actors 
and the specific features of the various discourses proposed by the 
biotechnology movement are largely presupposed as forces which 
originate a chain of reactions, or, as the authors put it, “hurdle” 
consequent to the diffusion of biotechnology. The study focuses instead 
on the results in the public sphere of the actions and discourses of these 
active parties . 
3.2 The public sphere  
The study has a three-part architecture covering public policy, media 
coverage and public perception. The complex interaction between these 
three areas defines the public sphere of biotechnology (Bauer & Gaskell, 
2002a: 5). Accordingly, studies looked at biotechnologies within the 
three distinct areas. First, Torgersen and colleagues (Torgersen & Others, 
2002) report a diachronic study of the developing debate and legislation 
covering biotechnologies in the EU, from health and safety regulations to 
food labeling measures and laws on artificial reproduction.  
Secondly, researchers in each participant country conducted a 
longitudinal analysis of biotechnologies in the media in Europe between 
1973 and 1996. In the Italian case, researchers analyzed 340 articles 
related to biotechnologies in the daily newspaper “Il Corriere della sera” 
to assess how biotechnologies were covered in the media (Gutteling & 
Others, 2002). 
Lastly, a third group of studies targeted public opinion via large scale 
surveys. Researchers from all participant countries carried out a survey 
on a representative sample of the European population. Eurobarometer 
46.1 was conducted in October and November 1996 to measure public 
perceptions of biotechnologies. The Eurobarometer, an official and  
comprehensive periodic survey of the EU, periodically polls 
representative samples of the European population over age 15. The 
survey conducted in October 2005 polled 25000 Europeans. The 




1991. Since 1996 it has incorporated many of the questions posed by the 
researchers within the ‘Biotechnology and the European public’ study. 
The surveys provide longitudinal and data about public opinion on 
biotechnologies across Europe.  
One of the recurring questions in the debate over biotechnologies is if 
and how textbook knowledge about biotechnologies affects attitudes. As 
is widely quoted, only 41% of polled Europeans in 2005 responded 
correctly to the statement “ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while 
genetically modified ones do” (in 1996 they were 35%). (Eurobarometer 
64.3)  This datum has given grounds for linking lack of support with lack 
of scientific literacy. However, one finding from the extensive poll is that 
people more informed about biotechnology are not necessarily more 
favorable to them. (Midden & others, 2002). Researchers wanting to 
measure the correlation between attitude and textbook knowledge made a 
distinction between two types of knowledge that they called ‘objective’ 
and ‘subjective’. The assumption of the study is that the two ‘types’ of 
knowledge can be distinguished on the basis of the likelihood that they 
can influence distorted views of biotechnologies. According to the 
researchers, for instance the belief that normal tomatoes don’t have genes 
or that GM animals are always bigger then their non GM counterpart are 
especially likely to foster “inaccurate images of biotechnology” (Midden 
& others, 2002: 218). On the contrary, not knowing that some bacteria 
can live off waste waters is less likely to produce inaccurate images of 
biotechnologies. The criterion for the discrimination of the two types of 
knowledge is perhaps not entirely convincing, and the two types of 
knowledge are highly correlated. However, the most important finding of 
the study is that scores measuring knowledge, whether classified as 
‘objective or ‘subjective’, are not correlated with the general attitude of 
the population, defined as ‘optimism’ or ‘pessimism’ (Midden & Others, 
2002: 219). These general results, obviously with some internal 
variations, hold true for all the 15 European countries polled in 1996. The 
important datum is that there is no positive correlation between textbook 
knowledge and optimistic attitudes toward biotechnologies. The study 





degree of knowledge, a finding confirmed by later studies in the Italian 
context (Bucchi & Neresini, 2004).   
Given the common topic, the relevance of these studies for my work is 
apparent. However, while the results of the Eurobarometer surveys are 
now basic to any further work on biotechnologies, my investigation takes 
a different perspective, in both scope and method. First, my study focuses 
on one application of biotechnologies: genetically modified foods. 
Studies have shown that respondents clearly distinguish between medical 
and agricultural applications of biotechnologies, and that they are largely 
more supportive of the former over the latter. While the studies included 
in Bauer & Gaskell (2002a) make  the distinction clear, they focus on 
general attitudes and images rather than specific representations of food 
biotechnologies. More important, I adopt a qualitative approach to 
representations of food biotechnologies. I use the analysis of discourse. 
Studies conducted under the ‘Biotechnologies and the European public’ 
umbrella are mostly based on the statistical analysis of responses from 
representative samplings of population. Focus groups have been used to 
isolate the appropriate questions to use in the surveys. By contrast, my 
data do not come from a representative sampling of the Italian population 
or of Italian media. Rather, my data are a “narrow but deep” cross session 
of mass media and conversations on food biotechnologies. Finally, my 
analysis looks at the detailed linguistic realizations of the representations 
within the specific contexts of their production in different social 
situations in Italy. The “Biotechnologies and the European Public” 
studies are comparative and longitudinal in scope.  They thus allow us to 
see differences and similarities across countries and across time. I take 
their results as backdrop to my own look at a specific environment and 
topic over a limited time window.  
3.3 Symbolic coping 
Wolfgang Wagner (1998), and later Wagner, Kronberger, and Seifert 




general public receives a new technology: the theory of symbolic coping 
with new technology. Following SRT, authors hold that everyday people 
achieve a common-sense understanding of out-of-reach or “experience 
distant” phenomena like biotechnologies. One of the main propositions 
of the theory is that when the public first comes into contact with a new 
technology, it is heavily dependent on the media, which may present the 
main features of the technology in a sensational or distorted way. As a 
consequence for a period of time such a distorted representation is the 
only information available about the given topic to the public; it may thus 
achieve the status of ‘knowledge’. The theory of symbolic coping holds 
that the reception of a new technology is a process with various phases. 
There is a “zero” time, in which people are completely unaware of the 
new technology, and ultimately a ‘normalizing’ phase in which lay public 
has come to grasp at least some of the features of the new technology. In 
between lies a phase of “symbolic coping” characterized by the fact that 
‘image-beliefs’-- for example, that GMOs are monstrous or contagious -- 
have an explanatory role in people’s understandings, reflected in their 
responses to questionnaires, for example.  The theory has been developed 
to explain the reception of biotechnologies in Europe, specifically in 
Austria and Greece, with data coming from the Eurobarometer surveys of 
1996 and 1999.  
The theory of symbolic coping shares assumptions with the theory of 
SRs, but it restricts its scope to new and controversial technological 
innovations (Wagner, Kronberger & Seifert, 2002: 341). In particular, it 
assumes a fundamental distinction between everyday thinking and 
scientific reasoning. The theory of symbolic coping “makes a case in 
favor of everyday imaginations as being functionally equivalent to 
scientifically informed knowledge” (Wagner, Kronberger & Seifert, 
2002: 341). The study on the reception of biotechnologies in Austria and 
Greece shows that the level of self-ascribed ignorance, measured as the 
number of “I don’t know” answers in survey replies, tends to decrease 
even when subjects have taken on image-beliefs rather then correct 





image-beliefs are functionally equivalent to scientifically informed 
knowledge (Wagner, Kronberger & Seifert, 2002: 341). 
The notion of symbolic coping is powerful to explain responses in the 
‘symbolic coping phase’ when people have recently come across the 
some new phenomenon, but it is less useful to explain later phases in the 
process. Respondents in my study proved to have an articulated vision of 
food biotechnologies. Respondents had a view of the features of the 
technology, of the main actors involved, of their development, and also 
of its large-scale consequences. Participants had not just a single image 
or metaphor to offer, but rather they proposed an interconnected set of 
related arguments and descriptions which showed their understanding of 
biotechnologies and the overall scenario in which they placed them.  
3.4 Images of genes and nature in Europe 
Wagner & others (2002) studied the different images of 
biotechnologies across Europe using the framework of Social 
Representations Theory. The authors posed questions about 
biotechnologies that roughly oriented respondents to produce what 
authors call “content” VS “evaluative” kind of replies, and they 
organized the replies to identify “discourses” – understood as repertoires 
of arguments - which recurred in the data. Their results suggest that when 
respondents associated biotechnologies with scientific research, their 
attitudes tended to be more optimistic – they related biotechnologies to 
“progress” (Wagner & Others, 2002: 251). By contrast, when 
biotechnologies were conceived as manipulation/alteration a dichotomy 
evoked between ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’, with the former negatively 
evaluated (ibidem). The evaluation of biotechnologies ranges from 
optimism to ambivalence to rejection. Optimism is based on the hope that 
biotechnologies will bring improvement of life quality. Rejection is 
based on perceived risks or on what the authors call “ideological” reasons 
(Wagner & Others, 2002: 254).The ideological position “judges 




assumptions about the nature of humans and their relationship with their 
environment” (ibidem). Under this category the authors included 
discourses of “interfering with nature”. Respondents used allegories of 
the Sorcerer’s Apprentice and of scientists who wanted to play God 
(ibidem). GM food in particular was described as artificial, unnatural and 
somehow polluted. While in each country respondents used local images, 
GM foods were coherently described as monstrous, and always bigger 
then their ordinary counterparts. Overall, the contrast between natural 
and unnatural plays a very important part in the discourses over 
biotechnologies and “the distinction between natural and unnatural is 
made synonymous with the distinction between the good and the bad” 
(Wagner & Others, 2002: 272). The results of this work are confirmed in 
my study, while the closer perspective I take shows the specific character 
of Italian discourses over food biotechnologies. Further, my own 
conception of “ideology” goes beyond general thoughts about nature and 
assumes a more power-related, political dimension linked to governance, 
corporate responsibility and social justice. As will be clear, discourses of 
justice, profit and democracy, which do not figure in Bauer & Gaskell’s 
(2002a) collective book, are prominent in the Italian data I have 
investigated. 
3.5 Summary 
Although there have been extensive longitudinal studies on public 
perceptions of biotechnologies in EU countries, they are largely survey-
based and broadly comparative. They offer a “bird’s eye” picture of 
similarities and differences between countries and across time. The 
results of the ‘Biotechnology and the public’ research are a starting point 
for more detailed research in smaller contexts, including the present 
study. Small scale studies have been carried out on social representations 
of genetically modified animals in Italy, using the framework of Social 
Representations Theory, based on focus groups and an association task 





novel foods, including GMOs, in Finland (Bäckström, A., Pirttilä-
Backman, A.M.& Tuorila, H., 2003). However, this is the first discourse-






4 LEGISLATION ON FOOD 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES. 
Controversy surrounding food biotechnologies is of global scale and 
represents a challenge for democratic institutions in much the same way 
as nuclear power. Food biotechnologies have become a platform for 
reconsidering the principles inspiring European governance in the light of 
a serious crisis of trust in political institutions, and they have played an 
important part in a policy shift in the European Union. (Abels, 2002) 
Before moving to the discussion of how in Italy people and mass media 
talk about biotechnologies, I provide a broad background about the 
international and national legislative framework. In the media and in 
informal discussions I found themes which resound with the 
preoccupations of legislators at international and national level. A 
description of the main concepts and of the principles incorporated in the 
law will provide an anchor to the multiform discourses I analyze. 
Legislation is the institutional response to the often opposing pressures of 
economy and society. Its regulatory power imposes an official, ratified 
discourse of biotechnologies. Such discourse infiltrates other domains 
and offers an influential perspective which is picked up and re echoed in 
other, informal domains. Law is the institutional expression of positions, 
features of which we find voiced also elsewhere. Legislation offers a 
specific representation of the GMO phenomenon.  
In legislation GMOs are routinely characterized as dangerous for the 
environment and for human health. For this reason, laws and 
international conventions are especially preoccupied with assessing and 
the managing risks connected with biotechnologies. The potential threat 
posed to health and the environment by technological advancements is a 
central object lesson for more general reflection on the theory and 
practice of democratic governance. Legislation in Italy clearly tries to 






4.1 International agreements and European 
legislation 
Laws about food biotechnologies govern research and commercial 
uses of GMOs.  I shall not discuss norms that specify safety measures for 
laboratory experiments with GM organisms and micro-organisms. I will 
instead illustrate in some detail institutional texts and laws that focus on 
the three following areas: field trials, commercialization of GM 
foodstuff, and commercial farming. 
4.2 Field trials:  
Field trials are scientific experiments in which genetically modified 
plants are farmed for purpose of study. In EU legislation these open air 
experiments are called “deliberate releases”. The risk normally associated 
with deliberate releases is that farmed GM plants might breed with 
sexually compatible conventional local varieties, thus spreading the 
inserted genetic trait or otherwise negatively affecting the local 
environment. Field trials are usually very small, to reduce their impact in 
contrast to that of cultivated commercial crops.  A number of safety 
measures are prescribed to limit interactions between GM crops and the 
rest of the environment. Experiments are authorized by competent EU 
and Member State authorities. Plants being farmed for scientific purposes 
have undergone previous laboratory studies and have been assessed to be 





4.3 Commercialization of GM food and feed:  
Commercialization implies admitting some GM and GM derived 
products into food sold in the country in question. Final products (like 
candy bars, soft drinks or tortilla chips) or GM ingredients (like flour and 
starches) and animal feed can be imported and used in the food 
production chain. In Italy for example certain imported GMOs can 
legally be present in food and feed if they are labeled according to law. 
4.4 Commercial farming:  
Commercial farming clearly requires that authorized GM varieties 
can be grown in the country and enter the food chain. It is never the case 
that laws permit the cultivation of a given variety but not its 
commercialization. In Italy no GM varieties can be farmed. 
4.5 A legal definition of GMOs 
The EU 2001/18 Directive provides basic legal descriptions of 
genetically modified organisms, descriptions which have been integrated 
into Italian legislation: 
For the purposes of this Directive: “organism” means any biological 
entity capable of replication or of transferring genetic material; 
“genetically modified organism (GMO)” means an organism, with the 
exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been 
altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural 
recombination; 






Italian laws on GMOs depend on EU Directives and Regulations. In turn, 
EU legislation is informed by the provisions of international agreements 
and by the overall policy that inspires governance in the Union. As a 
result, Italian institutional provisions can only be understood in the 
context of wider legislation. In this chapter I describe some relevant 
international agreements and Italian laws about GMOs, focusing on the 
fundamental assumptions behind regulation of food biotechnologies. 
Before I commence this lengthy and possibly boring description, I want 
to clarify its function in the context of a work on discourses over food 
biotechnologies. By providing the reader with information about the 
current legislation on biotechnologies in Italy and Europe,I wish to make 
clear the tension between European and Italian approaches to food 
biotechnologies. I offer a glimpse of the constitutive character that 
legislation has in the context of food biotechnologies. Legislation and 
agreements are one particular discourse on GMOs; they are inspired by 
influential ideologies and offer a normative, legally binding 
representation of GMOs. Besides, the law not only characterizes GMOs 
but also qualifies and assigns roles to various figures. In particular, 
legislation specifies how the public should be made aware of 
biotechnologies, and how it should participate in decisions that could 
have long term effects on health and the environment. The provisions of 
the law to provide public participation are of special interest for my 
discussion in the following chapters. An ethnographic study of a field 
trial in Italy illustrates how legal requirements of public participation are 
put into practice in the Italian context and shows how, in the concrete 
case of one field trial, the discourses of science, the law, and of local 
citizens clash. We here confront intertextuality and heteroglossia: 
arguments from different domains collide, merge, and ultimately cross 
fertilize within communicative settings. The legal discourse, developed at 
the international, European and Italian levels, has its own logic, its own 
core values, and it is expressed in a specific and often esoteric jargon. It 
has its own repertoire of words and expressions and a very limited 
circulation in society in its original form; in other words, it has its own 




and concepts, like for example the ‘precautionary principle’, are born and 
developed in influential international settings by experts of science and 
of public governance. However, fragments, splinters of such discourse 
penetrate wider circles in society and over time become common 
currency. They are known in wider areas of society and become part of 
the arsenal of words, and consequential of concepts, used to manipulate 
the GMO issue. Fragments of this legalese might then be chewed up and 
reused in different ways for the purpose of a conversation, to make an 
argument, to prove a point. One can see, in the speech of the citizens of a 
little Italian village, and in newspaper articles, the shadow of legal and 
otherwise authoritative discourses, but retailored and reconstructed for 
the purposes of the communicative action at hand. Legal provisions 
governing GMOs are important also because they show how 
representations of food biotechnologies are related to the issue of 
citizens’ rights.  
4.6 The White Paper on European 
Governance 
The White Paper (in Italian Libro bianco) is a programmatic 
document issued by the Commission in 2001; it addresses a crisis in 
European governance and suggests the principles for its improvement. 
The paper contains a set of recommendations on how to enhance 
democracy in Europe and to increase the legitimacy of political 
institutions. The paper starts with an assessment of the relationship 
between citizens and European Institutions in the Union and sets out 
reasons why European governance needs to be reformed. It says, plainly, 
that “people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply 
not interested in them”. (White paper on European Governance: 3). 
Disaffection and lack of involvement on the part of citizens have multiple 
reasons, among them “a perceived inability of the Union to act 
effectively where a clear case exists”, as for example with “food safety 





this programmatic document. The BSE (so called “mad cow disease”) 
crisis was at its peak in that period, and it is then that food 
biotechnologies came to be considered an integral part of the “food 
scares” (Charles, 2001). 
The White Paper sets out five principles of good governance for EU, 
national, and local institutions: 
 
Openness. The Institutions should work in a more open manner. 
(Omissis) They should use language that is accessible and 
understandable for the general public. (Omissis) 
Participation. The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies 
depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain – 
from conception to implementation. Improved participation is likely to 
create more confidence in the end result and in the Institutions which 
deliver policies. Participation crucially depends on central governments 
following an inclusive approach when developing and implementing 
EU policies. 
Accountability. Roles in the legislative and executive processes need to 
be clearer. (Omissis) 
Effectiveness. Policies must be effective and timely, (Omissis). 
Effectiveness also depends on implementing EU policies in a 
proportionate manner and on taking decisions at the most appropriate 
level. 
Coherence. Policies and action must be coherent and easily understood. 
(Omissis) 
(White paper on European Governance: 10) 
 
These principles are proposed for all European institutions to inform the 
way governance is carried out in the whole Union. Not only EU 
institutions, but also central governments are called upon. The accent is 
on participation and transparency which are assumed to inspire trust in 




involvement and participation generate better governance and increase 
support for institutions, the latter a proposition which has been 
questioned in political studies (Abels, 2002).  
4.7 Biotechnologies as progress 
European legislation on biotechnologies faces a challenge: putting 
into practice principles of inclusion and participation in government, 
while coping with fast paced, competitive technological development 
which has both great risks and great potential. The Lisbon strategy2  that 
the EU follows adopts as a premise that long term positive effects will 
derive from the developments in the life sciences--effects beneficial for 
the economy, the environment and for society in general. In a 2001 
Communication from the Commission this is clearly expressed: 
 
Many commentators believe that life sciences and biotechnology 
following Information Technology, will be the basis for the next wave 
of knowledge-based economies with huge potential for improving the 
quality of life through the creation of highly skilled jobs, improved 
competitiveness and economic growth in Europe, better healthcare and 
new tools to address the different challenges such as protection of the 
environment. 
( Towards a Strategic Vision of Life Sciences and Biotechnology: 5) 
 
and also: 
Life sciences and biotechnology have entered a stage of exponential 
growth, opening up a vast potential to move economies in Europe and 
globally towards more sustainable development and improved quality of 
life. They are therefore of strategic importance in Europe's quest to 
                                                 
2 Action and development plan for the EU set out in March 2000 by the 





become a leading knowledge-based economy. Europe cannot afford to 
miss the opportunity that these new sciences and technologies offer.  
(Towards a Strategic Vision of Life and Biotechnology: 3) 
Legislation on biotechnologies is the result of negotiations between 
different agendas and principles. As will become clearer in the rest of the 
chapter, the EU has incorporated novel foods coming from GM 
technology into its legislation and is cautiously regulating the 
commercialization and farming of genetically modified crops. Italian 
institutions on the other hand are resisting the diffusion of food 
biotechnologies even when this clashes with European policies and legal 
provisions.  
4.8 The Precautionary Principle and the 
rights of the public 
Biotechnologies are universally considered to be potentially 
dangerous, and the EU has adopted the so called “precautionary 
principle” for handling them. The principle was first enunciated in the 
context of international agreements on environmental development. 
4.8.1 The Rio de Janeiro Declaration 
The “precautionary principle” originates in the 15th principle of the 
Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted in 
1992, which states that: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.  




In the context of the international agreement the “precautionary 
approach” is an appeal to policy makers to make wise use of resources 
for preventing environmental damage. Because technological 
developments always imply uncertainties and lack of knowledge, such 
unavoidable lack of knowledge should not be used as an excuse to take 
risks that can be prevented with cost-effective measures. In the Italian 
legislation, reference is made to the principle in several instances. (See 
the paragraphs below) Appeals to the principle are common currency in 
discussions on food biotechnologies. The precautionary principle is a 
rhetorical tool, usually invoked to argue for a ban or moratorium on 
GMOs (see Amato Decree, 2000). 
4.8.2 The Cartagena Protocol 
The Caratgena Protocol on Biosafety, another international 
agreement negotiated in Cartagena the 29th of January 2000, has been so 
far ratified by 125 countries and inspires EU legislation on 
biotechnologies. The Protocol refers to the 15th principle of the Rio 
Convention: 
 
Article 1. Objective 
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective 
of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of 
protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may 
have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and 
specifically focusing on trans-boundary movements.  
 
The Cartagena Protocol is also concerned with the role of the public in 
the context of biosafety and calls for an increase in public awareness, 
knowledge, and participation. This aspect as well has inspired EU 






Article 23. Public Awareness and Participation 
The Parties shall:(a) Promote and facilitate public awareness, education 
and participation concerning the safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms in relation to the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health. In 
doing so, the Parties shall cooperate, as appropriate, with other States 
and international bodies; (b) Endeavour to ensure that public awareness 
and education encompass access to information on living modified 
organisms identified in accordance with this Protocol that may be 
imported.  
2. The Parties shall, in accordance with their respective laws and 
regulations, consult the public in the decision-making process regarding 
living modified organisms and shall make the results of such decisions 
available to the public, while respecting confidential information in 
accordance with Article 21. 
 
4.8.3 The Aarhus Convention 
Another international document important for understanding the 
discourse of International legislation on food biotechnologies and in turn 
Italian legislation and practice is the 1998 “Aarhus convention on access 
to information, public participation and access to justice in environmental 
matters”. The Convention recognizes “the concern of the public about the 
deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environment 
and the need for increased transparency and greater public participation 
in decision-making in this field” (Aarhus convention on access to 
information, public participation and access to justice in environmental 
matters 1998.) 
The Objective of the Convention is set as follows: “In order to contribute 
to the protection of the right of every person of present and future 
generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and 
well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, 




environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention”.(Art.1) 
The Convention recognizes that “to be able to assert this right and 
observe this duty, citizens must have access to information, be entitled to 
participate in decision-making and have access to justice in 
environmental matters”. Like the white paper on European Governance, 
the Convention is concerned with the level of participation of citizens in 
decisions concerning the environment and recognizes that “improved 
access to information and public participation in decision-making 
enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions, contribute to 
public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity 
to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account 
of such concerns”. The convention recognizes the “desirability of 
transparency” and the need to make the public aware of environmentally 
related issues.  Finally, article 3 sets the provisions of the Convention 
that asks all parties to provide practical access to information to the 
public in seeking justice in environmental matters.  
 
4.9 The White paper on food safety 
This programmatic document was issued by the Commission on 
January 12 2000; it calls for  improved legislation about food in the 
Union, and it is largely concerned with food biotechnologies. The 
introduction states that  
The European Union's food policy must be built around high food safety 
standards, which serve to protect, and promote, the health of the 
consumer. The production and consumption of food is central to any 
society, and has economic, social and, in many cases, environmental 
consequences 





The focus is not only on health issues but also on the social and 
environmental implications of food production and consumption.  
The white paper on food safety proposes 84 actions for the improvement 
of food quality and consumer confidence in food. One of the fundamental 
provisions of the document is to institute a European Food Authority, an 
organism super partes, with legal existence and personality separate from 
the current EU institutions, modeled after of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, whose job is to carry out independent risk assessment 
and risk communication to citizens, “so as to maximize its impact on 
consumer health protection and confidence building” (Article 39). The 
Paper puts the accent on the independence of the newly devised authority 
stating that  
If consumer confidence is to be regained, the Authority will need not 
only to act independently of outside pressure, but to be accepted as 
doing so by all parties concerned  
(Art.41, Independence).  
The document presupposes an apparently critical situation, in which 
confidence has to be regained.  
Article 6 of the document calls for legislative action to assess, authorize, 
and label GMOs and their derivates in food and feed.  Art. 50 asks for 
more transparency in the procedure for authorizing the introduction of 
GMOs into the market and a revision of EU regulations already in place. 
Article 76 focuses on novel food and states that “The Community 
provisions governing novel food have to be tightened and streamlined” 
(Art.76). The article sets the requirement for a new EU Directive on new 
food regulation and labeling. The white paper requests that additives 
containing or deriving from GMOs be regulated. In accord with the 
general policy of the EU, emphasis is put on the need for information to 
the consumer:  
“consumers have the right to expect information on food quality and 
constituents that is helpful and clearly presented, so that informed 





The European Food Authority was established in 2004. The requirements 
set by the Commission in 2000 have been fulfilled by EU legislation: 
Directive 2001/19 and Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003. These two 
pieces of legislation are discussed in what follows. 
4.10 Legislation on field trials and commercial 
use of food biotechnologies.  
4.10.1 Directive 2001/18 
Current laws in the EU use national legislation to implement the EU 
parliament Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the 
environment of genetically modified organisms. The Directive repeals all 
the previous laws on the subject:  Reg. (CE) 257/97, Reg. (CE) 1139/98, 
Reg. (CE) 49/2000, Reg. (CE) 50/2000 and the EU Directive 90/220. The 
directive clearly follows in the steps of the two white papers issued by 
the Commission and endorses the principles enunciated by the 
international agreements reviewed above. In particular, the precautionary 
principle is recalled: (8) The precautionary principle has been taken into 
account in the drafting of this Directive and must be taken into account 
when implementing it. 
The term “Public” appears 43 times in the document, mostly in the 
context of providing for information and public consultation at several 
steps in the procedure that would bring GMOs into the environment and 
the food chain, from the crafting of legislation to case-by-case decision 
making.  
(10) For a comprehensive and transparent legislative framework, it is 
necessary to ensure that the public is consulted by either the 
Commission or the Member States during the preparation of measures 
and that they are informed of the measures taken during the 





Article 9 of the directive sets requirements for public consultation on the 
subject of deliberate release of GMOs. This aspect of the law is 
significant for issues of citizens’ rights in the context of experiments that 
imply the farming of genetically modified crops.  
 
Article 9 
Consultation of and information to the public 1. Member States 
shall,(omissis) consult the public and, where appropriate, groups on the 
proposed deliberate release. In doing so, Member States shall lay down 
arrangements for this consultation, including a reasonable time-period, 
in order to give the public or groups the opportunity to express an 
opinion. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 25: . Member States 
shall make available to the public information on all part B releases of 
GMOs in their territory; . the Commission shall make available to the 
public the information contained in the system of exchange of 
information pursuant to Article 11 
 
Following the Directive, (art. 24, “Information to the public” and art. 31, 
“Exchange of information and reporting”) information on all ongoing and 
planned deliberate releases, the list of authorized GMOs, assessment 
reports and links to the relevant legislation are now publicly available on 
the “Biotechnology and GMOs Information web site of Joint Research 
Centre, European Commission Directorate General” (Deliberate 
releases and placing on the market of genetically modified Organisms, 
n.d.). Also, the public can file via email comments on planned releases 
and planned authorization to commercial use and can sign up for a 
newsletter that gives information on any new application filed with the 
EU. All information is in English. Member states are required to keep a 
register of the location of field trials and make them “known to the public 
by the public” (Art.31paragraph 3). 
While providing rules for the release of GMOs, the Directive is also 




potentially disregarding the provisions of the European authorities in 




Without prejudice to Article 23, Member States may not prohibit, 
restrict or impede the placing on the market of GMOs, as or in products, 
which comply with the requirements of this Directive. 
 
In Italy safety concerns characterized as applications of the 
“precautionary principle” have been used to overrule EU decisions and to 
prevent the commercialization of varieties that have been declared legal. 
(See below the discussion of the Amato Decree and the Coexistence 
legislation). 
4.10.2 Legislative Decree 224/2003 
The 2001/18 Directive was implemented in Italy with the Legislative 
Decree 224/2003, dated 8th July 2003; it substitutes for the previous 
Legislative Decree 92/1993 which implemented the EU Directive 
1990/220. The law regulates the deliberate release of GMOs for research 
purposes and the introduction of GMOs and their derivates into the 
Italian market.  
The first article of the law  
“establishes, in accordance with the precautionary principle, measures 
aimed at protecting human and animal health and the environment in 
respect to the release of genetically modified organisms in the 
environment (hereafter GMOs)” 
  
Clearly, the focus of concern for the legislators is safety; GMOs are 
assumed by law to threaten human, animal and environmental welfare. 
An appeal is made to the “precautionary principle”. With an interesting 





convention has become a “principle” here. The rhetorical power of 
appeals to the precautionary principle is evident in almost any discussion 
concerned with GMOs. The “principle” is one of the many expressions 
always referred to but seldom clarified; it has produced a large corpus of 
articles in the international and national press and it has also has received 
attention for the scientific and economic consequences of its application 
(Holme & Harris, 1999; Snidico, 2005.)  
The decree establishes the Environmental Ministry as the responsible 
agency to authorize  experiments and to coordinate relevant activities of 
other Ministries involved in the decision-making process. The criteria for 
issuing authorizations include fulfilling the following requirements: 
(Article 2/a) To verify that opinions from the competent Commissions 
for releasing GMOs in the environment for research and commercial 
purposes conform to the requirements of the present Decree 
2/b The assessment of possible effects on human health and on the 
environment with particular attention to natural ecosystems 
2/c  The compatibility of the deliberate release in the environment of 
GMOs with the requirement of safeguarding agricultural biodiversity of 
farming systems and of the food chain, with particular attention to 
typical, organic and high quality products. 
 
Again, the accent is on safety and on safeguarding Italian food products, 
a constant concern for legislators in the country.  
In accordance with requirements of the EU Directive, the law also 
provides for public consultation, defined as  
the possibility provided for anyone, person, insitution, association, to 
formulate observations or provide information in respect to any 
proposed release of GMOs.  
(LD 114/2003 art. 9)  
As noted above, public participation via disseminating information and 
consulting is of great concern.  EU legislators see it as one of the 




how lack of trust is presupposed by the White Paper) in institutions and 
increasing democracy. In the context of this study, entitlements to 
information and participation in respect to the GMO issue have turned 
out  to be key elements in many representations of food biotechnologies. 
One of the features often attributed to GMOs is that they are imposed on 
us, that people are not given a chance to express their opinion on the 
issue and are relegated to the passive, receiving end of a non democratic 
process. This is one of the main concerns that emerge from the empirical 
data described in chapter 6.  
 
Annex VIII, 1 
Annex VIII provides the means for carrying out public consultation. 
These include posting on the Ministry of Environment web site requests 
for release (called notifiche) and creating a mailing list of interested 
associations and organizations.  The information on the web site, the law 
says, “is given adequate publicity” (Annex VIII). Anyone, including 
private citizens, according to the law can ask to be included in the 
mailing list. Members of the list should receive prompt notice of new 
requests for release. The public, once notified of a new GMO release 
application, can file observations and information via email for a period 
of thirty days from the moment when the new request is filed to the 
authority. After thirty days the consultation is closed, and contributions 
from the public are referred back  to the competent body, that is the Inter 
Ministerial Commission for Biotechnology. The law does not specify 
what the Commission should do with the contributions received and does 
not prescribe a duty to reply or acknowledge public input. Clearly this is 
a limited and overly formal sort of “public participation” and “public 
consultation”. Furthermore, the law does not seem to be fulfilled in 
practice. To date the web site of the Environmental Ministry provides no 
information on the right of citizens to be included in the list of interested 
parties, nor does it mention any mailing list. In fact, I can see no easy 
way for a private citizen to know if such a list even exists. Moreover, it 
can be argued that publishing information about a forthcoming field trial 





experimental field. Even the mayors of cities and villages where 
experiments with GMOs take place are not notified about the request for 
authorization. This turned out to be the case in the ethnographic study 
presented in chapter 6, where in the assessment of local citizens this lack 
was considered a serious limitation to rights of information, let alone 
participation in the decision-making process. This field trial was 
autghorized under the previous national regulation, valid until August 
2003, which had no provision for citizen involvement in the decision-
making procedure and had even scantier provisions for informing citizens 
of ongoing field trials. Under the previous legislation, information about 
field trials appeared in a line on the Health Ministry web site only after 
the trials had been authorized. However, even under the new and more 
demanding regulation things don’t seem to have changed much, and local 
citizens are still likely to remain uninformed of experiments in their 
territory. This is a typical case in which the spirit of legal provisions set 
at the European level are defeated not so much in national legislation but 
in the practice of responsible parties. Formal provisions for citizen 
participation are enacted to fulfill legal requirements, but transparency 
and inclusion are in fact largely denied. The discourse of the law, calling 
upon values of public participation, is mostly ignored in Italy in the 
context of experimental planting of GMOs. Other European countries, in 
the light of strong controversy caused by food biotechnologies, have 
instead taken up the challenge of admitting the public to the decision-
making process and have included more practical and realistic 
requirements to assure that the public can express itself. In Germany, for 
instance, a request for carrying out a field trial must be also published in 
the local newspaper. The public then can file written comments and 
expect a reply from the competent authority. (PARADYS Final report to 
the Commission) In the U.K., one of the countries where the debate 
surrounding GMOs is very active, the government has carried out 
extensive public consultations on the subject (GM Nation, n.d.) and 
under the  provisions of “Fields on Trial”--a large scale evaluation 




releases of GMOs are planned. (PARADYS Final report to the 
Commission)  
In Italy it is still the case that the citizens most interested in a release of 
GM crops, namely the residents of the area where the experiment is 
planned, are also those most likely to remain uninformed, let alone able 
to file comments to the relevant authority. While the legal provisions 
might not be fulfilling the spirit of the EU, since the issuing of the 
224/203 LD a recently created  watchdog association called “Consiglio 
per i diritti genetici” (“Council for genetic rights”) has taken up the task 
of monitoring new applications and filing comments to the relevant 
competent bodies, both inside the country and in the Union. Further, the 
web site of the association explicitly mentions the rights of citizens to file 
their contributions. The association takes charge of forwarding them to 
the relevant authorities. (Consiglio per i Diritti Genetici)  
In practice, field trials in Italy are still carried out without the 
involvement of the public. However, the issue of experiments with 
GMOs is of limited practical importance in the country. Since the early 
nineties, more then 300 field trials have taken place in Italy, all under the 
provisions of the old legislation n.92/1993. Following growing concerns 
about food biotechnologies the number has decreased to almost zero. 
Two particular provisions contributed to the almost complete halting of 
research in Italy:  a de facto moratorium on GMOs since spring 1988 (no 
new authorizations for the commercialization of GMOs were granted 
until 2004 in the EU ) and the Amato Decree of 2000, which I consider 
further below. In the last 2 years only four requests for permission to 
carry out a field experiment have been made in Italy, of which three have 
been granted while one is still undecided. (Ministero dell’Ambiente). 
Given this shrinking number, filed trials are hardly an object of debate. 
Much more attention is given in the country to recent EU legislations on 
GM ingredients that are grown elsewhere but can be legally sold in Italy. 
They are discussed below. In this case too, issues related to the rights of 






4.11 Traceability and labelling.  
4.11.1 EU Regulation N. 1829/2003 and N.1830/2003  
These two EU regulations establish the compulsory labeling of GM 
ingredients in food and animal feed and set provisions for a system for 
back-tracing the ingredients of food products at all levels of food 
processing, “from farm to fork”; both are dated 22nd September 2003. 
They are effective in the 25 Member States without the need for 
implementation through national legislation. GMOs have been present in 
the ingredients of many foods for several years in Europe, and a clear 
legislation on how to regulate their presence was missing. Since the late 
nineties the inclusion of GMOs in many prepared foods, from soft drinks 
to canned foods, chips and virtually any prepared food containing soy or 
corn, have been of increasing concern in Italy (Poppe & Kjærnes, 2003; 
Ferretti & Magudda, 2004). Until the two regulations, no law was 
imposed to signal the presence of GMOs in food. Several companies, in 
Italy like in the rest of Europe, voluntarily chose to exclude any GM 
ingredient from their products and proudly advertised the fact to 
consumers with “GM free” stamps; however, those who did not opt to be 
explicitly “GM free” were under no obligation to provide, alongside the 
list of the ingredients, the fact that the corn syrup or starch or canola oil 
included in their products was genetically modified. As a result, 
consumers could not know if what they were buying and eating 
contained GMOs. While in the mid nineties this seemed irrelevant, the 
growing controversy on food biotechnologies made it the more and more 
a matter of rights for consumers to have the possibility to make a choice.  
The situation was even less regulated for animal feed. Before the issuing 
of the two EU regulations, the labeling system was so loose that, 
according to experts of the sector, animal feed constituted one major 
underregulated area , for almost anything could end up in the feed 
(personal communications). Food scandals like the outbreak of “mad cow 
disease” or the case of chickens fed with dioxin-contaminated feed 
greatly contributed to the loss of trust in food institutions--a main 




feed simply cannot be avoided. The EU, and Italy in particular, are not 
self sufficient and a large percentage of the feed consumed every year is 
imported from the U.S. and Canada. Usually the feed is composed in 
large part of corn and soy, and both crops in North America are now 
largely composed of genetically modified varieties (Global area of 
biotech crops 1996-2004, n.d.). For this reason, almost all cattle 
consumed in the EU in the last ten years has been fed with some 
percentage of GMOs. 
These two pieces of regulation were much awaited in the EU, for they are 
meant to give legal provisions for the right of citizens to choose between 
GMOs and non GMOs, and they also create a system for tracing back 
food products at any step of the food chain so that accountability and 
transparency are increased. 
Paragraph 17 of the introduction of regulation 1829 states that:  
the Community is to contribute to promoting the right of consumers to 
information. In addition to other types of information to the public 
provided for in this Regulation, the labelling of products enables the 
consumer to make an informed choice and facilitates fairness of 
transactions between seller and purchaser. 
 
The main changes from the previous regulations are the following: 
For the first time the rules on GMOs are applied to both food and animal 
feed. The regulation institutes a unified detailed procedure for the 
introduction into the market of food and feed containing GMOs. 
Authorized GMOs are listed in the Community Register of GM Food and 
Feed (Community Register of GM food and feed, 2005). The Register is 
accessible on line on the web site of the EU and contains information on 
the transformation of each variety.A unique identifier of authorized 
products is assigned to each GM product. 
The objective of the regulation is to:  
(a) provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human 
life and health, animal health and welfare, environment and consumer 
interests in relation to genetically modified food and feed, whilst 





Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of 
genetically modified food and feed; (c) lay down provisions for the 
labelling of genetically modified food and feed. 
(Chapter 1, Article 1) 
The regulation applies to GMOs for food use, foods containing GMOs, 
and food produced from or containing ingredients produced from GMOs 
(Chapter 2, Section1). Article 4 paragraph 1 states that the food in 
question must not have 
 adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment; 
mislead the consumer, differ from the food which it is intended to 
replace to such an extent that its normal consumption would be 
nutritionally disadvantageous for the consumer. 
 
The GM foods must have been previously authorized for consumption 
within the EU, and they can be authorized only if they fulfill the 
requirements set in the first paragraph. (Article 4 Paragraph 4) 
Section 2 focuses on labeling.  Article 12 applies to 
foods which are to be delivered as such to the final consumer or mass 
caterers in the Community and which: (a) contain or consist of GMOs; 
or (b) are produced from or contain ingredients produced from GMOs. 
(Section 2, Article 12) 
Article 13 specifies some additional labeling requirements for foods that 
are different from their conventional counterpart or that, among other 
things, might give rise to “ethical or religious concerns”. Such notion is 
clearly very vague and open to argumentation. 
The Regulation sets a tolerance of 0.9 percent of authorized GMOs or 
ingredients derived from GMOs or produced from GMOs, provided that 
their presence is “adventitious or technically unavoidable”.  
Chapter Three regulates GM feed and poses the same requirements posed 




presence of GMOs or their derivates is “adventitious or technically 
unavoidable”. 
The Regulation also sets a transitory measure for the presence of GMOs 
that are not authorized in the EU but are commercialized elsewhere and 
can be found in food and feed. The measure applies to GMOs that are 
undergoing authorization and that have already been positively assessed 
for safety. In this case the tolerance is of 0.5 percent, provided that, once 
again, their presence is “adventitious or technically unavoidable”. 
 
4.11.2 Authorization for introduction into the market 
The relevant norms are 2001/18 and 178/2002 for the assessment of 
risks in the area of food security. The European Food Authority sends its 
decision to the Commission after assessing the safety of the food product 
with respect to health and of environmental risks. The Authority also 
informs the applicant, other Member States and the Public, which can 
send its comments to the Commission. Eventually, the Commission 
authorizes the product with a permission that lasts ten years, after which 
the permission is re examined. Products that had already been authorized 
under previous legislation can remain on the market, but they have to be 
flagged so as to be included in the Community Register of GM food and 
feed. Further, regulation 1829/2003 also can require that a product 
continue to be monitored after it has been introduced into the market. 
 
4.11.3 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003  
Concerns “the traceability and labelling of genetically modified 
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from 
genetically modified organisms”. The Regulation on paragraph 11 of the 
premises specifies that  
(11) It is necessary to ensure that consumers are fully and reliably 
informed about GMOs and the products, foods and feed produced 







This Regulation provides a framework for the traceability of products 
consisting of or containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
and food and feed produced from GMOs, with the objectives of 
facilitating accurate labelling, monitoring the effects on the environment 
and, where appropriate, on health, and the implementation of the 
appropriate risk management measures including, if necessary, 
withdrawal of products.  
 
Article 4 regulates traceability and labelling requirements for products 
consisting of or containing GMO.  It states that at the first stage, when  a 
product consisting of or containing GMOs is placed on the market, 
concerned persons (i.e., those producing, trading, or using the products in 
question) shall ensure that the information about the GM products is 
transmitted in writing to those who receive the product. 
Article 5, on traceability requirements for food and feed produced from 
GMOs requires that operators placing GM or GM derived products on 
the market also provide all the information about each ingredient 
produced from GMOs or, when there is no ingredient list, that the 
product is produced from GMOs.  Article 8 of the law specifies how each 
kind of GMO must be labeled through the use of a unique identifier.  The 
provisions of the two EU regulations show a great concern for the right 
of both food producers and private consumers to be able to distinguish 
GM and non GM products, so that they are given the chance to avoid 
GMOs if they choose to do so. The authorizations granted after the entry 
into force of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on genetically modified 
food and feed are entered in the Community Register of GM Food and 
Feed. The Register provides useful product information such as the name 
of the authorization holder, the exact scope of the authorization, the 
designation of the authorized product, links to relevant risk assessments 
and the date of entry on the EU market. Thereby, the authorizations 
become accessible and transparent to everybody. Besides, the 




were lawfully placed on the market in the Community prior to 18 April 
2004 and about which the European Commission was notified before 18 
October 2004. The notifications received by the European Commission 
are subject to the verifications and the procedures in application of 
Article 8 and 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. As in September 
2007, there are 21 existing products included in the Community Register 
of GM Food and Feed under Article 8 and 20 of the Regulation (EC) 
1829/2003. They include several types of maize, cotton, oilseed rape, and 
one type of modified soy. 
4.12 Italian legislation 
Italy has taken a more cautious approach to food biotechnologies than the 
EU authorities. The resolutions of a succession of Italian governments 
and the legislation of the parliament show that national institutions are 
largely disinclined to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops 
in Italy. A position against GMOs is largely shared by both the right and 
the left parties, with the exception of few vociferous outsiders, usually 
scientists, who take the side of food biotechnologies in both wings of the 
parliament (Bonazzi, 2005). The ex ministers of Agriculture, Alfonso 
Pecoraro Scanio 3, and Giovanni Alemanno4, both have expressed very 
critical positions toward food biotechnologies and have proposed and 
acted so as to stop field trial research in the country. The current Minister 
of Agriculture, Paolo De Castro5 has expressed a position of “zero 
tolerance” in the context of allowing a legal level of GM contamination 
in organic foods (OGM: De Castro, tolleranza zero nel biologico, 2007). 
Several regions and councils have also issued legislation about food 
biotechnologies, all in order to ban them from the area of their 
                                                 
3 Green Party, minister of Agrticulture in the second  Amato government, 
from April, 25 2000 to June 11, 2001 
4 Alleanza Nazionale, minister of Agriculture in the second and third 
Berlusconi government, from June 11, 2001 to May, 17 2006 
5 Once a Liberal, now in the Ulivo coalition, minister of Agriculture 





jurisdiction. In the following I discuss some resolutions on GMOs that 
illustrate what can be called institutional resistance to GM food in the 
country institutions.  
4.12.1 The Amato Decree 
On the 4th of August 2000 Giuliano Amato – Prime Minister at the 
time - invoked an emergency procedure to suspend the import and sale of 
four kinds of GM corn: BT-11(Novartis), MON-809, MON-810 
(Monsanto) and T25 (Aventis).  Derivates of those four kinds of maize 
are found in a large number of prepared foods, and they are and were at 
the time legally commercialized in the EU. The decree states that 
“current scientific knowledge does not recognize risks for human or 
animal health due to the consumption of such GMOs”; however, 
somehow contradictorily it also calls upon article 12 of EU Regulation 
258/97, a security clause that allows individual countries to suspend the 
commercialization of products or ingredients if there is new evidence that 
such products might pose health risks. The suspension was prompted by 
the green association V.A.S. (acronym for Verdi Ambiente e Società) 
that filed a legal charge asserting that the four maize species and their 
derivates had been introduced into the EU market without due testing and 
safety measures. V.A.S. representatives insisted that not enough evidence 
had been given that the four types of corn are “substantially equivalent” 
to the non GM varieties (Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri, August, 4, 2000). “Substantial equivalence” is the required 
parameter for the introduction of a new variety of vegetable into the 
market: GM and non GM varieties need to be so similar in their 
biochemical composition shat they can be considered equivalent. As a 
matter of fact, the very notion that GMOs could be considered 
substantially equivalent to conventional varieties is extremely 
controversial from the perspective of green associations and prompted 
the filing of the legal report. The Amato Decree was the first occasion on 
which a EU country had recourse to the safety clause, and that the matter 




Had the decision of the Italian government been judged to be well 
founded, the suspension on the questioned corn varieities should have 
been extended to the whole EU. The Scientific Committee on September 
2000 reached the following “Conclusion:  The Committee is of the 
opinion that the information provided by the Italian Authorities does not 
provide detailed scientific grounds for considering that the use of the 
novel foods in question endangers human health”. (Opinion of the 
Scientific Committee on Food, 2000). The opinion did not induce a 
change in the Italian position; instead  it produced a long standing debate 
and a court case to have the products reintroduced into the Italian market. 
Monsanto Agriculture, Novartis Seed Spa (today Syngenta Seeds Spa), 
Pioneer Hi Breed Italy and Assobiotec filed a petition to have the four 
products reintroduced into Italy. Eventually, on November, 29, 2004, the 
Administrative Tribunal of the Lazio region (in Italian T.A.R.) nullified  
the Amato Decree but denied the suing companies financial 
compensation for loss of profit. Following the decision, members of the 
Italian parliament have argued that the Amato Decree “was and is fully 
justified by the application of the precautionary principle” and that Italy 
should be entitled to ban the four products. (De Petris, 2004)  
 
4.12.2 The Alemanno memorandum and the declarations 
of Pecoraro Scanio 
On November 15, 2002, the Minister of Agriculture of the Berlusconi 
government, Giovanni Alemanno issued a memo halting all field trials 
with genetically modified crops being carried out by research institutes 
which depended on the ministry of Agriculture. (Meldolesi, 2002)  The 
suspended experiments had been regularly authorized and monitored by 
the Italian authority. No emergency or new information motivated the 
resolution. The memorandum of the minister cites no concrete reasons or 
safety concerns. Scientists running experiments funded and authorized 
months or years before, mostly in the context of wider international 
research were outraged. The decision prompted a reaction from scientists 





(Meldolesi, 2002). Following public appeals of scientists in national 
newspapers, the minister issued more restrictive guidelines for regulating 
field trials across the whole country, tightening the requirements of EU 
Directive 2001/18. Two years earlier, the previous minister of 
Agriculture in the first left government in the history of the Republic, Mr 
Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio, had explicitly stated his intention to stop and 
ban all field trials in the country (Polacchi, 2000). However no ban was 
issued at the time.   
4.12.3 The Law on coexistence 
On July 23rd, 2003 the Commission issued a “Recommendation” stating 
that each Member State must find ways to guarantee “coexistence” 
between genetically modified and non genetically modified crops. These 
are measures to be put in place in order to make less likely that cross 
breed occur. Such measures include: maintaining distance between GM 
and non GM crops, creating barriers for pollens, and choosing to 
cultivate in one area plants that flower in different times of the year. The 
Commission issues its recommendations strating from the perspective 
that there are GM crops that can be legally framed over the 25 states. 
Italian law N. 5, dated 28 January 2005 turns into a permanent law of the 
Republic a previous Government Decree, the so called “Coexistence 
Decree” ( Decreto Legislativo n. 279), issued in November 2004, that 
regulates the terms under which authorized GMOs may be cultivated in 
Italy. A Government Decree is an urgent temporary law promulgated by 
the executive branch of the government which is valid for 60 days; a 
Decree loses its effect if within 60 days, unless it is reissued, the two 
chambers of the Parliament fail to approve it and thus convert it into a 
permanent law. “Coexistence” refers to the need to provide principles for 
the safe commercial cultivation on Italian soil of both GM and non GM 
crops. A Decree can be modified by amendments of the MPs during the 
parliamentary procedure necessary to turn it into Law. In this case the 
parliamentary debate was heated.  People both in and outside the 
Parliament argue that safe coexistence between genetically modified and 




supported by studies that show how pollen travels long distances. Given 
the small average size of farms in Italy and other features of landscape, it 
is impossible to guarantee that GM and non GM crops would not 
interbreed. The result would be contamination of non-GM crops and loss 
and damage for conventional and organic farmers. As a result, the 
argument goes, the only way to guarantee farmers and consumers GM 
free crops is to forbid the cultivation of GMOs in the whole country. The 
position is incompatible with European legislation, which requires that 
no barriers be posed by an individual country to products that have been 
approved for commercial use in the Union (art. 22 of the EU2001/18 
Directive). The decree defines the normative frame for the co existence 
between transgenic crops (other than those grown for experimentation) 
and conventional and organic crops, “with the aim of not compromising 
biodiversity of the natural environment and to guarantee freedom of 
economic initiative, the right to choose for the consumer, and the quality 
and typical features of national food production.”(Art.1)  
Art.2 focuses on the “protection of the co existence principle” 
(“Salvaguardia del principio di coesistenza)” The principle states that 
“different types of crops ( transgenic, traditional, organic) must be 
farmed so that the farming of one type does not compromise the farming 
of another type of crop”. Coexistence must protect “peculiarities and 
specific producing features” of crops, and must avoid “any form of 
contact between transgenic and conventional and organic seeds.”    
Article 2-bis specifies that introducing GM crops must not prejudice 
preexisting farming practices, and that there must be no necessity to  
change the character of those practices because of GM crops. Article 3 
states that coexistence “must guarantee the right of choice of farmers, 
other workers along the food chain,  and consumers to choose between 
conventional, organic and  transgenic products,  and therefore GMOs 
must be cultivated in a segregated food chain.” 
The law assigns to the Regions the task of “adopting a plan for 
coexistence” and this includes devising the technical provisions for 
realizing it. (Art.4/1) While developing the plan, Regions must consult 





can create  a monetary fund for the just compensation of possible 
damages caused by non compliance with the plan for coexistence 
(4/3bis). Whoever wants to cultivate GMOs must notify the region, 
elaborate a coexistence plan, and   keep a detailed register of the 
measures adopted (Art.5/3) Regions must collect and retain all the 
information included in these registers (Art.5/4).  
Article 6 focuses on sanctions, and establishes that failure to keep there 
registers is subject to a fine of 5.000 to 25.000 Euros, while cultivating 
GMOs before the competent region has issued a Law on coexistence is 
punishable with imprisonment from one to two years and fines from 
5.000 to 50.000 Euros. The most controversial provision of the Law deals 
with transitional norms. Article 8 in fact states that  
“in order to achieve the aims specified in article 1 (that is ,safe 
coexistence), until the adoption of the specific legal provisions of article 
4 (that is, regional legislation on coexistence) transgenic cultivation, 
aside from cultivation for research, is not allowed”.  
 
No deadline is specified for the regions to devise coexistence plans. 
Without fixed dates for the regions to provide legal ways to farm 
authorized GMOs, in Italy GMOs are effectively banned indeterminately. 
The provision has been called “medieval” by a representative of the 
Italian Association of Biotech Industries (Assobiotec) and it can be seen 
as a Machiavellian way of not complying with EU authority. As a result 
of this law, 13 GM crops which have been judged safe and are legally 
farmed in the European Union, are illegal in Italy. This piece of 
legislation can be considered a way the Italian parliament “resists” 
GMOs, a metaphor used in various forms by many in the debate.  
4.12.4 Anti transgenic councils and regions 
According to the official web site of the anti transgenic councils, 451 
of the over 8100 Italian councils have declared themselves to be 
“antitransgenici,” (Comune Antitransgenico, n.d.)  approving resolutions 
similar to the one I analyize in detail in paragraph 7.1. The web site of 




The last council having been added in April 2004; possibly more 
councils have declared themselves “antitransgenici” since then. More 
remarkably, all but 3 of the 20 Italian regional governments have issued 
legislation against GMOs. Following a governance policy called 
‘devolution’, Italian regions have received more and more fiscal and 
legislative powers over the last few years in fields such as of education, 
healthcare and taxes. In some regions GMOs cannot be cultivated and 
field trials are forbidden (Umbria, Regional Law N.20, 21st August 
2001). In others GM foods cannot be served in any publicly owned 
facility like schools and hospitals (Campania, Law N. 15, 24th November 
2001). In the Marche region, producers using food components that are 
derived from or contain GMOs are excluded from all regional incentives 
to the food industry. Also, it is forbidden to serve GMOs in any 
community restaurant depending on or directly owned by the region. 
(Marche Regional Law N. 5, 3rd March 2004). In other regions still, 
authorities offer incentives and monetary support to those who commit to 
GM-free farming practices, in order to discourage the cultivation of 
GMOs and to promote organic and traditional farming (Trento Province, 
Law N. 4, 28th March 2003). Similar measures have been adopted by 
almost all Italian Regions and are evidence of a consistent institutional 
rejection of food biotechnologies. As I have already pointed out, there is 
a potential clash between regional and local resolutions on the one hand 
and national and EU regulations on the other. There are so far thirteen 
different GMOs which have been judged safe and can be sold and farmed 
in the EU. Bans at regional level have no legal standing.  According to 
off record remarks of informed parties, it has occurred in the past that 
experiments were running in “anti transgenic” councils. However, while 
banning authorized GMOs from the shelves of supermarkets in regions of 
Italy might run counter to EU legislation, things are different when it 
comes to cultivating commercial GM crops like corn and soy on Italian 
soil. The Law on Coexistence appoints “Regional Authorities” for 
developing agricultural plans that would guarantee the safe coexistence 
between GM crops and non GM corps. Regions must find a way to 





features. Some regions might argue that given the nature of their territory 
and the extreme fragmentations of agricultural parcels, no coexistence 
with GMOs is possible if the rights of organic and traditional farmers are 
to be guaranteed. As a result, regions could legally argue for the 
exclusion of GM crops from their territories. The argument that no 
coexistence with GMOs is safely possible in Italy because of landscape 
features and because of the average small size of land lots has been made 
vociferously and has stirred the debate over the decree. (Approvato il 
decreto sugli OGM, n.d.) Given the laws against GMOs already issued 
by all but three Italian regions it is likely that many regional governments 
will propose coexistence plans so restrictive, so onerous for farmers who 
might want to grow transgenic plants, that GM crops will be de facto 
banned from Italy for a long time. This regional approach, plus a market 
strongly adverse to GMOs, will probably be even more effective in 
keeping GMOs out of Italy than legislations interdicting them. According 
to EU law in fact, the banning of authorized GMOs must be justified on 
scientific grounds, for otherwise it contravenes article 22 of the 2001/18 
Directive that requires free circulation of authorized GMOs. There is 
already a precedent. On the 5th of October 2005 the EU Court ruled that 
Austria had no grounds to ban the cultivation of legal GMOs on its 
territory. In 2003 Austria had presented to the Court a draft law arguing 
that, due to its landscape, GMOs could not coexist safely with other 
crops. The draft law was supported by a scientific report on how to 
realize GM free areas of farming in Austria; the report concluded that 
only the exclusion of GMOs would conform to the precautionary 
principle.  Nevertheless, the EU Court ruled that Austria had failed to 
show that the measure was scientifically justified.  It further ruled that a 
deviation from EU law was not warranted in this case, and that the 
arguments used to invoke the precautionary principle lacked substance. 
The Austrian actions were dismissed in their entirety. (EU Court 
overturns Austrian law to ban GM, October 2005).  
Even if antitransgenic councils and regions do not succeed in overruling 
regulation of a higher authority, the declarations can have an effect on 




disposition of those operating along the food chain, from seed dealers to 
farmers to food stores chains.  Since 1999 COOP, the major food chain 
and distributor in Italy, with over 6 million members, has banned GM 
products from foods bearing its in-house label. (Masciaga, personal 
communication). Many others in the food industry have done the same, 
in Italy and  all over Europe, while Greenpeace Italy keeps a public 
register for naming and shaming food companies that make use of GMOs 
in their products.(Alimenti OGM non nel mio carrello!.n.d.) On the roads 
entering each one of the over 400 anti transgenic Italian councils the one 
sign announcing the name of the city or of the village is supplemented by 
another that reads “comune antitransgenico”. Such a public declaration of 
aversion to GMOs might have little legal weight, but it can certainly have 
impact on how people conceive of GMOs. In the past, many Italian 
Councils led a campaign against nuclear power using the same strategy. 
A permanent sign was posted under the city name that read “comune 
denuclearizzato” a neologism, loosely translatable as “Council clear of 
nuclear power”. No doubt the anti nuclear power strategy has inspired the 
“antitransgenico” campaign. In that case too, the legal authority of the 
Council was dubious because decisions about nuclear power plants are 
the province of the central government. Nonetheless, the strategy 
represented a permanent and public statement against a controversial 
technology by local authorities. 
4.13 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have illustrated the legislation relevant to 
experiments and commercialization of GM foods at European and 
National level. By describing the key concepts that guide international 
agreements, EU Directives and Italian provisions, I have wanted to 
introduce some of the main buzzwords which resound in the discourses 
over food biotechnologies in Italy. “Public participation”, “risk 
assessment”, “precautionary principle”, “unforeseeable risks”, 





specific and esoteric legalese. These words are then re appropriate in 
more informal contexts by lay persons and once re-energised become a 
vital aspect of public discourse that eventually enters the sphere of 
legislative decision-making. Furthermore, my discussion of the existing 
tension between on the one hand the legal provisions at European level 
and the other hand the ones of Italian governments, which resist the 
cultivation of GM crops despite binding EU decision, will become 
particularly relevant as the background for the textual analysis of the first 





5 THEORETICAL COORDINATES 
In this chapter I give an account of different works which have 
theoretical influence on my study. I describe the main arguments and 
illustrate criticisms of the main theories I present. A central aspect of my 
own reflection is the role communicative action has in the study. I 
summarize how I conceive of the communicative processes in which 
representations of GMOs are constructed and the principles on which I 
base the empirical analysis.  
5.1 Introduction 
This work is concerned with discourses about food biotechnologies. In 
the media and in everyday conversations we find verbal depictions, 
representations of biotechnologies. Because this is a study in social 
psychology, the psychological status of these depictions is of central 
importance. In this chapter I will engage with the following questions: 
What is the nature of the discourses analyzed? Are discourses anything 
besides articulated utterances, voices that circulate within society, in the 
mouths of people and on the printed pages of magazines? Are discourses 
linked to mental representations, aspects of which are shared by segments 
of society? Above all, what is the relationship, perhaps problematic, 
between such mental representations and what is expressed in discourse? 
I will try to illustrate the issues behind such dilemmas and carve out a 
tenable stance in relation to other existing theoretical positions. The 
theoretical frame of my work relies on two different approaches, and I 
argue for the productivity of a reasoned syncretism between them. 
However, important differences which separate these approaches at 
theoretical and methodological levels must first be addressed. Social 
Representations Theory (Moscovici, 1976) and Discursive Psychology 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987) both assume that thought and discourse are 





questions. According to SRT, discourses of biotechnologies correspond 
to the voicing of socially shared representations of the phenomenon: they 
have a cognitive status and an essentially mental nature. Like other 
cognate socio-psychological concepts - for example attitudes, schemata, 
beliefs - Social Representations function as guiding principles in the 
understanding of a phenomenon. From this perspective discourses 
constitute an epiphenomenon, the symptom or contingent expression of 
mental states, and they reveal that interlocutors share a given 
representation. Within SRT, the answer to the question “why do people 
say what they say about GMOs?” is “because that’s what they think”. As 
we will see at length, exponents of Discursive Psychology (DP) criticize 
this simple explanation and the theoretical assumptions on which it is 
based from a programmatically anti-cognitive perspective. Within DP the 
sense-making role of representations is not excluded in principle (Potter 
& Edwards, 1999: 448) but it is de facto put to one side; it is not an 
object of enquiry. Discursive psychologists emphasize the strategic, 
contingent, action-oriented nature of representations, while “what people 
think” is not an object of attention. Representations from the DP 
perspective are moves in a social game; they are the means for 
participants in a conversation to substantiate a certain version of facts, to 
attribute or deny responsibility, to deflect blame and overall to maintain a 
strategically sound attitude given the social task one is engaged in. In 
short: for SRT, discourse is an expression of mental states and social 
representations; for DP discourse is a tool of strategic action with no 
presumed relation to beliefs.I will start with the most important 
theoretical roots and principles of both approaches, and I will move on to 
the criticisms launched against the approaches. Throughout I shall try to 
make clear what this work owes to both frameworks. 
5.2 The Theory of Social Representations 
Social Representations Theory developed in France based on the 




and is often regarded as a continental alternative to Anglo-Saxon social 
psychology. The theory emerged as a reaction to individualistic social 
psychology (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995).  Perhaps one of the reasons 
for the success of Moscovici’s theory lies in the emphasis it places on 
representations as supra-individual phenomena; the unit of analysis of SR 
studies is not the individual but the group or social milieu which shares a 
given social representation. Moscovici described Social Representations 
as “social entities, with a life of their own, communicating between 
themselves, opposing each other and changing in harmony with the 
course of life; vanishing, only to emerge under new guises” (Moscovici 
1984b:10). Studies of Social Representations focus on the onset and 
transformations of the representations of a given social phenomenon 
within a group; the vocation of the theory is to study how different 
segments of modern societies receive and understand or “popularize” 
new and/or otherwise unsettling phenomena, like techno-scientific 
developments, scientific theories, or dramatic events such as the 
spreading of a disease. Publications within the approach have focused on 
social representations of psychoanalysis, Marxism, madness, nuclear 
power, human rights, food, HIV and biotechnologies (for a 
comprehensive review see Wagner & Others., 1999; Wagner & Hayes, 
2005). A look at the programs of the 2004 and 2006 International 
Conferences on Social Representations shows that the theory continues 
to inspire an array of studies on a vast class of topics: fashion, gender, 
music, the body, driving, the Internet, animals, the Euro currency, Europe 
and European cities, to cite just a few. 
5.3 What are Social Representations? 
Defining the object of study is always a theoretical challenge. The 
‘object’ within Social Representations Theory has inspired many 
criticisms (e.g. Jahoda, 1988). The name of the theory clearly implies, via 
a presupposition of existence, that there are such “things” as SRs 





of SRs has proven problematic. Briefly put, SRs amount to social 
knowledge; they are the stock of understanding people share in the form 
of common sense theories about the world. They correspond to ‘a system 
of values, ideas and practices.’ (Moscovici 1973: xiii). In the words of 
Moscovici,  
Social Representations concern the contents of everyday thinking and 
the stock of ideas that gives coherence to our religious beliefs, political 
ideas and the connections we create as spontaneously as we breathe. 
They make it possible for us to classify persons and objects, to compare 
and explain behaviors and to objectify them as parts of our social 
setting. While representations are often to be located in the minds of 
men and women, they can just as often be found ‘in the world’, and as 
such examined separately.  
(Moscovici, 1988: 214) 
SRs are both conventional and prescriptive; they make up an 
environment in which we are submerged so that nothing we come across 
can be interpreted without recurring to these pre-formed schemas 
(Moscovici, 1984b).  Moscovici asserts that: “(…) we are never provided 
with any information which has not been distorted by representations 
‘superimposed’ on objects and on persons” (Moscovici, 1984b:5). Social 
Representations thus affect the way we think. Moscovici characterizes 
representations as something akin to ‘culture’ when he writes that: 
 (…) it is easy to see why the representation which we have of 
something is not directly related to our manner of thinking but, 
conversely, why our manner of thinking, and what we think, depend on 
such representations, that is on the fact that we have, or have not, a 
given representation. I mean that they are forced upon us, transmitted, 
and are the product of a whole sequence of elaboration and of changes 
which occur in the course of time, and are the achievements of 
successive generations.  




And also: “The weight of their [SRs] history, custom and cumulative 
content confronts us with all the resistance of a material object. Perhaps it 
is even greater, since what is invisible is inevitably harder to overcome 
than what is visible.” (Moscovici 1984b:12) These standpoints appear 
consistent with the epistemology of social constructionism (Berger and 
Luckman, 1966).The core idea is that we inhabit a socially generated 
world and that the only criteria at our disposal for making judgments are 
those we develop within such an already constructed universe, so that 
there is nothing accessible to us beyond it.6 Social Representations theory 
appears to be inspired by anthropology as much as by sociology. Most 
influential on Moscovici’s concept of ‘social representations’ is 
Durkheim’s notion of ‘collective representations’ (Durkheim, 1972). 
Durkheim uses the term to differentiate between individual and collective 
thought. Collective representations are those widely shared by members 
of society; they originate in society and are about society. Durkheim’s 
collective representations cannot be explained at the level of the 
individual and are independent from the individuals who express them; 
they must be explained at a social level. While collective representations 
are found in so called “traditional” societies, characterized by the weight 
of tradition, limited mobility, and few external excursions (when 
compared with urban aggregates), according to Moscovici Social 
Representations are the characteristic feature of fast paced, novelty-
stricken, media-submerged modern societies. Social psychology should 
study social thinking by becoming “an anthropological and an historical 
science” (Moscovici, 1984b) focusing on how certain social 
representations come into existence and are transformed at given 
moments in time in certain areas of society. 
                                                 
6 However, Gergen, (1982) accused SRT of positivism. See the discussion 






5.4 Function of Social Representations 
Among the all-encompassing forces of social reality on our minds, SRs 
are postulated to have a specific cognitive purpose. SRs  
conventionalise the objects, persons and events we encounter. They give 
them a definite form, locate them in a given category and gradually 
establish them as a model of a certain type, distinct and shared by a 
group of people. All new elements adhere to this model and merge into 
it. 
(Moscovici 1984b:7) 
If conventionalization were the only defining characteristic of SRs it 
would be difficult to distinguish Social Representations from any mental 
schemata. Moscovici explicitly addresses the need to qualify SRs 
unambiguously (Moscovici, 1984b) as designated for a specific kind of 
conventionalization, the familiarization of what is unfamiliar: 
“The purpose of all representations is to make something unfamiliar, or 
unfamiliarity itself, familiar. [Emphasis in the original] (Moscovici, 
1984b:24.) This specific character of Social Representations also clarifies 
why the vocation of the theory is to study phenomena that have some 
degree of distance or novelty.  
The act of re-presentation is a means of transferring what disturbs us, 
what threatens our universe, from the outside to the inside, from far off 
to near by. The transfer is effected by separating normally linked 
concepts and perceptions and setting them in a context where the 
unusual becomes usual, where the unknown can be included in an 
acknowledged category 
(Moscovici, 1984b:26) 
The focus of SRT fits well with the study of the public reception of food 
biotechnologies. While biotechnologies and their products have existed 
since the 1980s, for most Italians GMOs are a new and suspect 




to grasp. It is not easy for a lay person to gain first hand knowledge about 
GM foods; inevitably previous beliefs and currently available 
representations play an important part in how Italians are making up their 
minds about biotechnologies.  
5.5 Anchoring and Objectification  
Disrupting, threatening and unfamiliar events in the life of a group 
must be coped with in symbolic terms. This coping process is what 
generates social representations (Moscovici, 1976) SRs are formed via 
two cognitive processes, anchoring and objectification (Moscovici, 
1976). Anchoring implies relating the new phenomenon to others already 
known - events from the past - so that current words and images can be 
used to categorize the unknown. Objectification implies the uses of 
metaphors and vivid images to make concrete something distant and 
abstract. Moscovici illustrates this process with a compelling example: 
 (…) to objectify is to discover the iconic quality of an imprecise idea or 
being, to reproduce a concept in an image. To compare is already to 
picture, to fill what is naturally empty with substance. We have only to 
compare God with a father and what was invisible instantly becomes 
visible in our minds as a person to whom we can respond as such. 
(Moscovici, 1984b: 38) 
Social representations thus have figurative or metaphorical character. In 
my research participants often used metaphors from unrelated semantic 
fields while describing GMOs. They also associated GMOs with other 
more familiar items in order to make a point. One participant stated that 
“GMOs are like drugs” and further developed his thought saying that just 
like drugs, when you start using them you cannot stop: that you are 
enslaved to drugs and to those who produce them. Another person 
referred to the 1984 disaster of Bhopal, India, when a chemical plant  
released toxic fumes that killed and maimed thousands, to sketch a 





person referred to the tragic consequence for fetuses of the drug 
Thalidomide in  the 1960s in order to warn against the unforeseeable 
consequences of GM foods. Another participant used the metaphor of 
alphabets, letters, and words comparing them to the DNA sequence. He 
argued that in nature, just like in a word and in a sentence, if you change 
the order of elements things go wrong. On the other hand, scientists often 
associate the process of obtaining GMOs to traditional breeding of plants 
and animal through selection. All these images according to SRT are 
ways to apprehend, to gain familiarity with a rather abstract and out-of-
reach phenomenon, and to make it tractable. The process involves 
anchoring the new object to past experiences and making it tangible 
through metaphors and allegories. The core idea of SRT is that when 
faced with the unknown lay people develop creative ways to think and 
talk about scientific facts too complex and too abstract to grasp. 
5.6 The thinking society 
SRs are conventional and prescriptive (Moscovici, 1984b). However 
in the writings of Moscovici they are not simply the result of powerful 
external forces. SRs impose themselves on modern society via mass 
media (Moscovici, 1976), but at the same time they are the product of 
bottom-up creative activity on the part of society. SRs are born and 
change within everyday informal discourse: 
So what we are suggesting is that individuals and groups, far from being 
passive receptors, think for themselves, produce and ceaselessly 
communicate their own specific representations and solutions to the 
questions they set themselves. In the streets, in cafes, offices, hospitals, 
laboratories, etc., people analyse, comment, concoct spontaneous, 
unofficial, ‘philosophies’ which have a decisive impact in their social 
relations, their choices, the way they bring up their children, plan ahead 
and so forth. Events, sciences and ideologies simply provide them with 





Notably, Moscovici criticizes top-down views about the power of 
ideologies on society. He writes that these approaches are 
maintaining that groups and individuals are always and completely 
under the sway of a dominant ideology which is produced and imposed 
by their social class, the State the Church or the school, and that what 
they think and say only reflects such an ideology. In other words it is 
maintained that they don’t as a rule think or produce anything original, 
on their own: they reproduce and in turn are reproduced.  
(Moscovici, 1984b p.15) 
There is here a potential contradiction. According to Moscovici we are to 
assume both that people are free agents and make up their mind about 
emerging phenomena, but also that they are constantly confronted with 
the weight and power of their group-specific epistemic legacy so that 
they depend on previous, group-based social representations to form new 
social representations. This ambiguous aspect of the theory points to a 
central struggle in social psychology between individual free agency on 
one hand and the all-encompassing social constraints of group and 
culture on the other.  
5.7 Social Knowledge and memory: F.C. 
Bartlett 
SRT rests on the proposition that people cannot avoid applying their 
pre existing knowledge to understand phenomena. This assertion is not 
new, nor is the claim that much of what individuals use for making sense 
of reality is social in origin and largely shared within a given community. 
Evidence of the impact of social factors on cognitive processes comes 
from early studies on memory. F. C. Bartlett (1932/1995) in his seminal 
studies used evidence from recollections of stories, drawings and ink 
stains to develop the first theory of memory as a process of construction 
rather than “recollection.” In a famous experiment, he asked subjects to 





collected and translated by Franz Boas. The story contains odd elements 
which do not fit in the semiotics of a typical western narrative. When 
repeatedly asked to reproduce the text at different intervals of time, 
ranging from a few hours to several years, subjects provided an 
increasingly altered version of the story. Some of the alterations were 
interpretations and remarkable insertions of elements alien to the story 
and notably derivative of the cultural background of the subjects. The 
stories as recollected and retold were transformed by simplifications and 
conventionalization obviously influenced by the beliefs and social 
practices of the subjects. Bartlett notes that while his experiments 
focused on individuals, the results showed how social reality mediates 
the epistemic relationship between interpreter and text. The conclusion is 
that the processes influencing memory in an experimental setting are also 
in place in everyday life and affect our mundane recollection and 
interpretation of events:  
The form which a rumor, or a story, or a decorative design, finally 
assumes within a given social group is the work of many different 
successive social reactions. Elements of culture, or cultural complexes, 
pass from person to person within a group, or from group to group, and, 
eventually reaching a thoroughly conventionalized form, may take an 
established place in the general mass of culture possessed by a specific 
group. Whether we deal with an institution, a mode of conduct, a story, 
or an art form, the conventionalized product varies from group to group, 
so that it may come to be the very characteristic we use when we wish 
most sharply to differentiate one social group from another.  
(Bartlett, 1995: 118) 
The connection between Bartlett’s findings and the principles of Social 
Representation theory has been traced before (Jahoda, 1988). Bartlett and 
Moscovici both focus on the conventionalization implied in 
understanding and retaining unfamiliar information. Both argue that 




5.8 Principles generating standpoints: Social 
Representations as Ideologies 
In this paragraph I discuss the notion of ideology, a key concept for 
the whole argument of my work. According to the theory, Social 
Representations are located in individual minds and in the world, 
embodied in discourse and in all forms of communicative artifacts. As 
cognitive elements SRs have a mediating effect between a stimulus and 
the response it prompts. As discourses they constitute an environment in 
which social members are immersed. Like prejudice, ideologies and 
mental schemata, representations influence the way we perceive the 
world. Critics of the theory have pointed out that it is hard to distinguish 
SRs from these other key notions (Jahoda, 1988). Like ideologies, SRs 
are not simply a series of unrelated beliefs; they make up a whole 
structure, a worldview.  Representations are networked and anchored in 
several ways: anchored to their holders, their values and wider beliefs, 
anchored to the social class which expresses representations, and finally 
anchored to the specific position occupied by a certain social actor in 
respect to a particular issue (Doise, 1992). Moscovici is famous for 
programmatically resisting clear-cut definitions of the concept of Social 
Representations, on the ground that simple propositions could not 
describe appropriately such a complex series of concepts (Moscovici & 
Marková, 1998). However, other exponents of the theory have offered 
definitions. I report here the classic formulation of Doise, because it is 
clear, and because it guides my own use of the notion of social 
representations. As will be obvious, this definition emphasizes certain 
aspects of the theory while it leaves others behind. Doise starts with a 
quotation from Bourdieu, who in his work on the production of beliefs 
wrote: 
on n’achète pas un journal mais un principe gènèrateur de prises de 
position dèfini par une certain position distinctive dans un champ  de 
principes gènèrateurs institutionalisès de prises de position 






[(When you buy a newspaper), you don’t buy a newspaper but a 
principle generating viewpoints. This generating principle is 
characterized by a certain distinct position within a field of 
institutionalized principles which themselves generate viewpoints]. 
 
Newspapers, very much like social representations, offer a whole 
perspective, a particular vantage point from which to look at facts and 
make assessments. Bourdieu also explains what produces such prises de 
position. Belonging to a certain social class or the professional 
relationship with a certain topic has great impact on how individuals and 
groups interpret the world and come to terms with new phenomena.  
 
l’on peut poser qu’un acteur se sentira d’autant plus complètement et 
adéquatement exprimé que l’omologie sera plus parfaite entre la 
position de son journal dans le champ des organes de presse et la 
position qui’il occupe lui-même das le champ des classes (ou fractions 
de classe), fondament générateur de ses opinions. 
(Bourdieu 1977: 15 as quoted in Doise, 1986: 82) 
[One can hypothesize that an actor will feel that he has been expressed 
the more entirely and adequately the more perfect is the level of 
homology between the position of his newspaper within the field of 
printed media and the position that he himself occupies within the field 
of social classes (or fractions of classes), which is the fundamental 
element generating his opinions.]  
 
Following Bourdieu, Doise offers the following definition:  
les reprèsentations sociales sont del principles gènèrateurs de prises de 
position lièe à des insertions spècifiques dans un ensemble de rapports 
socioux et organisant les processus symboliques intervenant dan ces 
rapports.  




[Social representations are principles generating standpoints; they are 
linked to specific intersections within a group of social relations. They 
organize the symbolic processes which operate inside those social 
relations] 
 
The symbolic process is what moves from a sign to what the sign stands 
for. Social Representations organize this process, affecting the way in 
which we interpret images and facts. This definition is coherent with 
Moscovici’s insistence on the effect of SRs on how we think. However, 
unlike Moscovici, Doise makes no mention of the familiarizing function 
of SRs. Doise’s definition puts the notion of Social Representations close 
to the notion of ideology understood as a body of structured beliefs 
which guide an individual or a group. Some scholars within the paradigm 
of Social Representations theory explicitly fuse the two concepts. 
Wagner and Hayes for instance write that “it appears that one can 
subsume the essential features of ideologies for social-psychological 
purposes under the concept of ‘social representation’ (Wagner & Hayes, 
2005: 53). Conversely, within the area of Discourse Analysis, van Dijk 
(1999) makes use of the notion of social representations as a synonym of 
ideology, and he elects the latter term over the former. Like ideologies, 
Social Representations are socially shared cognitive structures; I shall use 
the two terms as synonyms. The notion of Social Representations has 
advantages over that of ideology. ‘Ideology’ is a broad notion and 
resonates with different scholarly traditions. ‘Ideology’ in the Marxian 
tradition implies a biased, distorted perspective, and implicitly assumes 
the existence of a non prejudiced, scientific or more authentic perspective 
(Eagleton, 1991). If there is an “ideological” version of facts, one 
implicitly assumes that there can be a realistic one. I do not share this 
view. As Wetherell and Potter put it: 
Our account of objects always construct those objects in certain ways 
and this construction is inescapable. Some versions of reality may be 
infinitely preferable to others, and should be argued for and pushed 






(Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 62) 
However, constructed is not the same as ideological; the two concepts 
must be kept distinguished. While there is not “versionless” reality, 
ideological discourse is characterized by its relevance for matters of 
power relations in society. Many discourses  encompass a dimension 
relevant to the current balance of social power, but not all of them do. 
Ideology is particularly relevant in discourses that focus on matters such 
as the distribution of resources and the authority to make decisions that 
affect society. Furthermore, ideological discourse invariably relies on a 
polarized tension between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (van Dijk, 1998) where the 
opposing pronouns can in turn identify clearly defined social groups, or 
the changeable associations of individual positioning within a given 
interaction. Bourdieu has criticized the concept of ideology in the 
Marxian tradition, particularly in Althusser, whom he accuses of having 
“a sort of a religious notion by which you must climb by degrees to the 
truth, never being sure to have achieved the true Marxist theory”. ( 
Bourdieu & Eagleton, 1994: 267) According to Bourdieu, ‘ideology’ 
retains the notion of “separation between the true knowledge – the 
possessor of science – and false consciousness” (ibidem). Boudieu 
further argues that “Marxism, in fact, remains a sort of Cartesian 
philosophy, in which you have a conscious agent who is the scholar, the 
learned person, and the others who don’t have access to consciousness”. 
(Bourdieu & Eagleton, 1994:268) On this ground Bourdieu actually 
rejects the term and instead adopts the concept of doxa, spontaneous 
belief or opinion, a notion which emphasizes how certain ideas are 
naturalized and come to gain the status of unquestioned reality. 
Bourdieu’s point, which is of great relevance for my own project, is that 
consciousness is not at the core of social life. 
 
The social world does not work in terms of representation. The social 
world doesn’t work in terms of consciousness; it works in terms of 
practices, mechanisms, and so forth. By using doxa we accept many 




(Bourdieu & Eagleton, 1994:268) 
 
I agree with Bourdieu’s reflections on the necessity to move from an 
emphasis on the relevance of consciousness to an emphasis on the 
relevance of practices in the reproduction of systems of power. 
Discursive practices clearly fall within the realm of practices. Their 
strength is in the contribution they make to something very concrete, 
what Bourdieu’s calls “the unconscious manipulation of the body”. By 
naturalizing certain power relations – Bourdieu makes the example of 
male domination – linguistic exchanges act as powerfully and forcibly as 
economic exchanges. (See Bourdieu & Eagleton, 1994:271). Moscovici’s 
theory has the advantage of focusing explicitly on the observable social 
process by which new events are shown to receive interpretations 
dictated by ideologies in given segments of society. Furthermore, the 
term “Social Represenations” is not burdened by a long history of 
scholarly debate as much as the term “ideology” is. However, the term 
“ideology” has the advantage to focus specifically on power relationships 
within society. In this respect “Social Representations” is perhaps too 
general a term. None of the two notions is perfect then. With these 
premises, I shall use the terms Social Representations or ideology when I 
refer to the structured set of power-related beliefs that seem to be the 
backdrop, the unspoken frame of reference of participants’ discourses.  
5.9 Criticisms of Social Representations 
Theory 
SRT has provided the theoretical frame for hundreds of empirical 
studies in Europe and in South America, including authoritative 
treatments of the reception of biotechnologies in Europe (Wagner & 
Kronberger, 2001,  Bauer & Gaskell, 2002a ). However the theory has 





discuss some of this criticism, particularly from the perspective of 
Discursive Psychology. 
5.9.1 Theoretical vagueness 
Some authors, while espousing the theoretical framework of the 
discipline lament that the vast array of methodologies used in studies 
within SRT reveals a “lack of conceptual clarity” (Bauer & Gaskell, 
1999). The success of the theory and its versatility have also meant that it 
has been used to provide theoretical grounds for studies so different in 
their scope and method that looking beyond the “brand name” it is hard 
to keep clear what belongs to the theory and what does not. Bauer and 
Gaskell’s criticism is hard to deflect:  Because such different methods are 
appropriate for different analytical questions, how can all reveal the same 
kind of social representations, if, that is, SRs can be appropriately 
characterized as a clear analytical object in the first place? Either the 
Theory of Social Representations is not well defined; or it is not a theory 
at all, since its explanatory power does not have a well defined field of 
application (Potter & Litton, 1985). If the notion of Social 
Representations cannot be clearly set apart from other key notions in 
social psychology, like beliefs and attitudes, then there is no special and 
unique object of enquiry. Fraser for instance has claimed that SRs and 
attitudes are “largely interchangeable and a fusion of the two would be 
desirable” (Fraser, 1994:2). Critics discussing empirical works within 
SRT have asserted that “it is difficult not be impressed by the strong 
contrast between high statistical precision [of the studies] on one hand 
and theoretical vagueness on the other” (Ibañez, 1992: 23). Ibañez 
recognizes that SRT focuses on the fundamental question of what is 
involved in social thinking. However, Ibañez points out that on the one 
hand the general propositions of SRT are widely shared within social 
psychology and are unoriginal; on the other hand the more specific 
claims of the theory are original but disputable. In particular, Ibañez 
asserts that there is general agreement that  
people construct actively and collectively their beliefs, knowledges [sic] 




society. There is also a long standing agreement on the fact that these 
societal knowledge, beliefs and feelings are tied to specific group 
membership [and] that they originate in everyday communication 
[omissis]  
(Ibañez, 1992: 22). 
Moscovici’s prolific (and sometimes self contradictory) writings over the 
last forty five years on one hand, and the diverse contributions of 
influential scholars in the field on the other, make it hard to identify 
univocally the basic standpoints of the approach and pinpoint an 
orthodox version of the theory. (See for instance the remarkable distance 
between the characterizations of the theory by Marková (2000) and 
Wagner & Hayes (2005).) Conversely, flexibility has been a key factor in 
the success of the approach.  
5.9.2 Novelty and Social Representations 
A central tenet of the theory is that SRs allow social groups to come 
to terms with new phenomena and to understand new facts by integrating 
them into the structured wealth of knowledge and values which is already 
the patrimony of the group. These assumptions fit well with studies 
which look at how society receives novelty, particularly novel scientific 
findings, and how scientific discoveries become part of lay knowledge. 
Wagner for instance writing about the reception of biotechnologies has 
developed the notion of ‘collective symbolic coping’ with the new 
technology (Wagner & Kronberger, 2001). However, SRT has been used 
to study all sort of phenomena, some of which, like food (Lahlou, 2002), 
madness (Jodelet, 1989), gender (Lloyd & Duveen, 1992), may be of 
great socio-psychological significance but do not necessarily involve 
novelty. Still, Moscovici (1988), responding to criticisms, has made clear 
that SRTs are not generated by novelty itself but by the need to make 
familiar something unknown or otherwise distant or troubling. 
Homosexuality is as old as sexuality, but it generates social 
representations. This is especially true when a new event – like the 





and of everyday conversations. Most likely, sexuality in general may 
generate social representations (see for instance Wagner, Elejabarrieta & 
Lahnsteiner, 1995). Still, it remains unclear if it is appropriate to speak of 
social representations of domestic animals, fashion or driving. 
5.9.3 Sacred and profane: the consensual and the 
reified universe 
Social Representations Theory holds that “everyday thinking differs 
fundamentally from scientific reasoning” (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). One 
particularly controversial aspect of the theory is its position about the 
existence of two clearly distinct “universes”, the reified and the 
consensual. While the reified universe is the realm of science, the 
consensual is the realm of everyday life, the realm of social 
representations. Quoting McDougall Moscovici re-asserts that “Thinking, 
by aid of the collective representations, is said to have its own laws quite 
distinct from the laws of logic” (Moscovici, 1984b:10). Moscovici 
advocates the coexistence of different, even contradictory reasoning 
systems in individuals, a phenomenon he calls “cognitive polyphasia” 
(Moscovici, 1976). This standpoint rejects the untenable model of the 
everyday person as an unrealistic “scientist, statistician and bookkeeper” 
(Wagner & Hayes, 2005:73). The rational model of the subject fails to 
explain the behavior not only of the everyday person but of the scientist 
as well. However, Moscovici also insists on the radical difference 
between the scientific and the “everyday” worlds: 
The contrast between the two universes has a psychological impact. The 
boundary between them splits collective and, indeed, physical reality in 
two. It is readily apparent that the sciences are the means by which we 
understand the reified universe, while social representations deal with 
the consensual. The purpose of the first is to establish a chart of the 
force, objects and events which are independent of our desires and 
outside of our awareness and to which we must react impartially and 
submissively. By concealing values and advantages they aim at 
encouraging intellectual precision and empirical evidence. 




give it shape, explaining objects and events so that they become 
accessible to everyone and coincide with our immediate interests.” 
 (Mosovici, 1984b: 22). 
This position has been extensively criticized on the grounds that it seems 
to imply a concession to positivism. SRT has been attacked for assuming 
that while lay people live in a consensual world, based on shared 
knowledge and its necessary prejudices, science resides in an essentially 
different and more ‘real’ universe. The critical point has been articulated 
by Purkhardt (1993) and is shared by scholars within the paradigm 
(Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). I argue that a necessary distinction must be 
made between scientific/logical reasoning on the one hand and the 
practices and institutions of science on the other. In the light of the last 
fifty years of studies in the sociology of science (Latour & Woolgar, 
1979, Latour, 1987) it cannot be sustained that scientific practice should 
be placed above and beyond the realm of social representations and in a 
different realm of  “objective” facts. Moscovici’s two cognitive universes 
can better be described as cognitive postures, frames of mind. In this 
sense the two universes can be associated with other distinctions made in 
psychology. For instance, the distinction between “rational thinking” and 
“experiential thinking” in Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST; 
Epstein, 1990) assumes that people have two modes of thinking, one 
rational (logical, analytic, dispassionate) and the other emotional and 
holistic, aiming not so much at finding the correct answer but at 
organizing and controlling threatening and incomplete information.  
Some passages in Moscovici appear do allow this interpretation. While 
scientific endeavor calls for open-minded exploration, the realm of 
everyday thinking boils down to reducing what’s new and disturbing to 
what is familiar: 
What I mean is, that consensual universes are places where everybody 
wants to feel at home, secure of any risk of friction or strife. All that is 
said and done there only confirms acquired beliefs and interpretations, 





(Moscovici, 1984b: 24)  
Common sense seeks closure, answers that provide at least temporary 
relief from uncertainty. On the contrary, the essence of scientific thought 
seems to rest precisely in posing questions, entertaining doubts, juggling 
uncertainty, and recognizing lack of knowledge for what it is. Sometimes 
in order to find good solutions we need to be able to coexist with 
ignorance for a long time, and possibly never to come to definitive 
answers. Individuals can shift from “scientific” to “non scientific” mode 
depending on social, emotional and cognitive needs. Nobody would ever 
buy lottery tickets if they were in a “scientific mode”, but obviously lots 
of people do, scientists included. In some descriptions of the theory, 
ways of thinking are described almost like clothes one wears for the 
appropriate occasion. As Wagner and Hayes put it: 
 
Contemporaries in Western and non-Western societies alike face a 
variety of situations where particular modes of reasoning fit better than 
others. Some are more useful in the family and in matters involving 
relatives, others are more apt for solving problems in political, 
economic, societal, religious or scientific matters. 
(Wagner & Hayes, 2005:234) 
I argue that the practices of reasoning in everyday tasks and in science 
belong to different social realms. Such realms have their own rules for 
what counts as appropriate evidence in a particular context. I will 
distinguish ‘Scientific reasoning’ as a cognitive posture--an inductive 
practice, characterized by logical argumentation, curiosity and inductive 
thought, something all humans, not scientists alone can in theory attain--
from science as profession and institution. My own argument against the 
idea that science might be set above and beyond the realm of social 
representations goes as follows: science is an institution and represents 
the apotheosis of the use of pre existing knowledge to understand new 
phenomena. There is a paradox in the division between reified and 




that capture our senses and affect our thought, why should science be the 
one domain in which we are stripped naked of all our previous 
knowledge and manage to reach above our own accumulated beliefs? In 
science more than in everyday life we constantly rely on the findings of 
others which we believe to be true and call knowledge, in order to further 
our own investigation. Moreover, scientific endeavors like the rest of 
people’s experiences are subject to the pressures and constraints of social 
life. My point is that scientific thinking is only part of what happens in 
science, and it is also part of what occurs in everyday thinking. Consider 
a trivial task which requires common-sense decision-making and 
compare it with scientific practice. While facing the task of choosing 
laundry soap, many factors come into play, “common sense” and 
“rational” or “logical” arguments among them.  One could think that 
choosing the soap on the basis of its cost/efficiency ratio is the rational 
way to proceed. However, we know that many other factors come into 
play when making such a decision. This is why billions are spent every 
year marketing products. Marketers tap into our emotions (Zaltman, 
2003) in order to build rationally non-justifiable preferences for a given 
product. Part of the logic that guides the purchase of laundry soap is 
about fulfilling the requirements of the community where the soap has to 
make its ‘contribution’. Will the children like it? Will the package fit in 
the cupboard where soaps are kept? The same holds for science. Science 
is an activity performed within a community, and there are precise but 
ever changing requirements that need to be fulfilled for a scientific report 
to be considered as making a contribution. There are fashions and 
accidents of history that have little to do with a strictly inductive 
“scientific” form of reasoning; these fashions enter into the practice of 
scientific enquiry and reporting because they are the requirements of the 
community to which the scientist belongs. Science is and has for long 
been an institutionalized establishment which sets its own rules and 
decides who is inside and who outside. There is no science without the 
approval of the community of fellow scientists.  There are group norms 
and customs that need to be addressed by any scientist and that are just as 





reasoning. For a start, one needs to address questions (empirical, 
methodological, and theoretical) that are currently important to one’s 
own community, for otherwise one’s work would be irrelevant. Most 
importantly, if thinking is, as Moscovici argues, inherently social, there is 
no better example than the scientific community to prove it. For it is 
under the supervision of senior scientist that young researchers forge 
their mentality, judgments, and prejudices. It is there that they learn what 
counts as science and what does not, what are the rules and practices of 
the art. So, if at the core of science there is a purely inductive, rational 
form of reasoning, I argue that this is partly also the case when the 
everyday person sets off to buy a bag of soap. And if then we are to 
consider other factors that clearly affect scientific production, like the 
likelihood of one’s research being funded or having the opportunity to 
work on a “hot” topic, these are collateral factors of the kind likely also 
to influence the purchase of soap. Can we argue that they are part of the 
scientific way of thinking? Maybe not: they are corollary elements that 
weigh on one’s ultimate decision, but so is the case for the decision to 
buy one kind of soap over another.  
5.10 Social Representations and the 
communicative process 
From my perspective, the most problematic aspect of SRT lies in its 
lack of attention to what happens in the communicative process. This is 
the reason why I began my investigation within the paradigm of social 
representations and ended up on the shores of Discursive Psychology. 
SRT since Moscovici’s early studies puts great emphasis on the 
communicative process, conceptualized as the constant flux of 
information that we are immersed in and contribute to.  It is in the 
“unceasing bubble” (Moscovici, 1984a.: 950) of everyday chatting that 
social representations are acquired, exchanged and transformed.  In his 
study on the reception of psychoanalysis, Moscovici (1976) characterizes 




1950s: diffusion, propagation and propaganda. These three forms of 
communication have produced different social representations of 
psychoanalysis within different social milieus in French society. While a 
neutrally informative style of communication aimed at the general public 
generated acceptance of psychoanalysis, a partisan, agenda-driven 
description aimed at the readers of communist press resulted in the 
rejection of psychoanalysis as ‘capitalist’ and thus corrupted practice 
(Moscovici, 1976). Huguet, Latanè & Bourgeois (1998) have shown that 
with passing time social representations of human rights become more 
uniform, that is shared, between persons who with some frequency 
discuss and exchange viewpoints on the subject. This finding may appear 
uncontroversial. Social beliefs are most likely acquired and exchanged in 
society through the communicative process. The problem is that human 
communication happens fundamentally though language. Even if visual 
communication is a powerful medium, it is parasitical on concepts that 
are acquired and exchanged through language (van Dijk, 1998). For 
instance, an image that appeared in the mid nineties in Austrian 
magazines accompanying articles on GMOs showed two latex gloved 
hands injecting something with a syringe into a tomato (see Wagner & 
Kronberger, 2001). Such an image could have meant many different 
things to someone who had never heard about genetically modified 
organisms: are tomatoes sick and need injections? Is someone poisoning 
our tomatoes? With the appropriate commentary the image acquires a 
specific sense and from that moment becomes a powerful icon which 
vividly incorporates the uncanny features of genetically modified 
organisms. Social Representations are “means of constructing reality” 
(Moscovici 1988: 230), and most of the time they are formulated 
linguistically and to this extent language dependent. Since much of our 
making sense of reality and transmitting it is linguistically bound, 
language is one of the key instruments for constructing reality. Language 
also tells us about the author of a “representation” and reveals how the 
depictions provided are intertwined with larger sets of beliefs and 
expectations. Moscovici has attributed importance to linguistic 





psychoanalysis in France (Moscovici, 1976: 407). However, in practice 
SRT remains primarily a cognitive endeavor, in that little attention is 
paid to the complex ways representations are exchanged within a social 
encounter - the natural setting for the creation and transformation of 
socially shared beliefs. This is the main criticism aimed at the theory 
coming by discourse oriented psychology. Potter and Edwards note that 
within the practice of SR studies, conversation  
has the anomalous position of being at the heart of the SRT as the 
engine for the generation and refinement of representations, and yet 
being a topic which has received no analytic attention, and where the 
relevant literature in conversation analysis (…) has been ignored 
 (Potter & Edwards, 1999: 449). 
Sociology, linguistic pragmatics, anthropology, sociolinguistics, and 
discourse analysis as partially overlapping but distinguished disciplines 
have all struggled to develop concepts and methodological instruments 
aimed at the study of the phenomenon that lies at the very heart of social 
knowledge, namely everyday informal conversations between people in 
social encounters. However within SRT these instruments are not used 
and research is mostly carried out using methods appropriate for a non 
anthropological social psychology: questionnaires, content-focused 
interviews, content analysis of media, word association tasks. Authors 
within the paradigm of SRs notice that ethnography is an effective 
methodology to research communities and remark that “it is perhaps a 
little surprising that ethnography has not been widely used in the study of 
Social Representations” (Wagner & others, 1999:103) although there are 
some important exceptions (Jodelet, 1989; Lloyd & Duveen 1992).  
While one is more likely to understanding children through observation 
than through questionnaires, social representations in adults are usually 
studied by asking them what they think of a given phenomenon.  
Representations are as a result constructed as mostly mental entities 
extracted from subjects by elicitation, with little attention to how they 
naturally emerge in everyday life and how they are conveyed between 




relation between what is thought and what is said. What is said thus 
transmits thought to the researcher, who proceeds to code and classify it. 
This linear assumption is perhaps not a problem with measurable data, 
like wealth or votes, but it becomes an issue for action data of any kind. 
Speech, as it has been extensively argued, is action (Austin, 1975; Clark, 
1996). 
5.11 The meaning of communicative action 
A need to articulate further the mechanisms of meaning construction 
in social research is not an issue for SR theory alone. Rather it is an 
ongoing problem for all sciences that deal with interpretative data. The 
matter can be subsumed under the vexing question of what exactly social 
studies measure when data are the result of intentional communication: 
filling out a questionnaire, participating in an interview or any other 
experimental setting which requires subjects to give accounts and 
assessments.As Habermas argues, the problem of the measurement of 
social facts is linked to that of the “transformation of communicative 
experiences into data” (Habermas, 1990: 100). Otherwise put, when we 
measure interactional data, what are we measuring? What is the 
epistemological status of the responses we classify, count and use to 
further a certain line of argument? Habermas frames the problem of the 
role of interpretation in the measurement of social facts as follows: 
Standards of measurement are rules in accordance with which everyday 
experiences that have been interpreted in ordinary language are 
reorganized and transformed into scientific data. No such interpretation 
is fully determined by the experienced material itself”. 
(Habermas, 1990: 97) 
Habermas finds some answers in the phenomenological approach of 
Aaron Cicourel, whom he quotes extensively:  
The precise measurement of social process requires first the study of the 





the use of day-to-day language categories and the non linguistic shared 
cultural experiences inform every social act and mediate (in a way 
which can be conceptually designated and empirically observed) the 
correspondence required for precise measurement. The literal 
measurement of social acts (…) requires the use of linguistic and non 
linguistic meanings that cannot be taken for granted but must be viewed 
as objects of study. In other words, measurement presupposes a 
bounded network of shared meanings, i.e. a theory of culture.  The 
physical scientist alone defines his observational field, but in social 
science the arena of discourse usually begins with the subjects’ 
preselected and preinterpreted cultural meanings. Because the observer 
and the subject share cultural meanings interwoven with the language 
system they both employ for communication, the shared everyday 
meanings and the particular language used by the sociologist form a 
basic element of the measurement of social acts.  
Cicourel, (1964) quoted in Habermas (1990: 104). 
The possibility of measuring social facts depends on the possibility of 
understanding the rules that determine how meanings are constructed in 
communication: 
(…) The “rules” governing the use of language and the meanings 
conveyed by linguistic and non-linguistic utterances and gestures are 
unclear and remain an almost untouched problem for empirical 
research. If the “rules” governing the use of language to describe 
objects and events in everyday life and in sociological discourse are 
unclear, then the assignment of numerals or numbers to the properties of 
objects and events according to some relatively congruent set of rules 
will also reflect a lack of clarity.  
(Cicourel, 1964 quoted in Habermas,1990:105) 
These are not the rules of grammar, but rather the “fundamental rules to 
which communicative action in the world of everyday life conforms” 
(Habermas, 1990: 105). These are social norms embedded, intertwined, 




socio-linguistic competence. By paying attention to the rules of 
communicative action, studies in ethnomethodology, sociolinguistics, 
pragmatics and discourse analysis have focused on the conventional ways 
people accomplish things in interaction, including giving descriptions, 
offering opinions and manifesting attitudes. The findings of these 
disciplines can shed some light on the socially dependent ways in which 
representations are formulated in communication and thus improve our 
insight on representations themselves.  
5.12 From inner states to linguistic action: 
Discursive Psychology 
One example might clarify how the rules of communicative action shape 
verbal data. In the course of a research interview it happens that 
participants will talk in ways that we normally associate with 
incompatible attitudes. The phenomenon has been exemplified by 
Wetherell and Potter (1988). The authors provide two quotes expressing 
opposed views, which turn out to have been issued by the same person in 
the course of the same interview. Such occurrences can be problematic if 
one assumes that the expression of viewpoints is linked to holding stable 
beliefs. Because the two opinions are expressed during the same 
interaction in the very same setting, we cannot easily explain the 
phenomenon as cognitive polyphasia. Rather than assuming that sane 
people think/believe one thing and its opposite at the same time, 
proponents of discursive psychology programmatically avoid the 
question of what people think and instead look at the expressions of 
opinion as instances of social action, as performances (Edwards, 2005: 
266). Voicing a certain view is treated as a way of claiming an image for 
oneself, or as a strategy for avoiding blame, or persuading the 
interlocutor. As has been argued exhaustively, the “rules of 
communicative action” involve a complex interplay of position-taking in 
the context of what is often a recorded, institutional interaction. They 





1967). Within discourse-oriented psychology,  some have tried to give a 
very different explanation for the expression of self-contradictory 
opinions. Billig has proposed that self-contradiction might be involved in 
the process of understanding. He argued that the expression of 
contradictory views rather then being a symptom of internal confusion 
can actually serve cognitive aims. Voicing contradictory views can be a 
way in which people think aloud, jostle with different opinions and 
consider them in their various aspects. (Billig, 1987; 1991a; 1991b). 
Unfortunately, because of the nature and the objectives of “opinion-
collection” studies, both the pervasive impact of the necessity to protect 
one’s social persona while responding on a controversial topic and the 
cognitive role of self contradiction, confusion and “voiced thinking” in 
the replies must be downplayed. When the aim of a study is to “count 
thoughts” thoughts must be reduced to countable items, which for the 
purpose of the study must be assumed to be consistent and discrete units. 
The works of Billig, Wetherell and Potter mark the beginning of a turn in 
social psychology that proposes to substitute the study of inner states 
with the study of linguistic action (Potter & Weherell, 1987; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1988; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The 
‘Discursive Psychology’ approach is born in polemic, questioning the 
common assumption within social psychology of the existence of  what 
Billig calls ‘ghostly essences’ (Billig, 1987).  These might include 
attitudinal systems understood as well formed cognitive structures which 
are conceived as residing in people’s minds, lying behind what they say 
and do, and impinging on surface phenomena including both talk and 
non-linguistic behavior. Discursive psychology assumes that the 
phenomena to be studied are those produced during social interaction and 
not what is behind the conversation or the behavior. Among exponents of 
DP, Billig has argued that precisely by studying language use one studies 
the process of thinking. According to Billig thought simply cannot be 
distinguished from its expression in argumentative conversations: 
Cognitive psychologists have assumed that thinking is a mysterious 
process, lying behind outward behaviour. However, the response and 




manifestation of the ‘real’ processes of thought. The remarks are the 
thoughts: one need not search for something extra, as if there is 
always something lying behind the words, which we should call the 
`thought'. Wittgenstein put the point graphically: `When I think in 
language, there aren't meanings going through my mind in addition to 
the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought’ 
(1953: remark 329). [Omissis] In short, to discover what is being 
thought, when words are uttered, the observer should analyse the 
rhetorical complexity of the utterances themselves. Thus, discussions, 
in which people are responding rapidly to new dialogic challenges and 
are in their turn creating such challenges, offer the psychologist a 
royal road to examining thinking in action. 
(Billig, 1997b) 
Introspection tells us that even when one thinks alone, in silence, the 
thought process relies on language. However, I notice a contradiction 
between a strategic notion of language use on the one hand and what 
Billig proposes here, which is a view of language use as, once again, a 
route to thought. One would think that either we are opportunistic 
performers who express an unlimited number of attitudes, shifting from 
one to another depending on social necessities, or else that we really exist 
cognitively “on the surface,” thinking socially and transparently. 
Unfortunately Billig’s position does not account for the obvious fact that 
people lie, which shows that it is not always the case that “the remarks 
are the thoughts”; there is a distinction between what we think and what 
we say. However, Billig’s line of argument accounts for a particular kind 
of interaction and private talking which is crucial in the life of the self. 
Billig’s emphasis on the role of dilemmatic thinking proposes that 
thought is essentially argumentative, a proposition which resounds with 
Bakhtin’s notions of “inner speech” and dialogism and is in agreement 
with dialogically oriented versions of SRT (Marková, 2000). The 
discursive approach proposed by Billig, Potter, Wetherell and Edwards 
provides a new perspective within social psychology for analyzing the 
ways people give opinions, remember and express attitudes. The 





action, usually performed outside a lab, in more natural settings, 
precisely in the usual conditions where social representations are 
supposed to be created and exchanged. In particular, the approach does 
not treat responses as free standing manifestations of inner states. The 
level of enquiry is on the action being performed linguistically. 
Discursive psychology is now a well established approach with 
thematically specialized versions. In particular in the works of Edwards 
the focus is often on the use people make of psychological terms, like 
‘thinking’, ‘believing’ or ‘feeling’. The fundamental standpoints of DP 
can be briefly outlined in a schematic way: 
 
1. Discourse is a social practice, an empirical phenomenon rather 
than an abstraction or an epiphenomenon linked to inner states. 
2. The analysis focuses only on discourse with no attention to its 
supposed referent, be that reality or what is in people’s minds. 
3. Discourse is an activity which “gets things done” (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992) 
4. The research deals with naturally occurring data. Talk is 
transcribed verbatim-  
5. The enquiry is concerned with the content of text and talk and 
looks at social aspects of it. As Potter and Wetherell wrote: 
“Our concern is not purely with discourse per se; that is, we are 
not linguists attempting to add social awareness to linguistics 
through the addition of the study of pragmatics. We are social 
psychologists expecting to gain a better understanding of social 
life and social interaction from our study of social text”. (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987 p.7).  
6. The analysis aims to reveal the function a certain discourse has 
in a given moment, the aims, interactional or otherwise social, 
which are pursued through discourse. 
 
I largely share the rationale of this approach. I hold that the analysis of 
discourse is useful for doing social psychology; it neither substitutes for 




discipline that deals with verbal expressions of attitudes, evaluations and 
descriptions needs a well spelled-out theory of what happens in the 
course of social interaction. A structured interview and an experimental 
setting in which participants are required to express their views or 
imagine dilemmas and give their opinions on an imaginary scenario are 
first of all social encounters; the views expressed therein must be looked 
at as instances of social action. In any social context, giving an opinion is 
not simply (if at all) the expression of an inner state; it amounts to 
“taking a stance in a controversial matter”(Billig, 1991a). The same is 
true for the expression of attitudes. According to Billig attitudes should 
be approached in their rhetorical context because they are stances 
expressed in public. Billig asserts that subjects mostly do not possess a 
clear cut system of reference that they pull out when asked to express an 
opinion. Rather, they flexibly produce standpoints that are dependent on 
the context of expression and on the scope of the actual situation. The 
expression of attitudes is social in the sense that attitudes divide and unite 
people. Attitudes about items on which everybody agrees are not even 
discussed. A certain level of controversy is a necessary part of an 
attitude; thus expressing an attitude is equivalent to taking a stance in a 
debate. As Billig puts it: “an attitude is not merely an expression of the 
attitude-holder’s viewpoint; it is also an implicit, or explicit, opposition 
to a counter-viewpoint” (Billig, 1993: 57) One way to study attitudes as 
articulated stances is to study how discussions unfold and how people 
engaged in a conversation express themselves. By looking at dialogue 
one can access the process of thought, but not a person’s thoughts as 
objects.  Traditional social psychology focuses on more or less stable 
grids in people’s mind, on mental schemata or coherently displayed 
attitudes, and the mind is modeled as a receptacle of propositional 
thoughts. DP does not concern itself with these features of the mind, and 
instead it looks at thought as the process that it is generated and modified 
during the activity of interaction. What we see in action during 
conversation is not a reflection of the content of someone’s mind; it is the 
ongoing process of constructing a coherent and defendable version of 





the social, often institutional setting of the encounter and the scope and 
aims of the participants in the encounter. 
5.13 Interpretative repertoires 
Within a constructionist sociological framework, Gilbert and Mulkay 
(1984) used the notion of ‘interpretative repertoire’ in their studies on the 
rhetorical construction of scientific facts. As Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) 
found interviewing scientists, the development of a scientific theory and 
its results are narrated in radically different ways depending on the 
context of the account. In public texts scientists recount the process of 
construction and corroboration of a scientific discovery as a procedure in 
which theory, methodology and empirical evidence take their idealized 
places. In this kind of narrative, the world is made of objective facts that 
are discovered thanks to scientific procedure. However, during ‘hats off’ 
conversations the very same process can emerge as a much less coherent 
progression which incorporates interpersonal dynamics, often involving 
curious inversions between empirical corroboration and theoretical 
hypotheses. Some arguments, with correlated lexicons and distinct 
overall linguistic registers (the “empiricist repertoire”) are appropriate for 
an institutional context, while others (which are labeled the “contingent 
repertoire”) are used in informal situations, usually in the context of 
describing things that went wrong. Gilber and Mulkay’s point is that both 
repertoires converge to provide an image of science as factual and 
objective. While the “empiricist” repertoire offers a polished and 
coherent depiction of the progression of science, where everything falls 
into the right place, the contingent repertoire downplays failures (for 
instance a difficulty to replicate the desired experimental result) as 
“contingent”. The difficulty to replicate an experiment may for instance 
be ascribed to human error. By these means, what could be potentially a 
serious objection to the correctness of a theory is represented as non 
problematic. 
The concept of Interpretative Repertoire has been developed within 




Wetherell and Potter, 1988; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and constitutes a 
content-related analytic unit for researching representations in discourse: 
In dealing with lay explanations the analyst often wishes to describe the 
explanatory resources to which speakers have access and to make 
interpretations about patterns in the content of the material. The 
interpretative repertoire is a summary unit at this level. Repertoires can 
be seen as the building blocks speakers use for constructing versions of 
actions, cognitive processes and other phenomena. Any particular 
repertoire is constituted out of a restricted range of terms used in a 
specific stylistic and grammatical fashion. Commonly these terms are 
derived from one or more key metaphors and the presence of a 
repertoire will often be signalled by certain tropes or figures of speech.  
(Wetherell & Potter, 1988: 172). 
The unit of analysis is located at the level of speakers’ linguistic 
“explanatory resources”. In a study of racist discourses in New Zealand 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992), the authors found that white middle class 
New Zealanders when interviewed often argued that aborigines are a 
cultural patrimony, apparently showing appreciation for aborigines. 
However within the same interview respondents would also express 
strikingly racist views of aborigines. The two authors consider ‘Cultural 
patrimony’ not the expression of an attitude toward aborigines but an 
interpretative repertoire. The interpretative repertoire is an argumentative 
articulation which serves different interpersonal aims in the course of the 
interaction. For instance it can give credibility to the speaker, toning 
down an otherwise blatantly racist position. This type of analysis moves 
from the study of inner states to verbal expressions. There is no explicit 
claim about what speakers think. Also, the units of analysis are not sets 
of individual attitudes or the attitudinal system of a single person. Rather, 
researchers illustrate the inner logic of the many discursive arguments 
persons use and modify for their immediate aims. The authors explore 
the effects of these widely shared discursive repertoires about aborigines 
and immigrants. They argue that the flexible deployment of widely 





native New Zealanders, one whose racist undertones are nonetheless hard 
to isolate and thus confront. Such a representation is possibly even more 
damaging and dangerous than any full fledged racist view, for it offers 
multifaceted justifications for social injustices. Repertoires have their 
own logic and terminology. Here is a further definition: 
By Interpretative repertoires we mean broadly discernible clusters of 
terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around 
metaphors or vivid images. In more structuralist language we can talk of 
these things as systems of signification and as the building blocks used 
for manufacturing versions of actions, self and social structures in talk.  
They are some of the resources for making evaluations, constructing 
factual versions and performing particular actions. Interpretative 
repertoires are pre-eminently a way of understanding the content of 
discourse and how that content is organized. Although stylistic and 
grammatical elements are sometimes closely associated with this 
organization, our analytic focus is not a linguistic one; it is concerned 
with language use, what is achieved by that use and the nature of the 
interpretative resources that allow that achievement.  
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 90).  
The interest of the authors is in rhetorical constructions. They focus on 
how forms of talk and writing give an effect of realism to particular 
versions of a story, which thus acquire the status of accepted fact. 
Realism in this kind of analysis is “a product of a historical developed 
familiarity in the use of discourses” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 94). 
Certain Interpretative Repertoires become cultural repertoires, 
‘commonplaces’ Billig (1991b) which are taken-for granted and seldom 
challenged in one society. The hermeneutic of the Interpretative 
Repertoire enquiry uses rhetorical categories: metaphors, effects derived 
from categorization, particularization, the use of vivid and systematically 
vague formulations, narrative techniques involving consensus and 
corroboration, polarization, lists and contrasts. Other categories used in 
DP are associated not with the linguistic form of expressions but with the 




inoculation” (Potter, 1996) is used to describe moves which downplay or 
deny the partisan interest of the speaker in matters under discussion, 
independently form how in the context such “inoculation” is performed. 
The categories I use in my study rely on the ones of DP. However, I also 
make use of more linguistically oriented tools and of the systematization 
proposed by van Dijk’s discourse analysis. I illustrate my categories in 
detail in the following chapter. DP shares many assumptions with 
discourse analysis inspired by the works of Foucault (Wetherell, 2001). 
However, exponents of DP have distanced themselves from versions of 
Critical Discourse Analysis in which the social practices of discourse are 
not analysed in detail. Arguably, when text is not the object of the 
attention, discourse analysis focuses on abstract entities which act upon 
each other to shape our reality. The analysis becomes what Wetherell and 
Potter call a patchwork or “tectonic study of discourses” (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992: 90). In these analyses the detail of the discursive context, in 
which ideologically loaded concepts are mobilised and thus filled with 
locally generated meaning, is lost because of lack of attention to the 
actual linguistic practices of participants.  
5.14 Criticisms to Discursive Psychology 
In my analysis of newspaper articles I use analytic units systematized 
by Theun van Dijk in his works on racist ideology (van Dijk 1995, 1998). 
I have found van Dijk’s categories useful when trying to describe the 
linguistic details of discourses about biotechnologies in the press. I 
wanted to pinpoint how stance is expressed in discourse at several levels, 
from the macro organization of a newspaper editorial to lexical choices 
and other micro features of text. Van Dijk’s emphasis on the influence of 
discourse in the construction and reproduction of racism, and his detailed 
linguistic analysis,  put his work close to that of Discourse Psychologists. 
However, van Dijk’s epistemic stance allies him closely with 
assumptions of SRT, by contrast with the epistemology of DP. Contrary 





van Dijk holds a realist position. His work on racism debunks discourses 
that mystify the reality of racist discrimination by representing issues 
related to minorities and immigration in a distorted manner, a position 
which implicitly commits him to a view that there must be a way of 
describing these issues closer to how things really are. Also, van Dijk 
keeps central a notion of ideology as shared representations with 
correlates in individual minds. He considers ideologies to be socially 
shared cognitive structures generated and exchanged in the 
communicative process. Accordingly, van Dijk has trenchant objections 
to the anti cognitive claims of DP. He argues that discursive 
psychologists have disposed of the operational concept of mind without 
having proposed a valid alternative. Criticizing discursive, rhetorical and 
social constructionist psychology van Dijk targets the works of Billig 
(Billig, 1987, 1988, 1991a,); Edwards and Potter (1992), Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) (see van Dijk, 1998:43 and 324, note 13). van Dijk 
formulates DP’s position about the concept of attitude as follows: 
Some social psychologists have criticized the traditional notion of 
attitude on (…) anti-cognitivist ground. They dispute that people ‘have’ 
something like attitudes in the first place, and that such attitudes control 
people’s actions or discourse. According to these critics, opinions or 
attitudes do not ‘exist’ at all, at least not as ‘fixed’ mental 
representations. They emphasize that opinions (like the mind in general) 
are social constructions. Moreover, these scholars emphasize that 
opinions should be defined in terms of their discursive formulation. For 
them, opinions vary with the context in which language-users 
rhetorically engage in debate or other interaction with other participants. 
Instead of attitudes, discursive ‘repertoires’ are proposed to account for 
such variations in the formulation of opinions. And if attitudes should 
‘exist’ mentally at all, they should rather be dynamically represented as 
some kind of rhetorical structure, or as an argument.  
(van Dijk, 1998:43) 
In the following pages, van Dijk argues against his characterization of the 




if all ‘non-observable’ mental entities would need to be dispensed with, 
we would also have to throw out beliefs in general, including 
knowledge, rules, and of course discourse meaning, among other 
cognitive notions. Moreover, interaction and discourse structures 
themselves are abstract and hence unobservable. The same is true for 
other practical and theoretical ‘unobservables’, such as groups, power, 
inequality, institutions, society and culture, which we also postulate (in 
a social theory) in order to be able to describe and explain people’s 
activities (‘behaviour’) among other things. In sum, if ‘observable’ were 
a criterion, neither commonsense nor theoretical analysis of action, 
discourse or society would be possible, no more than an analysis of 
people’s minds.”  
(van Dijk, 1998:43) 
Hence, van Dijk claims that DP is a form of interactionist or even 
behaviorist reduction that “fails to describe and to explain fundamental 
properties of both thinking and discourse”.(ibidem) van Dijk observes 
that  
denying the existence of attitudes because they are ‘unobservable’ 
would in this case be as silly as affirming such existence, simply 
because there would not be any direct evidence for either claim. This is 
the case for all properties of the mind. They are postulated, practically 
and theoretically, because they are real in their consequences: they 
explain how and why people can ‘meaningfully’ and ‘purposefully’ act 
and talk. They explain very powerful common-sense self observations: 
people know they think, they know they know they think, and they 
know they ‘have’ opinions, whether or not they express them, and even 
if they express them differently in different situations. 
(van Dijk, 1998: 45) 
Criticizing in particular the status of Interpretive Repertoires van Dijk 
asserts that 
they are left undefined as to their precise structure and status, or in fact 





of knowledge or belief, and hence mental. After all, we can hardly 
assume that repertoires are floating in the air or in people’s mouths. If 
they allow people to talk or understand talk and text, we have no 
alternative but to locate them in the minds of people, as in the case of 
grammars, discourse rules, norms, and indeed knowledge and beliefs. 
 (van Dijk, 1998: 45)  
Academic polemics are sometimes carried out by setting up a straw-man 
who is then easily trashed and burned. The position criticized is 
characterized in terms that the theory’s proponents would not recognize. 
Discursive Psychology points to limits of attitude research by 
challenging the assumption that respondents “pull out” pre-formed, de-
contextualized attitudes on request for the social researcher. Discursive 
Psychology also argues that talk is social action, thus to be analyzed as 
such, and not as the free standing expression of thought. However DP has 
not (as far as I understand) argued that what is unobservable does not 
exist, that interpretative repertoires have nothing to do with what goes on 
in people’s minds or that people have no minds at all. Repertoires (again, 
as far as I understand them) are ways of talking and understanding and 
are used ad hoc to further certain lines of arguments. What differentiates 
Repertoires from social representations - which too are ways of thinking 
and talking - is a programmatic emphasis on performance, the roots of 
which I will discuss in later paragraphs in this chapter. 
5.15 Limitation to Discourse 
Van Dijk criticizes also what he describes as a lack of interest on the 
part of DP in social practices. van Dijk claims that reducing the analysis 
to verbal ‘repertoires’ overlooks the fact that discrimination is based on 
prejudice, and that prejudice exists even when we cannot observe 
discriminatory behavior. Both proponents of DP and van Dijk are greatly 
concerned with the textual realization of communicative acts.  Both have 




adopts a realist position, exponents of DP propend for a relativist one 
(Wetherell, 2001:394). However, both van Dijk and DP researchers 
assume that text is a fundamental locus of the construction, exchange and 
modification of social reality. The rationale of discursive approaches is 
that discourses shape our perceptions and structure the social world we 
inhabit. However, a focus on discourse may be limiting. Restricting 
attention to verbal behavior ignores fundamental powerfully constitutive 
extra linguistic aspects of social life. Material structures and practices are 
left out of the analysis of discourse. While van Dijk criticizes DP for 
focusing on discourse over social practices, he himself chose to focus his 
attention on racist ideology as expressed in writing in a disturbing 
academic text (van Dijk 1998) and in a series of editorials in the New 
York Times (van Dijk, 1995), and not ‘in the field’ nor with other social 
artifacts . This is hardly surprising: the tools of textual discourse analysis 
are apt for analyzing language in use. Finally, DP researchers have made 
explicit that, although their work focuses on discourse, they do not 
consider discursive practices to be exhaustive of the constructing powers 
of social landscape (Wetherell & Potter, 1992:63). Material conditions, 
such as migration, war, finance, politics obviously shape nations and 
lives. However, material elements inevitably enter social life inseparably 
from the discourses that offer representations of, or give meaning to, 
those material elements. As such, discourse is constitutive of social life 
as much as material conditions. (See Wetherell & Potter, 1992 ibidem) 
5.16 Stakes, ideology and discourse 
One criticism moved to DP has to do with its anti-mentalist and 
contingently strategic notion of subjects’ agency. Within DP, the 
thoughts of participants, the ideas they might hold, are programmatically 
not taken into consideration. Further, subjects are not seen as carriers of 
the project or ideas of a group. Discourses thus conceived seem to have 
merely the function of fulfilling the contingent and ever changing 





perspective risks undermining the force of the analysis, for it locks voices 
and discourses in the ghetto of extemporary moves. On this subject, 
Carla Willig argued that: 
 
DP is unable to account for why particular individuals, or groups of 
individuals, pursue particular discourse objectives. Why is it that 
speakers work so hard to disclaim certain attributions? 
(…) 
in other words, DP assumes that all conversation is driven by stake and 
interest; however, it is unable to account for what motivates people to 
adopt, or fail to adopt, a particular stake or pursue, or fail to pursue, a 
particular interest. Put another way, DP brackets, and yet relies upon, a 
notion of motivation or desire, which it is incapable of theorizing.  
(Willig, 2001:102) 
Within the relativist frame of Discursive Psychology discourses are 
severed from out-in-the-world reality on the one hand, and from the 
reality of the self on the other. What is left is a very narrow window 
reasoning in which the analyst can argue why a participant expressed a 
certain view in a certain manner. In such an analysis, who decides that 
one argument represents the “real” view of the participant while another 
is merely a strategic maneuver? For instance how can we decide if one 
stance represents the ‘true’ racist self of the respondent while another is 
nothing more than a strategic concession to non-racist views? Within a 
constructionist and relativist perspective there is no real view, only 
narratives and accounts; there is no theoretical ground for attributing one 
stance or another to a given subject. This is a difficulty for Discursive 




5.17 Action, Cognition and the referential 
notion of language and communication 
Exponents of DP assert that the SRT approach is cognitive rather 
than action oriented (Edwards & Potter, 1999). This means that SRT 
focuses on the role social representations play in understanding 
phenomena. For instance, one could say that Catholics in France in the 
1960s understood psychoanalysis by analogy with the practice of the 
confession, a practice they were familiar with, while French communists 
understood it as a product of the bourgeois practices of the North 
Americans upper class and as such rejected it (Moscovici, 1976). DP 
proponents don’t deny the cognitive role of representations or ideologies, 
which would be utterly counter intuitive, but propose an overall different 
way of dealing with the concept of “understanding” or cognition. DP’s 
concept of cognition is rooted in a pragmatic notion of linguistic meaning 
which owes much to the works of Wittgenstein (1958) and Austin 
(1975). In my understanding the divide between the epistemologies of 
the two disciplines originates in the fact that SRT privileges referential 
uses of language, while DP has adopted an action oriented view of 
language and communication.  In the following sections, I clarify this 
distinction which in my view goes beyond the emphasis in DP on the 
strategic, action-oriented nature of the expressed attitudes (for instance in 
Edwards and Potter, 1992). In order not to banalize the action-oriented 
standpoint of DP I return to a long lasting debate in the philosophy of 
language and to a particular movement within the discipline, Logical 
Positivism, that developed an extreme version of what largely remains 
the received view of language within the social sciences.   
5.18 Logical Positivism 
The most celebrated representative of this philosophical movement is 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and its most celebrated illustration is offered by 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, first published in 1932. 





meaning and holds that truth conditions are central to the understanding 
of language. In short, within this paradigm we can say that to understand 
a sentence equals knowing the truth conditions of that sentence. For 
instance, according to this approach, I understand the sentence: 
 
 The cat is on the mat 
 
if I know its truth conditions: if the cat is on the mat than the sentence is 
true and if the cat is not on the mat, the sentence is false. In order to be 
able to assign truth values we must also be able to univocally identify the 
referents for ‘cat’ and ‘mat’, and so on. This is a view of language that 
focuses on the capacity language has to represent, to describe things, 
leaving aside the social and ritual aspects of language, often described as 
phatic or emotive and treated as distinct and marginal in respect to the 
core language functions of reference and predication. This theoretical 
standpoint has a number of corollaries and consequences: 
1 The essence of language is its representational capacity 
2 The default, syntactic model of the language unit is the statement, a 
description (like “the cat is on the mat”). All other occurrences are 
interpreted on the basis of this baseline model and are reducible to this 
original form. 
3 All linguistic productions not reducible to the essential sentence type 
are either nonsensical or irrelevant. 
4 Communication consists in exchanging meanings contained in 
statements  
Notoriously, Wittgenstein changed his mind and became a proponent of a 
radically different view of language meaning. At the beginning of his 
Philosophical Investigations (first published in 1953) Wittgenstein 
illustrates the referential view of language with a quote from Augustine. 
Augustine’s view of language inspired the Tractatus Logico 
Philosophicus and remains, implicitly or explicitly, a common view of 
language meaning and communication: It offers, as W. puts it, “a 





It s this: the individual words in language name objects - sentences are 
combination of such names. – In this picture of language we find the 
roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is 
correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands 
Wittgenstein, 1958. I 
This embodies the idea that language carries meaning from the form of 
words (the sound, the smear of ink on a page) to its content, the concept 
which the word embodies. Having been one important contributor of the 
Logical Positivism movement, which relies precisely on this notion of 
language, Wittgenstein sets off to tear apart such model and proposes an 
alternate perspective on linguistic meaning.  
5.19 Meaning as use: “Philosophical 
Researches” 
 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I 
give him a slip marked “five red apples”. He takes the slip to the 
shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up 
the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample opposite to it; then 
he says the series of cardinal numbers – I assume that he knows them by 
heart – up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an apple of 
the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. – It is in this and in 
similar ways that one operates with words. – But how does he know 
where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with 
the word ‘five”? -  Well, I assume that he acts7 as I have described. 
Explanations come to an end somewhere. – But what is the meaning of 
the word ‘five’? – No such thing was in question here, only how the 
word “five” is used 
Wittgenstein, 1958 I 
                                                 





Wittgenstein argues that the ‘label’ model of linguistic meaning is not 
good enough for explaining what language does, and he proposes to 
substitute a notion of meaning as use. He exemplifies his idea describing 
a primitive language, consisting only of a limited set of words that allow 
workers use to coordinate their activity while they pass each other the 
material to construct a wall. Wittgenstein uses the example of one person 
shouting “slab” and the other passing him a slab. The implication is the 
following: “slab” in that case does not mean what we might find under a 
dictionary under the lemma “slab”. Rather, it is something like an order.  
We might want to gloss it as “pass me one of those slabs now” uttered by 
one worker to the other. W. leads us to a very different notion of 
linguistic meaning and to what understanding amounts to. In this case, 
meaning is entirely dependent on the activity type the two workers are 
engaged in and on the rules they have set up for carrying out the job.The 
consequences of the shift from a notion of meaning essentially linked to 
the link between word and concept to a notion of meaning as use is of 
great consequence, for it roots meanings in the social activities in which 
words are used, what W. calls language games. Consequentially the 
focus moves to the role language plays in carrying out activities, 
including the expression of inner states or internal reflections, thought 
and the use of knowledge.  Mathematics for instance, as W. points out, is 
knowledge but is also an activity. The interest shifts to the activities in 
which language is used and the social and conventional aspects of 
language games. 
5.20 Inner states 
DP is strongly characterized by its endorsement of an action oriented 
view of language. The rejection of “cognitive” social psychology lies in a 
frustration with unspoken assumptions within the discipline:  that 
language is a transparent tool for moving from the form to the content, 
from surface expressions to inner states, attitudes, beliefs and so on. This 




produced, the language game inside which utterances are produced. In a 
post-Wittgensteinian model it is impossible to capture meaning unless we 
know what participants are doing, what the rules of the game are; there is 
no meaning other than that which emerges in the course of the activity by 
virtue of the rules followed by the players. Expressions of inner states in 
this perspective are not treated as the external reflection of the inner state 
but rather as the thing itself, the only available datum, not the symptom 
of some hidden element that constitutes the object of attention of the 
researcher. When we say something like “I have the conviction that” or 
“I have the intention to” we are not reporting an inner state; rather we are 
arguing, requesting, describing, and most of the times we are trying to 
convince someone. We risk being entranced by words, taking the objects 
in these expressions as things that exist by themselves and failing to 
recognize these expression for what they are: ways of talking. 
Psychology is particularly prone to fall for this sort of mirage, for its data 
are often “reports of inner states.” As a consequence psychologists are 
subject to this type of bewitchment. We may start believing the 
metaphors we have developed in natural language to manage things we 
do not see.  Then we are tempted to talk about ‘attitudes’, ‘beliefs’, 
‘representations’, ‘prejudices’ as if they were apples and pears that we 
hold in our pockets and can pull out and display on demand.  
Paradoxically, the development of sophisticated brain imaging 
techniques has worsened the delusion of being finally able to access 
people’s minds to see ‘desire’, ‘sadness’, ‘happiness’ as images of 
activated neurons on a computer screen (Uttal, 2001). However, we still 
rely on the verbal report of subjects to tell us what they are feeling at the 
moment their neurons produce a certain image on the computer screen. 
The received take on inner states has also a methodological explanation. 
Natural sciences use numbers and have countable results. In order to 
count something it is essential to isolate units of analysis. Perhaps the 






5.21 The status of inner states 
The handling of the subject of inner states is central to my 
perspective. Wittgenstein’s reflections on the subject illustrate what I 
find a useful perspective on how to treat the expression of inner states, 
including the voicing of attitudes and opinions toward food 
biotechnology.In a way relevant to the polemics between SRT and DP, 
Wittgenstein criticizes how Psychology treats psychological states. He 
states that Psychology can only access external expressions of feelings 
and attitudes and emotions, and that 
580. An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria 
Wittgenstein (1958) 
 
W. is interested in the status of inner feelings and how to deal with them. 
His remarks are about the inaccessibility of inner states without the 
contribution of the expressions of them. Introspection and inner dialogue 
show that we do have inner states. Obviously it is not the case that if I am 
in pain but I am not expressing my pain then I have no pain, that if I 
don’t express my fear I have no fear. This would be contradicting 
everyday experiences, as van Dijk points out. When W. writes  
 
580. An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria 
 
his point is not that there are no inner processes without outward criteria, 
rather that we have no means to access inner processes other than 
through some outward criterion. This point refers not only to the level of 
interpretation of another person’s inner states. Most relevantly it applies 
to the manner in which I am capable of expressing my own inner states. 
The only ways I can express my inner feelings is through the linguistic 
and non linguistics tools I have available to me, usually those I have been 
socialized into. The problem is that inner states are not something we 




not that I have hope the same way in which, for example, I have a 
bicycle, or a degree, or red hair. But this is only part of the problem.  
 
584. Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N.N. will come and 
bring me some money, and suppose one minute of this state could be 
isolated, cut out of its context; would what happened in it then not be 
hope? – Think, for example, of the words which you perhaps utter in 
this space of time. They are no longer part of this language. And in 
different surroundings the institution of money doesn’t exist either. A 
coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute of this 
proceeding out of its surrounding: the crown is being placed on the head 
of the king in his coronation robes. – But in different surroundings gold 
is the cheapest of metals, its gleam is thought vulgar. There the fabric of 
the robe is cheap to produce. A crown is a parody of a respectable hat. 
And so on. 
 
W. insists on the fact that entities such as “dignity” only exist in a social 
world as part of a social practice and that they acquire their meaning 
from the general rules that hold for that particular game. There is no such 
a thing as “pomp” or “dignity” without the overall social, conventional 
apparatus in which notions of “king” and “crown” have a meaning. The 
fact that we can talk about “pomp” and “dignity” in a way that appears 
similar to the way in which we can talk about apples is the result of the 
inefficiency of our grammar. Because we have no better way for talking 
about inner states, we use the instruments we have, but it is a mistake to 
assume that such things exist in the same way as my bicycle does. The 
imperfection of our linguistic means leads to a mistreatment of inner 
states in psychology. Psychology is modeled on natural sciences, but its 
objects are often observable only by virtue of the narrative or of the 





5.22 Discursive Psychology and the dialogical 
version of Social Representations Theory. 
Proponents of DP have engaged in articulated and repeated criticisms to 
the theory of SR (Potter & Litton, 1985; Litton & Potter, 1985; Potter & 
Billig, 1992; McKinlay, Billig, 1988; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 1988) 
which have generated replies ranging in tone from dismissive to severe 
(Moscovici, 1985, Moscovici & Marková, 1998, Marková, 2002). It 
appears to me that over the years supporters of DP have gone back again 
and again to criticizing, commenting and discussing SRT as illustrative 
of shortcomings that affect all of Social Psychology. I also think that 
such unbroken interest originates from appreciation for SRT as a 
genuinely socially oriented framework that should live up to the 
centrality attributed to communication by Serge Moscovici. This is at 
least what I claim in this work, and this is what is keeping me interested 
in both frameworks. The main criticism is that the processes of anchoring 
and objectifying are perceptual-cognitive and thus ultimately located at 
the individual level. Social Representations are ways of understanding 
the world which influence action but are not themselves part of action. 
(Potter, 1996: 168). Conversely, within SRT the analysis of discourse has 
been considered a useful methodological complement for the analysis of 
Social Representations (Flick, 1998; Moscovici & Marková , 1998: 246). 
Accusations of ‘cognitivism’ have been dismissed in light of the 
centrality the theory of Social Representations assigns to the 
communicative process and to everyday discourse. Social 
Representations develop thanks to communication, understood as 
everyday informal conversation and chatter. In response to accusations of 
“perceptualism” and “cognitivism” Marková insists that Social 
representations have a “holistic nature” (Marková, 2001: 232) and that 
thinking is inherently dialectical. The dialogical and dialectic theory of 
SR as described by Marková offers a theoretical embrace that extends 
from Hegelian dialectic to the works of the Bahktin circle. Marková 




version of SRT . In the words of Marková Social Representations Theory 
conceives  
 
the dynamics of thought, language and social practices as 
interdependent socio-cultural and individual phenomena which are co-
constructed by means of tension and polarization of antinomies  
(Marková, 2000: 419)  
 
The theoretical discussion of Marková develops the richness of SRT in 
the direction of dialogism. Edwards and Potter write that “representations 
are mostly treated as cognitive structures or grids that make sense of 
information, particularly about unfamiliar social objects” (Edwards and 
Potter, 1999: 449). According to Marková, Edwards and Potter broadly 
misunderstand the theory, which is not based on ‘perceptual cognitivism” 
and “information-processing”. In particular, Marková insists on the 
influence of the Bahktin circle and on the resonance between the notions 
of genre and dialogism with the dialogical epistemology of SRT. 
However, the works of Bahktin, Medvedev and Volosinov are never 
quoted in methodological and empirical studies in SRT. Indeed, except 
for Marková,  they are virtually absent from the reference lists of studies 
on SR theory, including recent sizable and exhaustive presentations of 
the theory (see Wagner & Hayes, 2005). In the same line, Voelklein & 
Howarth (2005) state that accusations of “cognitivism” originate from a 
mistaken conception of the notion of cognition within SRT. The authors 
clarify that one of the central aims of SRT is to “reconstitute the 
essentially socio-historical nature of cognition”(p.442). In agreement 
with Marková they argue that that within SRT,  
 
[c]ognition is based upon a dialogical understanding of the mind that is 






 Social Representations theorists regard cognition as socio-cultural, as 
dynamic and, hence, as something that cannot be simply reduced to the 
level of the individual (p.443).  
 
In respect to criticisms to the allegedly cognitive nature of the processes 
of anchoring and objectifying Voelklein and Howarth state that: 
The processes of anchoring and objectifying are not “purely cognitive”, 
they “are indeed social, cultural and ideological as much as cognitive” 
(p.441).  
And finally that: 
The theory seeks to integrate culture and cognition, which is “inherently 
and inevitably social and cultural”[emphasis in the original]. (p.443)  
 
There is then a lively convergence of recent theoretical studies in SRT 
that focus explicitly on dialogism. From a dialogical perspective, they 
argue, cognition is not individual and is not oppositional in respect to 
action.  Marková’s reflections on social representations show an 
important affinity between the project of SRT and Billig’s (1997) 
discussion of discursive and ideological messages.  However, her 
dismissal of the criticisms moved to SRT from discourse oriented 
scholars is not entirely convincing. Marková does not address what 
seems to me to be the relevant criticism which has been raised by 
discourse-base approaches.  Despite the richness of Moscovici’s writings 
the corpus of studies in Social Representations pays little attention to the 
sorts of “texts” which constitute the very kernel of social knowledge 
production: the texts of everyday interaction and arguments as they occur 
in natural settings. For instance if Social Representations are rooted in a 
dialogical model of communication, they can hardly be captured in a 
multiple choice survey. Surveys entail a propositional and perceptual 
model of communication. Surveys collect individual responses and then 
sum them up into collective responses, which are then correlated with 
social variables. Surveys artificially constrain the “interactive texts” that 
can occur. Further, objectifying and quantifying “answers to questions” 




interchanges. Lastly, a survey assumes from the very start that there are 
“ideas” or ”attitudes” hidden inside individual brains which can be, 
directly or indirectly, measured by using such an experimental ‘probe’.  
So there is virtually nothing left of natural interactive processes once all 
has been reduced to a survey and its “results”. On the other hand, in the 
midst of real interaction the reverberations of the many voices present in 
a given society exhibit a multi layered complexity and depth. Bahktin’s 
key reflections about language and genres focus particularly on how 
secondary genres like novels are derivative of a whole range of other 
speech activities. Everyday talk energizes current ideas and finds its way 
in literary genres, thus re injecting itself in the life of society. While the 
centrality of everyday discourse and communication for understanding 
social knowledge has been established by Moscovici from the very 
beginning, studies of SRs largely don’t engage with the theoretical and 
methodological implications for the theory. Not enough effort has been 
made to utilize the theoretical reflections and methodological instruments 
developed within cognate disciplines. Language within SRT is often seen 
as a route to the concept, as a way of representing the idea that lies 
behind it; like a picture or a drawing, a depiction, an arrow that takes us 
from the surface to the content. In most social psychology research  
speech and dialogue are examined for content, as a guide to orient the 
researchers to develop hypotheses and questionnaires that then generate 
the ‘real’ data, countable items that look like the ones available to ‘hard 
science’. This transformation inevitably fosters a misperception that 
hides the indirect and problematic nature of discursive data.  
5.23 Discourse as a tool for what? 
DP leaves unresolved a fundamental conflict between the actual 
discourses generated by individuals on some topic of immediate concern 
to them and wider sociological facts at some supra-individual, non-local 
level.  Within DP, the explanation of a person’s account is limited to the 





aims of the individual beyond the immediate interaction. Sooner or later 
analysis must shift from a locally produced and motivated account of a 
phenomenon to some other level of recurrent, articulated, and socially 
anchored position-taking. This can be the level of culture or ideology. 
DP’s notion of a chameleon-like, strategic and ever opportunistic subject 
generates difficulties. Within DP, discourse is programmatically treated 
as a tool for carrying the current conversation forward in a socially 
positive manner. Neither what participants think or the wider 
consequences of their discourse is discussed. I take a wider view on the 
functions that discourse has in social interaction. Discourses offer 
particular perspectives and support one particular perspective on events. 
They thus go beyond the immediate interpersonal needs of participants, 
to lend support to large-scope scenarios which have consequences 
beyond the immediate context of the discourse itself. DP scholars are 
obviously concerned with real life issues and with the role of discourse in 
large-scale social phenomena like racism (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
Still, the theoretical principles of the discipline make difficult the leap 
from the micro-level of interaction to a broader social perspective, if, 
indeed, these two levels are mutually interdependent. There is one further 
issue. The relativist posture of Discursive Psychology is problematic. If 
research is to ground social critique and help justify positive change, 
researchers must acknowledge a relation between what people say and 
what we might call the reality of social facts. Severing discourses from 
cognition on the one side, and from the “out-there-reality” on the other 
might turn out to be a trap. Such danger is clearly not avoided by 
dismissing some discourses, particularly hegemonic discourses, as 
strategic manoeuvres, while regarding dissident or subaltern discourses 
as more authentic. Discursive Psychology wants to recognize the 
creativity and autonomy of human subjects, seeing them as protagonists 
rather then guinea pigs showing ‘symptoms’ to the researcher.  At the 
same time, it seeks to be a critically engaged discipline which can have 
an impact on reality. However, if we treat people’s discourses only as 
strategic action, paradoxically, we run the risk of torpedoing the 




Relativism, while a popular epistemological position for discourse 
analysis, may have the unwanted consequence of reducing subjects to 
strategists, self serving narrators. This perhaps is the reason why works 
in critical discourse analysis tend to focus on the discourse of those 
analysts disagree with rather than on the discourse of those they agree 
with. The relativist viewpoint seems particularly appropriate for a study 
like mine, where the stories of scientists, activists, lay people and 
politicians produce a tapestry of accounts that frame food biotechnology 
from different perspectives. Truth is in some sense irrelevant here, and it 
can be safely left out of the research question. However, I would feel 
very uneasy to apply the same programmatic relativism to my data if I 
were analysing racism, inequality, or violence, where there are victims 
and perpetrators, and where opposing parties usually have 
incommensurably different resources for making their voices heard. In 
these instances I would find it hard to accept that the voices of 
discriminated, victimized participants are framed as merely opportunistic 
( “doing being the victim of rape” for instance) generated by the endless 
mutations of the paper-thin strategic self Discursive Psychology seems to 
hypothesize.  
5.24 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described the main tenets of SRT and of DP. I 
have also illustrated the criticisms advanced against the two frameworks 
by various scholars. The criticisms are part of a longstanding debate 
between the two paradigms and constitute a relevant chapter in the 
ongoing discussion over the scope and epistemological foundations of 
Social Psychology. I have given my perspective on shortcomings within 
Social Representations research, and I have explained why I find DP a 
useful perspective on the study of Social Representations. The 
contradiction remains unresolved, and some may judge that the two 
approaches I use are not compatible. As the empirical part of this work 





Psychology. I place much emphasis on how certain representations of 
GMOs are produced in context and on which interpersonal and strategic 
aims they serve in a given interaction. However, while studies in DP 
programmatically ignore the underlying beliefs that may be linked to 
certain expressions, I am convinced that some account of ideology as 
articulated cognitive structures is necessary in order to explain the 
regularity and predictability of individual responses. Discourses of 
biotechnologies that I have analysed show recurrent arguments that lead 
to support or rejection of GMOs on the basis of beliefs, either implicitly 
or explicitly present in conversation, with a relevant ideological 
dimension. Legislation, mass media and recorded conversations show the 
emergence of ideologies that stipulate the roles of scientists, politicians 
and lay citizens in the decision-making processes related to food 
biotechnologies. These data suggest that ideologies play a part in the 
positions people take, whether they support or reject food 
biotechnologies. After reviewing the dialogue between SRT and DP, I 
still hold as essential the emphasis on the world-shaping power of social 
representations. The discussion on inner states constitutes my response to 
the criticisms advanced by van Dijk against Discursive Psychology. I 
agree with van Dijk and Moscovici that “a discourse is not a 
representation, even if every representation is translated into 
discourse”(Moscovici, 1985: 92). van Dijk’s objections to the “reduction 
to linguistic repertoires” suggest the theoretical importance of engaging 
with the concept of mind and inner states rather than leaving them aside. 
Recent studies have focused on talk and cognition from the action 
oriented - “talk without a mind” - approach (Heritage, 2005, te Molden & 
Potter, 2005) and show that there is an ongoing debate between mentalist 
and anti-mentalist approaches to language and communication. Van 
Dijk’s criticism of the notion of ‘repertoire’ underscores the importance 
of clarifying the analytical concepts of DP. Where, if not in the mind, do 
learned verbal and communicative resources and strategic arguments 
‘live’? Wetherell and Potter (1992) describe repertoires as figures in the 
moves of a dancer, the enactment of a competence, something a person 




what happens with the grammar of a language we master. Obviously 
such capacities depend on the brain/mind. Still, this does not mean that 
we shall treat thoughts as things that are held in the mind, most likely in 
the form of propositions. My position is the following: inner states, like 
pain, hope, prejudice or even the ‘holding’ of a certain view of 
biotechnologies clearly ‘exist’ even when they are not expressed and thus 
made visible, embodied in some behavior, verbal or otherwise. However, 
such inner states are not there the same way as apples and pears on a 
plate are, even when we cover them with a cloth and thus cannot see 
them. Inner states not only become visible when they are expressed, like 
an apple when it is in sight, they are produced ad hoc, for an audience, 
within the frames socially and culturally available to participants. 
Further, opinions are performed within a certain course of action, in the 
context of a social encounter, with certain scopes and within a given 
social setting the rules of which are partly set and partly negotiated by 
participants. Outside such situated performances, opinions and attitudes 
are not only inaccessible to the psychologist (or to anyone else) but 
impossible to isolate at all. Thus attitudes and inner states are inherently 
social and need to be understood as elements of interaction, moves within 
a social encounter. Ultimately the aim of my analysis is not simply to 
collect rhetorical devices subjects use to render their version of the 
biotechnology story more realistic, or to defend themselves effectively 
during a given interaction. The success of the analysis depends on 
making visible the ideologically loaded frame which supports the 
assumptions speakers display, and to make more visible the implicit 
stance that renders natural and obvious the positions taken by 
participants. The data will show how ideologically loaded remarks are 
traded in a public setting and how sometimes they are challenged, other 
times they are welcomed by a collective laugh or simply reinforced by 
silence. As Bourdieu wrote, “The most successful ideological effects are 
those which have no need of words, and ask no more than complicitous 
silence.” (Bourdieu, 1977: 188). A certain view of capitalism, 
technology, of the United States, of scientists, of the lay public, and the 





express themselves as they do when it comes to GMOs. A close analysis 
of text is one way to move from the locally performed and negotiated 
position taken on a topic like GMOs to a wider set of assumptions which 
support and sustain those positions. Despite the theoretical minefield 
underlined by van Dijk, and the warnings voiced by Carla Willig (2003) 
and Vivien Burr (2003) within the Discourse Analysis framework, the 
core assumptions of Discursive Psychology are essential in this work, in 
particular its emphasis on the strategic nature of the expressions of inner 





6 HEURISTICS FOR THE ANALYSIS 
OF DISCOURSE  
6.1 Features of discourse 
In order to illustrate the methodology I propose I shall make use of a 
fragment of recorded interaction. Analyzing a transcript allows me to 
show in practice the language-oriented tools I use to approach discourses 
of food biotechnologies. The extract is a verbal exchange between a 
citizen and a professor, part of a public debate that occurred in a small 
village in the north west of Italy. The debate focused on a nearby field 
trial with genetically modified rice. There were about seventy people 
present, among them experts, politicians and citizens.In the transcript 
“S2” is a citizen in the general audience, and “L1” is a professor of 
biotechnologies who came to the meeting as representative of the 
association of Italian biotech companies. Two other persons briefly take 
part in the exchange: “S1” is another citizen in the audience (a woman); 
“Sindaco” is the village mayor. At lines 1-10 S2 takes the floor after the 
contribution of scientists, politicians and other citizens. The sentence 
“Americans have been eating transgenic stuff since nineteen-eighty-four” 
quotes an earlier statement by the scientist who is conducting the 
experiment. The scientist does not participate in this particular exchange. 
 
  1 S2; allora premesso che se è dal:'ottantaquattro 
  2  quanto diceva lei che gli americani mangiano = 
  3  =transgenico 
  4  a me- me- non me può, 
  5  importar di meno, 
as a premise I say that I could not care less if it is the 
case that, what you said before, Americans have been 





6 quello che mi da molto fastidio è che i 
signori = 
  7  =americani 
  8  dietro, (.) vari:, paraventi, 
  9  (.) son- 
 10  ci hanno sempre usato come terra di = 
 11  =colonizzazione, 
but what bothers me very much is that gentlemen 
Americans, behind various covers, are, have always 
used us like a colonization land  
 12  perche non mi dica professore 
 13 che tutte le varie sementi che abbiamo  
 14  qui vengono da- da ditte italiane, 
because don’t you tell me professor that all those 
various seeds that we have here come from Italian 
companies 
 15 L1; nho: sentite posso posso tentare di fare:, 
no, listen, can I,  can I try and make an… 
 16  un u: u::, 
  [        ] 
 17 S2; no no non sto- 
 18  non la sto accusando eh= 
no no I am not, I am not accusing you 
 19 L1;                         =no no no he: 
 20  proprio per carità io poi: 
 21  ripeto:, 
please please, then I... 
  [ 
 22 S2; cioe sul fatto del- 
 23  delle biotecnologie per il mio lavoro, 
 24  sono fondamentali 
 25 <perchè servono a portare avanti la 
salute della = 
 26  =gente>, 
I mean about biotechnologies, they are fundamental for 
my work because they are useful to further people’s 
health, 
 27  hh queste altre cose che hanno:, 
 28  (1) 
 29  vorrebbero portare:, 
 30  la salute il cibo: alle popolazioni 




those other things that they have, that they would  like 
to bring food and health to African populations, and to 
our populations too, 
 32  h ma dietro leggi dei soldi americani:, 
but following the laws of American money 
 33  che mettono in mezzo: 
who mix up, 
34 quelli venderebbero anche la madre per 
poter far = 
 35  =denaro, 
 36  <tra virgolette> hh per cui,(.) 
those would sell their own mother to make money  
37 poi qui il fatto che queste 
sperimentazioni vengano, 
 38  (.) nasco-  
 39  o perlomeno, 
 40  nascosti dietro delle pieghe, 
then the fact that these experiments are hidden, or at 
least hidden behind covers 
41 <che uno dovrebbe spostare queste 
pieghe per = 
 42  =vedere che ci sono> 
 43  perché in effetti ci sono le cose 
one should  move those covers in order to see, because 
in fact things are out there 
 44 L1; sentite ( ) 
 45  diciamo io credo che ( ) 
 46 e::: l'ha detto prima il collega diciamo 
non = 
 47  =viviamo di slogan 
listen, I think that, the colleagues said this before, let’s 
not think in slogans  
 48 S2; no non stò:, 
no no I am not... 
 49 L1; oggi come oggi i proprietari di queste  
 50  tecnologie sono europei 
 51  non sono americani 
 52  la più grande concentrazione di nouau = 
 53  =biotecnologico oggi sta alla baier, 





as of today the owners of these technologies are 
Europeans, they are not Americans. The biggest 
concentration of biotechnological know how is at 
Bayer, which is let’s say 
 55  queste grandi multinazionali non sono di  
 56  nessuno sono degli azionisti, 
these large multinationals don’t belong to anyone, they 
belong to the shareholders 
 57  hh io vorrei che ri- h ritornassimo a un  
 58  mio a un modello no, 
 59  diciamo che abbiamo gli agricoltori che  
 60  sono degli imprenditori, 
I would like to go back to my, to a model right, let’s say 
we have farmers who are businessmen  
 61  hh e ci sono delle altre imprese no quasi  
 62  tutte multinazionali 
 63  che forniscono i mezzi tecnici agli, 
 64  agricoltori è così credo da moltissimi  
 65  anni,hh siete, 
 66  gli  agricoltori come imprenditori sono  
 67  clienti,di chi produce tecnologia. 
and then there are other companies, almost all 
multinationals, which provide the technical tools to 
farmers. It has been this way for many years. You are, 
farmers, as businessmen are customers of those who 
produce technology.  
 68  la tecnologia normalmente è tecnologia  
 69  chimica,hh tutti gli anni ci son dei nuovi  
70 fungicidi dei nuovi pesticidi e via di 
seguito, 
The technology normally is chemical technology, every 
year there are some new mould killers, new pesticides 
and so on  
 71  tra le altre cose, 
 72  hanno sviluppato anche qualche pezzo di  
 73  biotecnologia, 
among other things they have also developed some 
piece of biotechnology  
 74  vorrei ricordare qui che sono solo  
 75  quattro le piante coltivate, 
 76  in modo significativo nel mondo sono  




I would like to recall here that in the world the plants 
that are significantly cultivated are only four. They are 
corn, soy, cotton and rapeseed 
 78  di questi l'unica che interessa l'Italia = 
 79  =sostanzialmente è il mais 
 80  perché gli altri tre sono di fatto non sono  
 81  coltivati esiste quindi una-, 
and the only one which interests Italy is corn, because 
the other three as a matter of  fact are not cultivated. 
There is then a, 
 82  (.) 
 83  il fornitore di mezzi tecnici che ha  
 84  offerto al mondo dell'agricoltura 
 85  sono tutte multinazionali e quindi a tutti  
 86  gli agricoltori del mondo 
 87  una nuova tecnologia hh 
the provider of technical tools which has offered to the 
world of agriculture, they are all multinationals so 
((they offer)) a new technology to all the farmers of the 
world  
 88  che è stata accettata dagli agricoltori  
 89  americani in particolare i coltivatori di  
90 soia,h perchè quelli di mais s: sono così 
così, 
((a technology))which has been accepted by American 
farmers, in particular those who farm soy, because 
those who farm corn ((accepted it)) so and so,  
 91  gli agricoltori europei per loro motivi = 
 92  =apparentemente non la accettano. 
 93 non non è niente di male non è mica una 
tragedia = 
European farmers, for their own reasons, apparently 
don’t accept it. There is nothing wrong, it is not a 
tragedy 
 94  =(.) 
 95  diciamo sta al colt- il riso, 
 96 è ancora molto lontano il riso 
transgenico, 
 97  h  ma sta ai coltivatori di riso, 
 98  di sapere  quanta tecnologia ci sarà nel  





let’s say it is up to rice farmers, transgenic rice has 
still very far to come, but it is up to rice farmers to 
decide how much technology there will be in their 
future. 
100  hh quando diciamo è 
comparsa la meccanizzazione  
101  poteva essere rifiutata: 
102 ma voi oggi vi immaginate le mondine 
nelle risaie? 
When let’s say mechanization came about, it could 
have been refused, but can you imagine the rice-
pickers in the rice fields nowadays?  
103  allora la tecnologia ha avuto degli  
104  investimenti tante cose 
At that time technology had investments, many things  
105  quindi le biotecnologie agricole possono  
106  essere accettate o rifiutate 
107 però diciamo sono i conti di un 
imprenditore, 
108  ((omissis)) 
so agricultural biotechnologies can be accepted or 
refused, but in the end these are the calculations of a 
businessman  
109  vede io vorrei spendere una parola da:, 
110  di buon senso 
111  ((omissis)) 
112 hhh quando noi mangiamo il 
transgenico:, 
113 di diciamo chiunque di noi mangia 
alcuni grammi = 
114  =di geni tutti i giorni, 
115  (.) con la sua dieta normale, 
you see, let me add here a word of common sense, 
((omissis))when we eat transgenic food, let’s say 
anyone of us eats some grams of genes every day with 
one’s normal diet,  
116  hh io mangio insalata da vent'ann- da 
  ettant'anni = 
117  =e non sono verde, 
118 hh quindi diciamo non è che i geni: 
passino = 




120  hh in modo automatico, 
I have been eating salad for twen-, for seventy years 
and I am not green, so let’s say it is not that genes pass 
into human organism in an automatic way, 
121  dal punto di vista dell'alimentazione, 
122  hh un una transgenesi, 
123  n fatta nel mais che poi viene mangiato  
124  dall'animale e via di seguito, 
125  la probabilità  che faccia male è nulla! 
126  (1) 
127  non so se ve ne rendete conto, 
128  (0.5) 
129  non è, non è un: un veleno 
when it comes to  food, a transgenesis done in corn 
that then gets eaten by the animal and so on, the 
probability for this to be harmful is null!!! I don’t know 
if you realize that!! it is not- it is not a poison 
  [ 
130 S2; ma allora di cosa discutiamo? 
                    [ 
what are we talking about then? 
131 S1;                   ma io non mi fido di lei, 
132  (.) 
133  mi scusi, 
134  ((ridendo)) io non mi fido:, 
but I don’t trust you, sorry, ((laughing)) I have no trust  
  [ 
135 Sin; però professore, 
136  io credo:, 
137  ((omissis)) 
but, professor, I believe that, 
 
This verbal interchange contains some articulate representations of food 
biotechnologies. It offers them in the complex and multilayered way in 
which they usually surface in day-to-day communication. The citizen and 
the professor propose two contrasting perspectives: after reading the 
transcript we know that for the former food biotechnologies are 
negatively characterized while for the latter they represent progress. 
However, an appraisal of the overall sense of the two opposing 





constructed and what confers on them such characteristics as factuality 
and persuasiveness. Further, the ideological aspect of the representations 
may be lost if we simply extract the pros and cons from the opposing 
discourses. I argue that the content of the representations proposed 
cannot be detached from the situated, linguistically dependent 
performance of the accounts which construct these ideologically 
opposing discourses during the conversation. Representations amount to 
the performance of discourses the compelling quality of which largely 
relies on their linguistic properties. The animated exchange, which was 
filmed and transcribed, on paper does not offer the richness and the 
complexity of a live interaction, in which gesture, intonation and a 
countless number of visual cues affect the overall realization of the 
conversation. However, it still retains a sense of how communication 
unfolds and how arguments are built and traded within interaction. In 
what follows I illustrate a number of structural and language-dependent 
categories of discourse with particular attention to how they can be put to 
the service of ideological understandings of the food biotechnologies 
phenomenon.  
6.2 Theme 
Themes are the general issues under discussion. Theme is any broad 
subject: “Finnish design”, “child rearing”, “immigration in Europe,” 
“Italian politics”. All data in this study refer to the same umbrella theme 
“food biotechnologies”. From newspaper articles to informal chats 
recorded during a protest march, all the discourses and texts collected 
belong to the same blanket argument. The conversation above falls under 






Topic is a semantic macro structural feature of discourse; narrower 
than theme, the topic tells “what a discourse is about” (van Dijk, 1998). 
The category is not linked to the linguistic surface of text or talk; one can 
address a topic in any given manner.  The notion refers instead to the 
content of a discourse. The “food biotechnologies” theme encompasses 
many topics; as an example, a few of those identifiable in the data are: 
“risks associated with biotechnologies”, “unnaturalness of 
biotechnologies”, “patenting of living organisms”, “food related 
allergies”, “the role of multinational corporations in the diffusion of 
biotechnologies”, “contamination of fields by GM seeds”,  “Italians’ 
attitude toward biotechnologies”, “advantages of biotechnologies”, “third 
world hunger”, “scientific progress”.  The ideological function of 
discourse topic is of wide significance. Given one theme, in this case 
food biotechnologies, participants in a social encounter or editorialists 
writing for a newspaper can address the topics they find most relevant. 
Topics are not equivalent to one another for they carry evaluative 
elements which contribute to the overall appraisal of the theme.  The 
choice of one topic as opposed to another already displays the inclination 
of the participant in respect to the issue. For instance, if someone chooses 
to talk about the “advantages of biotechnologies”  rather then of the 
“risks of biotechnologies” it is likely that they are inclined to 
emphasizing advantages over risks and in their discourse they will call 
attention to the former over the latter; they thus provide an overall 
positive depiction of food biotechnologies via topic selection. By the 
same token, choosing to talk about the Catholic Church’s approval of 
food biotechnologies, is likely to “gain points” in favor of food 
biotechnologies, at least among those who accord some authority to the 
Catholic Church. However, topic choice by itself does not identify the 
stances expressed by an article or within a discussion. A topic can also be 
selected by a participant with the aim of targeting in a polemic way the 
related claims brought forward by adversaries. A person can raise a 





it.  In the above example at lines 1- 5 the citizen reintroduces--but only in 
order to refute it--an argument that had been used earlier by the scientist 
responsible for the field trial trial. “I could not care less” at line 4-5 
clearly does not express lack of interest; rather it challenges the relevance 
of the claim made earlier by the scientist that Americans have been 
eating GMOs for years. Against the implication that GMOs have been 
used with no harm for a long time, the citizen opposes another topic. The 
alternative topic is polemically suggested as being more relevant through 
the adversative clause “but what bothers me very much” at line 6. The 
citizen wants to talk about the economic control that according to him the 
U.S.A. has had for a long time on “us” ( “they have always used us like a 
colonization land” at line 10-11), and he proposes this economic/political 
relationship as the core of the issue, the central topic. The negative view 
of GMOs which emerges from this contribution (lines 1-14) is apparent 
from several linguistic cues.  Principally,  the speaker describes as a 
relationship of colonizer/colonized that between “Americans” and “us”. 
According to this view GMOs are imposed on “us” by a colonizing force. 
The first person plural accusative pronoun apparently refers to “Italians”. 
At lines 57- 99 the biotech professor proposes his own perspective.  “I 
would like to go back to my- to a model, let’s say we have farmers…” 
The “model” proposed downplays the political role of economically 
powerful companies and instead depicts a world in which everybody is 
free and the market is naturally regulated by it’s own rules. The theme 
remains the economics of adopting or refusing GMOs but the discourse 
is very different. At lines 109-129 the professor changes shfts the focus 
to  the dangerousness of GM food, a topic dear to detractors of food 
biotechnologies; however, he does so only in order to claim that GMOs 
are not dangerous (“the probability for this to be harmful is null!”, line 
125) Topic setting is of great significance in the media. In newspapers 
the topic of an article is introduced by the headline. With the limitations I 
mentioned, the title often supplies -either explicitly or inferentially- 
information on the stance taken by the author.  
I list some examples of Italian titles which both set the topic and express 




fairly explicit. Very explicit is also the title “Pregiudizi errati: anche noi 
siamo OGM” (“Wrong prejudices: We too are GMOs”) (Messaggero 
Veneto, 16 November 2003) summarizes the main point of the article. 
Consider also: “GMOs are among us”  (“Gli OGM sono tra noi”), 
(Verga, 1999). Here the title hints at a B movie about zombies and 
alludes to an invasion of GMOs. The expression creatively bestows on 
GMOs a number of negative characters by associating them with the 
living dead.   
6.4 Polarization 
Ideological discourse focuses on controversial matters and has a 
fundamental evaluative dimension (van Dijk, 1995). These two 
characteristics combine to produce strongly polarized narratives that 
construct groups and objects related to the given subject as in opposition 
to one another.   GMOs are often constructed as the opposite of both 
organic and conventional products. GMOs are “bad” while organic or 
“traditional” products are “good”. This opposition is so widespread that it 
is taken as the starting assumption of social psychological studies trying 
to correlate attitudes toward GMOs with other variables (Dreezens & 
Others., 2005). Polarization encompasses objects and protagonists, and it 
sometimes creates the typical in-the-trenches tone of propaganda talk. In 
the fragment above, the citizen at lines 1-11 offers a radically polarized 
narrative in which “we” are being “colonized” by “Americans”. The 
account clearly proposes an “us” ingroup, probably corresponding to 
“Italians” opposed to “them” outgroup (Americans). Polarization in this 
instance underlines the opposite interests and values of two groups, 







The act of reference must fulfill two somehow opposing functions: 
efficiency and exhaustiveness (Sacks & Shegloff, 1979). On one hand, a 
referring expression must point to the referent in an unequivocal way; on 
the other hand it ought not to be redundant or lengthy so as not to affect 
negatively the communication. The choice of the referring expression is 
then always a compromise between two competing requirements. This 
holds for reference as a phenomenon essential to the communicative 
process. Reference though is not only the way entities are identified for 
the purpose of information exchange, rather it plays an important part in 
the social practices involved in any kind of interaction. Social actors 
involved in a communicative activity, whether writing a newspaper 
article or discussing with interlocutors, always have multiple purposes; 
successful pointing to the correct referent is clearly one aim in 
communication but it is always joined by rhetorically informed agendas: 
convincing the audience, defending an argument, construing as factual a 
certain storyline. For each entity in a universe of discourse a participant 
has to select an appropriate referential expression or formulation.  
Because it is always the case that one can refer to the same thing in 
several ways, while referring the speaker also provides some information 
about how she places herself in respect to the referred item. What S&S 
call “referring simpliciter”--that is, “referring and nothing else” or 
referring in a “basic” and “neutral” way--is largely not achievable; it has 
been argued that referring is always “dupliciter” (Haviland, 2005) 
because it is not possible to refer without also expressing stance, that is, 
displaying in some respect the relation that links the speaker to the 
referred item. Reference actually displays a relationship between each 
interlocutor and referent, and between interlocutors themselves 
(Haviland, personal communication). In other terms, the act of reference 
is one of the many ways in which positioning is performed. The case of 
courtesy pronouns in Italian (the formal “voi” and “lei” as opposed to the 
more intimate “tu”) illustrates how in this language one cannot perform 




about the relation the speaker has toward the referent along the axes of 
power and solidarity (Brown & Gilman, 1960).  Pronouns can convey not 
only positioning but also stance. Consider, at line 34 of the transcript 
“those would sell their mother…”. The choice of the pronoun, over the 
default “they” adds to the critical nature of the remark. Using “those” 
implies that the object of reference is distant from the speaker. In this 
case, the distance is not spatial but metaphorical; it marks an 
incompatibility between two ways of thinking.  Van Dijk (1995) notices 
that “distancing” through the use of pronouns is a feature of some 
ideological discourses on immigration and is used to mark the 
“outgroupness”, the alien nature of immigrants.  In the case at hand the 
choice of pronoun further shows that the speaker finds the behavior he 
ascribes to Americans uncanny. Pronouns are not the only referential 
device of course,.   Lexical choice is ubiquitous and so is its stance-
displaying nature. No type of communicative act is free of this character, 
including scientific reports. In the above extract for example, I had to 
decide how to refer to the different participants, and I had several 
options: the person I refer to as the “professor” in the transcript is 
certainly a professor but could have also been referred to as “professor of 
biotechnologies” or, given the fact that he was at the public encounter as 
a representative of the Italian association of biotech companies, as 
“Assobiotec representative”. The latter definite description for instance 
would be likely to underline his interested position in everything he says. 
Those I refer to as “citizens” could also be identified as “lay people” or 
“members of the public”. These referring labels are not equivalent. Given 
the context in which the action takes place--a debate on a field trial in the 
local village--calling participants “citizens” emphasizes their rights, 
compared to a term like “lay people” which might have put the accent on 
their lack of expertise, in contrast with the knowledge of the experts 
present . The choice of referring expression on my part then reveals a 
standpoint; from the very start of the analysis I implicitly position the 
speakers in some way.  It is no surprise that one prominent form of 
expressing stance in discourse is the choice of wording or phrasing used 





topics that have to do with discrimination there are “politically correct” 
ways to make reference, the result of careful and historically contested 
thought, precisely because some referential formulas are recognized to 
express and possibly reinforce prejudice. “Mentally challenged” as 
opposed to “retarded” or “visually impaired” as opposed to “blind” 
correspond to carefully chosen wordings substituting lexical items which 
carry with them a negative characterization of the given referent. Most, if 
not all terms of reference who describe a person clearly are not 
“ideologically neutral” themselves. Politically correct terms of reference 
for instance express an ideology that claims to be inspired by values of 
inclusion and equal opportunities.In discourse about genetically modified 
foods, lexicalization provides constant examples to illustrate that how a 
person refers to an object constitutes an evaluative categorization. 
“Organismi geneticamente modificati” is in Italian the standard way of 
referring to organisms the genetic patrimony of which has been modified 
using biotechnology.  Usually the expression provides little  information 
on the standpoint of those who use it. “Organismi transgenici”, 
‘Transgenic organisms”, arguably hints more explicitly at the fact that 
genes are moved, transferred from one organism to another.  This term is 
used by opponents to mark the artificiality and the uncanny character of 
the resulting products. (See for instance Garrou & Others, 2001). 
“Organismi giornalisticamente modificati” (“Journalistically modified 
organisms”) is how the scientist Giorgio Poli, a bold supporter of 
biotechnologies, in the course of a RAI TV program decided to refer to 
GMOs thus summing up his view of the distorted representation the 
media present of food biotechnologies. Journalists, in this view,  not 
scientists are the ones who modify reality.“Genetically enhanced 
organisms” (Weckman, n.d.), though not an Italian example, is an 
explicit attempt to propose an alternative lexical description of GMOs, a 
term of reference which explicitly suggests that biotechnologies can 
improve organisms. . “Organismi Frankenstein” (“Frankenstein 
organisms”) and “cibi di Frankenstein”(“Frankenstein foods”) clearly 
carry negative connotations, evoking both artificiality and monstrosity , 




terminator” (“terminator seeds”), an expression inspired by the 1985 
movie starring Arnold Swarzenegger,  powerfully evokes the fact that 
with this technology plants can be made to produce sterile seeds. The 
expression refers to this trait  as a death carrier, i.e. mortiferus; it was the 
brainchild of Pat Roy Mooney, executive director of RAFI, a foundation 
dedicated to the preservation of seeds. In 1998 the organization was 
struggling to attract the interest of the media on the new “terminator” 
technology. The catchy name bestowed on the invention, it turned out, 
was critical in the group’s gaining wide public attention. (Charles, 2001: 
218)The expressions cited refer to GMOs and to the technology which 
produces them; they show how wording can embed ideologically imbued 
positions and construct an entity as conforming to a particular viewpoint.  
However, appropriate names for GMOs are only one facet of ideological 
discourses on biotechnologies encapsulated in referring expressions. As I 
have remarked, ideological discourses are characterized by the 
polarization of opposed factions. The scenario of narrated 
biotechnologies is populated by the social actors who play a part in the 
diatribe: scientists, the public, green activists. Partisan representations of 
friends and foes play an essential part in the making of opposed 
storylines on what food biotechnologies “really” are. Referential 
expressions and lexicalization in this case too prove to be a constant 
strategic discursive mechanism.Consider at lines 6-7 of the above extract, 
“gentlemen Americans” an expression with a clearly antiphrastic 
meaning, ironically critical of those who seem to impose biotechnologies 
on “us”. Through the appellative “signori” Americans are implicitly 
qualified as rich and powerful but also as bossy and undemocratic. At 
line 7 in fact “colonization land” qualifies “us” as victims, passive 
recipients of invasion and long term exploitation at the hands of 
Americans. Other examples of ideological use of lexicalization include: 
“fondamentalismo scientifico” (“Scientific fundamentalism”),  a phrase 
used by Pecoraro Scanio, ex Minister of the Environment during a RAI 
TV debate to refer to the attitude of scientists in favour of 
biotechnologies. The expression clearly embeds charges of short sighted 





culturale” “Cultural battle” (Vieri, 2004) is how during a conference the 
representative of Italian Agriculture Association chose to define the 
ongoing legal struggle between multinationals and the Italian government 
on the matter of the commercial introduction of GMOs in Italy. “Un 
modello di sviluppo culturale” “A model of cultural development” is how 
the same speaker refers to Italian agriculture as a precious heritage under 
attack by multinational interests. “I pescecani come li chiamo io” 
(“Sharks, as I call them”), is how a farmer during a street protest refers to 
multinational companies producing GMOs. Further examples are 
“ecologismo ideologico” (“ideological ecology”) (Baget Bozzo, 2003) 
and “scienziato imprenditore” (businessman-scientist”). All these 
expression carry ideologically relevant meanings which fit within a 
particular perspective on the food biotechnology debate.  
6.6 Qualifications 
Qualification is another lexically dependent manner used to 
characterize and thus to position members of the outgroup and of the 
ingroup: At line 34-35 in the example the citizen says “venderebbero 
anche la madre per poter far denaro”, (“they would sell their own mother 
to make money”). The hyperbolic predicate obviously implies that 
Americans are not to be trusted because they are only after profit. From a 
very different perspective, at lines 59-60 the professor says “gli 
agricoltori che sono degli imprenditori” (“farmers who are 
businessmen”). The attribution in the relative clause fits in the “model” 
the speaker is offering to the audience: a reassuring scenario of a self-
regulating ideal capitalism in which farmers are free clients that can 
accept or refuse GMOs. The description is offered as an alternative to the 
alarming picture delineated by the citizen, in which “we” are enduring 
“colonization”. At line 83 the professor uses the noun phrase “il fornitore 
di mezzi tecnici” (“the provider of technical tools”) to refer to the 
corporations which put GMOs on the market. The qualification is 




the other providers of technology and by inference no reason to worry 
about the imposition of a technology for motives of profit.  The scenario 
proposed using carefully chosen qualifications clearly opposes another in 
which “we” are the target of an invasion on the part of an untrustworthy 
agent.  
6.7 Categorization 
The classification of ideologically relevant items plays an important 
part in the management of stake in discourse. Van Dijk (1995, 1998) 
pointed out that ideological discourses on immigration in Europe often 
include the distinction between “good immigrants” and “bad 
immigrants”. Once the distinction is made, actions advocated by 
supporters of strong policies against immigration are invoked not for the 
“good” but for only for the “bad” ones. In terms of stake management, to 
make distinctions can amount to a discursive strategy which protects the 
speaker from charges of holding a prejudiced and generalized negative 
attitude toward immigrants. Discourses of food biotechnologies 
interestingly present the same argumentative property, no doubt because 
they share with the debate about immigration the same controversial 
character and, for those participating in the debate, the same mutual 
accusations of prejudiced, interest-driven positions which ignore facts. In 
the GMO debate, “red”--that is medical--biiotechnologies are “good”, 
while “green” ones--agriculture biotechnologies--are considered “bad” 
(Eurobarometer, 2000). As in immigration debates, speakers often use 
the distinction between “red” and “green” to argue that their criticisms of 
biotechnologies don’t amount to generalized accusations but to well 
thought out, conscientious assessment.  In sum, categorization is a tool 
speakers use to make their arguments less easy to dismiss. 
There is an example of this rhetorical strategy in the conversation 
reported above. At lines 22-26, the citizen says that biotechnologies “are 
useful to further people’s health” but then immediately contrasts these 





food biotechnologies. An analysis of the sequential position of the 
utterances shows that the citizen at that point was attempting to display a 
less oppositional or propaganda-driven position. His statements at lines 
1-14 had prompted an adversative utterance on the part of the professor 
“no, listen….” (line 15), which is followed by the citizen’s “no no I am 
not accusing you” (line 17-18), uttered in overlap with and thus 
effectively interrupting the professor. The citizen seems to try to defend 
himself from potential accusations of being unjustifiably aggressive; his 
utterance appears to be designed to protect the speaker’s ritual face. 
Appearing too partisan and unreasonable in a discussion can diminish the 
strength of one’s arguments. In the sequential context the distinction 
between good and bad biotechnologies serves the rhetorical aim of 
taming the stance expressed and helping to gain recognition for the 
claims made. 
6.8 Metapragmatic descriptions 
Metapragmatic refers to any characterization of a particular language 
use. A powerful way of positioning the interlocutor or a third party in 
discourse is to attribute to their actions a certain illocutionary force. 
Illocutionary force is the conventional effect of an utterance (Austin, 
1975). In many languages, specific verbs, which Austin calls 
illocutionary verbs, have the peculiarity of performing the action which 
they describe when they are conjugated in the first single person of the 
indicative present. For instance, “I fire you” if spoken by the right person 
in the right context, performs the act of firing the “you” in question. 
Many times there is a single word which characterized the action of 
someone. Metapragmatic descriptions often occur when the talk of 
another person is summarized as amounting to the performance of some 
conventionally describable action. Certain words  build upon the 
semantics of language to characterize actions. These words are often - 
but not necessarily – verbs which describe an action, (to complain, to 




characterization can be more subtle. I report an extract from an interview 
in which a scientist says “Italians are terrified”. The scientist’s 
characterization of Italians is derived upon his assessment of their 
behavior (in this case how subjects responded to a survey on GMOs). 
However, there is not clear reference to a specific action, in this case the 
characterization is being affected by terror of GMOs. In other instances 
the metapragmatic characterization is more obvious. Reporting speech 
indirectly we routinely sum up someone’s words as amounting, for 
instance, to a complaint, a request or a criticism. Metapragmatic 
descriptions are a device to create dialogical oppositions in discourse: 
they attribute character and generate a form of voicing. Metapragmatic 
descriptions are found in reported speech in which the quoted talk of one 
party is embedded within the speech of another but also in indirect 
reported speech. As Duranti and Goodwin put it, “verbs of saying are 
ideal framing devices for expressing local linguistic ideologies and can 
thus be equally exploited by authors/speakers and analysts for getting at 
the interplay of alternative interpretations of text or talk.” (Duranti and 
Goodwin, 1992: 20) The notion can be extended to any description of 
someone’s communicative behavior, not only actual but potential. 
Metapragmatic descriptions are one of the ways in which the dialogic 
interplay of different discourses is achieved within one person’s talk.In 
the above fragment there are no examples of metapragmatic descriptions 
which make use of verbs of saying. However, there are a few instances in 
which participants qualify their own words or those of their interlocutor 
as amounting (or not amounting) to a particular action. At line 17-18, the 
citizen says “I am not accusing you”. In this case the metapragmatic 
description is used to qualify hisown previous words as not being an 
accusation. The move seems to fence off further reactions on the part of 
the interlocutor who was trying to take the turn (see Fele, 1991). At lines 
64-67  the professor says “let’s not think in slogans”, which amounts to 
summing up the whole preceding contribution of the citizen as partisan 
trivialities. In this case the metapragmatic move characterizes the content 
rather then the type of action performed by the interlocutor. However, the 





particular type of behavior, even if no single verb, in Italian or in 
English, can univocally label it.  At line 109 the professor says “let me 
add here a word of common sense” which introduces and qualifies his 
own following contribution as “common sense”: uncontroversial, 
intuitive, rational, and right. In this case too the description focuses on 
the content of the words the professor is about to speak, rather then the 
type of action he intends to accomplish. There are several further 
examples of metapragmatic description in the data. One scientist, while 
narrating a public encounter in which someone from the floor 
vociferously criticized him, said of a lady “ha cominciato a sbraitare” 
(“she started to squeak”). The term has a disparaging meaning. 
“Sbraitare” amounts to shouting in an uncontrolled and uncivilized way 
in order to blame or complain. The scientist then makes a direct quote of 
what exactly the “squeaking” amounted to, reporting that the lady, after 
having missed his explicative explanatory introduction on 
biotechnologies because she was outside the room smoking, had said “I 
am against GMOs and that’s it” . By describing the action performed by 
the lady as “sbraitare” the scientist diminishes whatever authority the 
person might have had and dismisses the criticism that were directed to 
him. The move amounts to a derogatory strategy. Consider also another 
example from an interview with a scientist: “non si puo’ dare un grande 
peso all’impressione di chi non possiede l’argomento” (“one cannot 
attribute a lot of weight to the impression of those who don’t master the 
topic”). In this case the interviewed scientist argues for a decision-
making process on field trial which won’t include lay people. The 
scientist metapragmatically describes the assessments of lay people as 
“impressione”, and thus he implicitly undermines such judgment as 
superficial and cursory. This is a more subtle example. In this case 
“impressione” is not the description of an accomplished speech act. In 
this instance the scientist is not referring specifically to the discourse of 
one person or to one newspaper article which he sums up as amounting 
to impressions. Rather, he describes as “impressions” any contribution, 




making process. The discourses of uninformed people are thus framed as 
originating from a superficial appraisal of the phenomenon.  
6.9 Evidentiality 
The term indicates any strategy in discourse aiming to strengthen 
one’s point of view through authority or argumentation. Speakers can be 
made accountable for what they say; thus they tend to provide proof for 
their beliefs, especially in conflictual settings where their claims might be 
challenged. Furthermore, providing evidence for one’s position furthers 
one’s argument and can make it more persuasive. Depending on the 
context, different evidence is required to support one’s propositions. In 
informal chatting on trivial topics, vaguely referring to a piece of news 
seen on TV or to something read in the paper is usually considered good 
enough (see van Dijk, 1998). In scientific contexts the requirements are 
different, and evidentiality is achieved through more structured protocols 
of authority and proof.  In situations where participants are opposing 
each other and have conflictual perspectives, providing evidence can be 
one way of challenging claims and making points over the adversary 
(Fele, 1992).  Also, evidence in such contexts is more liable to rejection. 
At lines 1- 3 of the above fragment the citizen refers to the claim, made 
beforehand by the scientist in charge of the field trial, that “Americans 
have been eating GMOs for the last 10 years”. The argument made by the 
scientist is an evidential move. The scientist clearly wanted to make the 
point that GMOs have so far been harmless and was attempting to 
provide some evidential support to his claim. He did it by stating, 
implicitly, that nothing bad had occurred to Americans because of what 
they had been eating for the last ten years, and, by inference, that there is 
at least some proof that GMOs have no adverse effects on human health. 
In chapter XX, dedicated to the field trial, this example is discussed 
along with the reaction it produced in the public. At line 116 the 
professor says “I have been eating salad for twen- for seventy years and I 





“it is not that genes pass into human organism in an automatic way”. In 
this case the evidential move takes the form of exemplary argumentation: 
if the professor is not green, the logic goes, after having eaten green salad 
all his life, then genes do not pass into the organism.  
6.10 Presuppositions 
Presuppositions are pragmatic inferences which convey what is 
presupposed as something already known by both speaker and hearer 
(Levinson, 1983).  They are ubiquitous in discourse and have an 
important part in making communication efficient. Presuppositions have 
also been defined as shared assumptions which constitute the background 
of the ongoing communication (Stalnaker, 1973). The notion relies upon 
the concept of “common ground” (Stalnaker, 1974). Two people’s 
common ground is “the sum of their mutual, common or joint 
knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions” (Clark, 1996: 93). Common 
ground includes a wide spectrum of information which is shared between 
interlocutors, ranging from the general knowledge two persons living in 
the same country normally share to very specific and private pieces of 
information. In a restaurant for instance, both customer and waiter have a 
partly shared sense of the setting they are in; as a consequence they have 
expectations about what is happening and what should happen next.  
These shared expectations produce inferences which determine how the 
talk and the actions of both parties will be interpreted. While 
“presupposition” is used in common language, the notion of 
presupposition has a technical sense in linguistic pragmatics. 
Presuppositions are inferences activated by specific linguistic triggers. 
Presuppositions are characterized by constancy under negation. For 
instance, the sentence “Mary’s car is broken” presupposes “Mary has a 
car”.  Noticeably, even if what is predicated of Mary’s car is negated, as 
in: “Mary’s car is not broken”, the presupposition “Mary has a car” 
remains valid. Such presuppositions are called existential because they 




descriptions like “Mary’s car” are among the most common forms for 
providing information in efficient way. Normally we are not aware of the 
presupposed existential assertion when we merely use a definite 
description. What is presupposed seems obvious. However, the level of 
epistemic commitment in the delivery of information through 
presupposition is lower then when the information is delivered asserting 
it rather then presupposing it. Presuppositions can be explicitly denied. 
One could say: “Mary’s car isn’s broken because, in fact, she doesn’t 
have a car” without incurring in logical contradiction while one could not 
say, without being self contradictory: “Mary has got a car only she does 
not have one”. Because presuppositions can be cancelled, they make the 
speaker not fully “liable” for their content. As such, they have a very 
important rhetorical role. Presupposition is of interest to linguistic 
pragmatics, and it has been the object of innumerable studies (for a 
review see Levinson, 1983).   I shall not dwell any further on the nature 
of the phenomenon, but I list here some of the linguistic elements which 
trigger presuppositions: Definite descriptions, as in the examples we have 
just seen, trigger existential presuppositions.   Factive verbs such as 
“realize” (as in “John realized/did not realize that he was in debt” that 
presupposes “John was in debt”).“Know” or “regret” presuppose the 
truth or factuality of their complement clauses. Also, change of state 
verbs, like “to stop”, “to begin”, verbs of judging, temporal clauses, 
(“before,”, “while”), comparison and contrasts, and non restrictive 
relative clauses (relative clauses that provide additional parenthetical 
information) all trigger characteristic presuppositions. For instance, the 
sentence “Mary, who knew the story, told it to John” presupposes that 
Mary knew the story. Furthermore, counterfactual conditionals and 
questions also can introduce presupposed information. For a detailed list 
and theoretical discussion see Levinson, (1983: 181 – 185). In the 
context of a study of the ideological proprieties of discourse, 
presuppositions have an important role, for they not only hint at the 
shared knowledge between speakers, they also can have informative uses 
(Karttunnen, 1974). Let’s go back to the sentence: “Mary’s car is 





one all participants know that Mary has a car, in the other the speaker 
clearly knows it but some of the others so far did not know so. In the 
second case participants will infer that Mary has a car because of the 
properties of the sentence. When a presupposition introduced in the 
discourse is not already part of the shared knowledge of participants but 
rather constitutes a new piece of knowledge for some interlocutor, the 
presupposed information is passed on inferentially as part of the stock of 
knowledge shared between participants (Lewis, 1979). Cognitively 
fundamental in any kind of communication, presuppositions also project 
the flavor of uncontested reality on elements the reality of which can in 
fact be highly contestable (van Dijk, 1995; Sbisà, 1999). In many 
circumstances social arrangements make it hard to challenge the 
presuppositions of the speaker without entering a confrontational terrain, 
something which is frequently avoided in interaction (Goffman, 1967). 
Because of their normative affect presuppositions can have a persuasive 
function. The validity of what is presupposed constitutes one of the 
felicity conditions for the accomplishment of assertive speech acts 
(Austin, 1975; Sbisa’, 1999). Presuppositions can contribute to create a 
context which offers as objective and uncontested one particular version 
of reality: when the version of reality proposed has to do with values and 
socially relevant issues, informative presuppositions can be an instrument 
for the persuasive delivery of ideologically imbued discourses. These 
particular inferences seem to have a normative component (Sbisà, 1999). 
Thus, presuppositions can play an important role in the construction of 
reality via linguistic means, and they are frequently exploited in 
ideological discourse. The interaction I have been using to illustrate the 
methodology offers no clear examples of this kind of “persuasive” use of 
presupposition, so I shall illustrate it using text from a newspaper. 
Newspaper headlines frequently make use of presupposition: 
Consider: 
“La posizione della Santa sede in favore degli OGM e’ un fatto di grande 
importanza” [The position of the Holy See in favour of GMOs is a fact of 
great importance](Bozzo, 2002). Here the definite description triggers the 




exists. Because we know from a wealth of other data that support from 
the Church is neither unanimous nor uncontested to offer it as a given 
constitutes a partisan way of representing facts which suggests that the 
writer supports GMOs.   
6.11 Conclusion 
I have listed a number of linguistic features of discourse that play a part 
in the construction of narratives on food biotechnologies. All these 
features fit into larger discursive strategies. In order to make a narrative 
compelling and more believable, speakers deploy general strategies that 
include characterizing as factual one’s own version of events and 
constructing oneself as competent, dependable, and not personally tied to 
a position one is supporting. In the example quoted above, the professor 
deploys a general “professorial” strategy to make his claims more 
persuasive.  The scientist advocates a “model” of biotechnologies that 
reduces the GMO issue to matters of technological advancements and 
economic decision-making. This effect is achieved rhetorically through 
argumentation. By the same token, the polarized view that sees 
“Americans” “colonizing” “us” and puts the accent on the enormous 
economic interests implied in the development of biotechnologies is 
dismissed as “slogan” and an alternative “model” is proposed. The 
responsibility for the diffusion of biotechnologies is dissolved: “these 
large multinationals belong to nobody” says the professor, and further 
distributes responsibility among all “the shareholders”. The “American” 
vs. “us” storyline is rejected, and instead a relationship between 
“technological tools providers” and “clients” is proposed. This shift 
marks the beginning of an argument that depicts GMOs as simply the 
latest technological advancement in a very long series of positive 
developments for agriculture.  How does the professor proceed to 
communicate that GMOs are safe, that they represent progress, and that 
nobody is trying to force them on us? The professor’s discourse exhibits 





discourse” (Gilber & Mulkay, 1984). This kind of discourse is typical of 
scientific reports and bears all the linguistic signs of objective and factual 
description of events; “the empiricist repertoire is a standard device for 
constructing the out-there-ness of scientific phenomena” (Billig, 
1987:153). The features of the empiricist discourse include: grammatical 
impersonality, data primacy, universal procedural rules (ibidem: 153). 
These translate into third person impersonal verbal forms and in 
expressions like “data suggest that…” in which the data are given agent 
role and results seem to come straight from them without the interpreting 
intervention of the researcher.  This type of discourse is meant to provide 
factuality and universality to scientific data, but as Billig puts it, it is 
“also bound up with the business of fact construction” (ibidem: 153). In 
this less specific form, the repertoire of the empiricist serves the purpose 
of conferring matter-of-fact-ness to one’s particular narrative in any 
given context. Overall, the strategy aims at minimizing the contribution 
of the speaker and letting the “facts” speak for themselves. In this 
example, factuality is matched with assertiveness and at times with the 
character of explicative, pedagogical talk found in lectures.  
Consider: 
“as of today the owners of these technologies are Europeans, they are not 
Americans. The biggest concentration of biotechnological know how is 
at Bayer” (lines 49-53). 
Here the assertiveness of the sentence contradicting the previous speaker 
is underlined by the temporal phrase “as of today”. The resulting 
impression is that we have been presented with a fact by a 
knowledgeable person with state of the art information: 
“I would like to go back to my, to a model right, let’s say we have 
farmers who are businessmen,” continues the professor (lines 57-60). The 
sentence proposes an abstraction, something appropriate in explanatory 
contexts like lectures; this is not mere opinion but exhange of knowledge 
from more knowledgeable to less knowledgeable persons.  
The professor carries on illustrating his model: “and there are other 
companies […] which provide the technical tools…” (lines 61-63). The 




clients and providers of technology stand to each other in the proposed 
relationship of mutual freedom.  
The model is explicit, almost pedagogical.  Consider: “farmers like 
businessmen are customers” line 66, “The technology  normally is 
chemical technology”  (line 68),  
The expression “among other things” at line 71 seems to play a part in 
building up the sense that biotechnological advancement is nothing but a 
further development within a system that has been in place for a long 
time. Overall, the professor uses expressions that are part of the 
repertoire of the knowledgeable expert, who knows some field inside out. 
The exchange shows that the interlocutors negotiate not only a view of 
biotechnologies but also the very frame of the interaction. The metaphor 
of frame has been used to describe the structures of expectation of a 
given interaction. Some of these structures are intrinsic in the ongoing 
social situation: a public encounter with invited speakers. Others are 
negotiated by the participants. Here the professor dexterously shifts the 
interaction to a “professor to novice” frame. As such the exchange takes 
on the features of a passage of information from knowledgeable to 
ignorant rather than those of a discussion between peers. At line 93 the 
professor asserts that if European farmers don’t accept GMOs “it is not a 
tragedy”. The professor teaches biotechnologies in a major university and 
he represents the Italian Association of Biotech Companies at the 
meeting. He is arguably quite interested in the future of biotechnologies 
in Europe. His statement then can amount to “stake inoculation” (Potter, 
1997), a device for managing the speaker’s partisan interest in a 
particular version of events. Letting the public know that he is not 
particularly concerned about the future biotechnologies, the professor 
implicitly claims impartiality. If the public recognizes his impartiality, 
this is likely to further the professor’s credibility in the 
discussion.Specific jargon also plays a part in projecting onself as a 
competent, expert speaker. Esoteric lexicon is often a feature of scientific 
discourse; it positions the speaker as specialist in the field and may also 
have the effect of inhibiting expression of contrary positions by less 





opposing voices that cannot match or contest technical jargon. The 
scientist uses the English expression “know how” (line 52), which is not 
very common in Italian and “trasgenesi”, a term specific to the field of 
biotechnologies. Most likely no lay parson in the room knows exactly 
what “transgenesi” means. It is from the position of expert, constructed in 
discourse in part thanks to  specialized lexicon,  that the scientist can 
declare with emphasis that “the probability that this is harmful is null!”. 
For good measure he adds “I don’t know if you realize that” (lines 127) 
further to underline that his statement is not only true but that it should be 
self evident to everyone. The reaction from someone in the audience 
shows that not everybody was convinced by this discourse. The citizen 
who says “but I don’t trust you” (line 131) clearly takes the contribution 
of the scientist as nothing more then the expression of his belief, and not 
as the definitive pronunciation of an expert in the field. Clearly, she 
cannot challenge the scientist’s claims about “transgenesi”; nor perhaps 
can she contradict his appraisal of the worldwide market for 
biotechnologies. She simply publicly denies her trust. The utterance of 
the citizen is loud enough to be heard by everybody (including my tape 
recorder); but it may not have been loud enough (or sufficiently “on 
record” or “ratified”) to be counted as a turn; perhaps the professor 
simply decided to ignore her.  Nonetheless, her contribution amounts to 
the last word, a last word forcefully in opposition to the whole position of 




7 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I propose the analysis of a council’s declaration of 
rejection of GMOs, of four texts concerning the position of the Catholic 
Church towards biotechnologies, and of excerpts from a case study 
involving the experimental cultivation of GM rice. Whereas the Bubbio 
declaration, and the published pieces about the Church, suggest a kind of 
fixed, pre-thought position, which is also more “designed” and 
constructed, the interactive material shows bits of ideology in action in a 
public, sometimes confrontational setting. 
7.1 The anti-transgenic declaration of the 
Bubbio council 
As I have mentioned in the paragraph dedicated to Anti transgenic 
councils and regions, (4.8.4), many local administrations in Italy have 
declared themselves against GMOs. Councils and regions have voted to 
ban the cultivation of GM crops from their territories. GMOs are 
sometimes excluded from food served in public institutions such as 
schools, hospitals and employers canteens. Some administrations oppose 
the diffusion of GMOs and campaign against them via council 
resolutions. The legal status of these resolutions is dubious because they 
rule over matters that are under national and European jurisdiction (but 
see paragraph 4.9.3 on the Italian Law on Coexistence). As of August 
2005, there are 26 products, GMOs or derived from GMOs that can be 
legally commercialized in the EU (Community register of food and feed, 
n. d.). These products have passed the duly required assessments and 
have been declared safe by the European Food Authority under the 
provisions of EU legislation. Products that have been authorized for 
human consumption in the E.U. cannot be banned from part of Italian 
territory because of the resolution of a local administration. By the same 





of the Environment in Rome; local administrations do not have authority 
over the permission for experimental planting of GM crops and they 
cannot veto the decision-makers. Furthermore, as we have seen, local 
administrators are not even directly notified of authorized field trials. 
However, in practice it might be awkward to cultivate GM crops in a 
territory that local authorities have declared “GM free”; when possible 
scientists avoid controversies for fear of vandalism to the fields. In past 
cases where potential conflict was anticipated, the applicants have 
withdrawn their requests and carried out the experiments elsewhere. 
(Battaglino, personal communication; Onorati, personal communication; 
D’onofrio, personal communication) Local authorities opposed to GMOs 
are listed in the web site of the Association “Free from GMOs” The web 
site also lists all the local resolutions and links to information over the 
GMO controversies. The association has also been involved in 
organizing three conferences.  The “First national conference of anti 
transgenic councils” was held in Florence in May 2001.  The second was 
held in Asti in 2004. There was also a “European conference of the GM 
free regions, biodiversity and rural development” in Berlin in January 
2005.In Italy the first local administration to issue a formal resolution 
against GMOs was in Bubbio, a small village in the Asti province. The 
Asti geographic area, in the north-west of Italy, is famous for its food 
products, in particular for the sparkling wine called spumante. Bubbio 
decided to become a “Council free from GMOs” on August, 13, 1999. 
Bubbio’s vice mayor, Gianfranco Torelli, is a wine maker, and he is 
committed to organic farming and to the anti GMO cause. He promoted 
the resolution and is an active figure in Italy opposing the introduction of 
genetically modified foods and crops. (Torelli, personal communication) 
I here present the translation of the Bubbio resolution. The original text of the 
“delibera” in Italian is in the appendix. 
Bubbio Council 
Asti Province 




The Council assembly, having taken into account that the introduction 
into farming of GMOs has raised great doubts and perplexities in public 
opinion  
for ethical reasons, 
for the consequences on the health of citizens, 
for the irreversible dangers to the ecosystem,  
for the further disparity that it would create between rich countries and 
developing countries. 
Considering that the new farming model proposed is in clear 
contradiction with that practiced in our area, which is strongly linked 
with traditions and with the features of the territory; 
Having decided, in the light of what is mentioned above, by virtue of 
the scope of its authority, to take a stand  against the introduction into 
agriculture of genetically modified organisms 
Having taken into account the support of the Council Secretary, in 
accordance with article 53 of the law 142/90 concerning the 
administrative regularity of the present document; 
unanimously and concertedly with votes expressed by raising hands; 
decides: 
to declare the council of Bubbio an “anti transgenic council” 
to post below the street signs at the entrance of the village the sign 
“Antitransgenic council” 
To forbid in all the  territory of the council experiments, farming, and 
animal farming of living organisms, both vegetal and animal, obtained 
using genetic manipulation   
To create an ad hoc council commission initially composed of the vice 
mayor and two council members and that can be in the future composed 
of other persons in order to pursue the following aims: 
To inform, using meetings, postings and letters, the producers in the 
council territory (winemakers, ham producers, bakers and 





products in the (re?)productive chain (for example eggs from chickens 
fed with GMO feed, selected yeasts, enzymes, ascorbic acid obtained 
with methodologies that imply the use of GMOs and so on) 
To inform, using meetings, postings and letters, the resellers in the 
council territory about the risks of selling foods of producers who have 
been accused of using genetically modified products in the 
reproduction8 chain 
To inform the citizens, using meetings, postings and letters, about the 
risks linked with the eating of products obtained with GMOs and to start 
a serious campaign for alimentary education linked to the use of 
traditional quality products 
To foresee during events organized by the local association for Bubbio 
an effective promotion of local products promulgating in the most 
effective way the message against genetically modified products. 
 
This official text contains almost in a nutshell a large number of the 
arguments against GMOs heard in Italy. I analyze it as a specifically 
Italian representation of GMOs. The raison d’etre of the document comes 
from the “great doubts and perplexities” engendered in “public opinion” 
by the farming of GMOs. This by itself is of interest. The Bubbio 
administration roots its decision in the concerns of the public, as if due to 
public pressure there were an urge to legislate or to take a stand on a 
controversial matter. “Public opinion” is a very general term and it is 
likely to refer more to the worldwide movement against GMOs than to 
citizens of Bubbio particularly worried about GMOs. The programmatic 
part of the document, further down, proposes to inform, warn and 
educate citizens and food producers and dealers, so it is fair to suppose 
that at the moment in time when this document was issued there was not 
a well formed, public opinion movement in Bubbio calling for an 
“Antitransgenic” declaration.  The reasons for public concern, which in 
the text appear to be at the root of the resolution, are of four kinds.  The 
                                                 
8 This is most likely a mistake for the intended expression “production 




first is “ethical”: which obviously seems to imply that GMOs are 
unethical.  The point is not developed any further, as the document then 
focuses elsewhere, but this aspect is mentioned as the first reason of 
concern. In this instance, “unethical” can refer to the practice of 
introducing alien genes in an organism. Further down there are references 
to other, socially linked reasons why GMOs can be considered 
“unethical” The declaration has the features of polemic discourse, which 
taps on several argumentative levels to question its target. The first 
reason why GMOs are unethical most likely has to do with the intrinsic 
character of genetically transformed plants. The second reason, “the 
consequences on the health of citizens”, uses an existential 
presupposition, triggered by the definite article, to attribute with implicit 
certainty unhealthy properties to GMOs. There is no hedge to such a 
claim.  The consequences, clearly negatives, for citizens health are taken 
for granted. Also linguistically presupposed - and thus taken for granted - 
are “the irreversible dangers to the ecosystem”, the third reason given. 
The fourth reason refers to what can be called the ‘Social Justice’ issue, 
namely the fact that GMOs might have the effect of further 
impoverishing certain areas of the world for the profit of rich 
corporations in the west. The document also introduces a fifth argument, 
although it is not explicitly listed. The argument is linked to matters of 
tradition, culture and identity. While these aspects emerge with 
consistency in the Italian data, they have so far received little attention in 
the literature on biotechnologies (See for instance Bauer & Gaskell, 
2002a). This aspect is actually what specifically characterizes the food 
biotechnology debate in Italy. In the Bubbio declaration, GMOs are 
described as opposed to what farming is in “our” area, where the plural 
first person possessive indexes a community and an identity which 
encompasses farming practices. Tradition and territoriality are seen as 
values “in clear contradiction” with GMOs.  GMOs here are something 
much bigger and wider then pest-resistant varieties of crops. GMOs are 
depicted as the wrong approach to agriculture; they are the product of an 
entire worldview that is rejected here. The Bubbio resolution represents 





culture and economy. In particular, GMOs are represented as threatening 
the current way of farming, which is in turn strongly linked with tradition 
and with local geography and terrain.  
7.2 The Catholic Church and GMOs: 
analysis of four texts 
In Italy the influence of the Catholic Church on opinions about 
GMOs is conspicuous. As I will show, the authority of the Vatican serves 
as rhetorical ammunition for making claims both for and against the 
technology and its products. Some informal discussions of 
biotechnologies--for example media reports--frequently claim that GMOs 
are good because “even the Church approves of them”; on the other hand, 
others evoke the claim that the Church is against them. The moral 
authority of the source makes one’s own claim stronger. The truth about 
the attitude of the Roman Curie toward biotechnologies is mostly lost in 
the discussion. This occurs not only as a consequence of biased reporting 
but also because the Catholic Church incorporates, though not without 
struggles and contradictions, several different voices. It is easy to find 
diametrically opposed positions on the issue expressed by different 
Church members. I will consider here four different documents: one 
intervention from a Cardinal at a seminar organized by the Vatican on the 
topic of GMOs and three newspaper articles, two of which are written by 
priests and one reporting the statements of an archbishop. I aim to show 
how different representations of food GMOs exist even within a highly 
hierarchical and allegedly ideologically compact body like the Roman 
Catholic Church. One interesting aspect will be the range of  appeals to 
different values which are appealed to in order to support the respective 
positions. 
7.2.1 “Dress and keep” 
The first document comes from the web site of the Vatican. It 




symposium “GMOs: menace or hope?”, held in Rome on November 10  
to 12, 2003 (Martino, 2003). Participants included world renowned 
scientists, theologians and ministers of the Italian government. I present 
here the translation of the most salient parts of the document.  Numbers 
between brackets have been added to aid in identifying paragraphs. 
 
(…) 
{1}The Pontifical Council of Peace and Justice has organized and 
promoted this encounter with the aim of collecting the largest body of 
informative data about GMOs, which in the future might serve to 
supplement ethical and pastoral judgment, which is day after day more 
needed and which can await no longer. 
(…) 
{2} This Pontifical Council has all the responsibility to face such 
problematic complexity, which proposes once more, from certain 
vantage points, the question of the relationship between faith and 
science; this Dicastero9 wants fully to take charge of it and to make 
good use of your science and experience, and at the same time, to rely 
on the century long knowledge of the Church and its doctrine, which 
allows [us] to find, with balance and in the truth,  a point of useful and 
fertile synthesis for producing good for men of our time, especially for 
the poor. 
{3}From the program of the seminar you can see that it is structured in 
four sessions: GMOs and scientific research, GMOs, aliments and trade; 
GMOs and security of the environment and health; GMOs and moral 
implications. 
(…) 
{4}Many have displayed some surprise and wonder at this initiative of 
the Pontifical Council, asking what reason justifies it. It is, in this case 
                                                 
9 I was not able to find a proper translation for this term, it indicates the 
Vatican institution that organized the conference, an institution that aims 






as well, about giving way to a deep and essential need in the religious 
and moral mission of the Church, that of shedding the light of the 
Gospel on all that concerns the promotion of man and the affirmation of 
his dignity. The Church does this, respecting natural law, making good 
use of the results of scientific research, and bringing up to date the 
message of the Holy Books and applying the principles of its social 
doctrine. 
{5}And in this respect, while I conclude this short introduction, let me 
share with you the lesson, very pertinent and instructive, which comes 
to us from the first chapters of the Bible which talks about the creation. 
In the plan of the Creator in fact, created realities, good in themselves, 
exist in the service of man. While creating man in his image and 
likeness, He wants [man] to “have dominion over the works of thy 
hands; thou hast put all things under his feet. All sheep and oxen, yea, 
and the beasts of the field. The fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea, 
and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas”. (Sal 8, 5-710). 
{6}The dominion of man over other living beings, though, does not 
have to be despotic and thoughtless; on the contrary, [man]  has “to 
dress and to keep” the goods created by God: goods that man has 
received as a precious gift, put by the Creator under his responsibility.  
{7}The prohibition of eating from “the tree of knowledge of good and 
evil” (Gen 2, 17) reminds man that he has received everything as a free 
gift, that he continues to be a creation, and that he will never be the 
Creator. The sin of our ancestors was provoked exactly by this 
temptation: “and ye shall be as gods” (Gen 3, 5). Adam and Eve wanted 
to have absolute dominion over all things, without bowing to the will of 
the Creator. Since then man must gather food from the soil with pain---
“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the 
ground” (Gen3, 17-19). 
{8}Despite Original Sin,  the plan of Creator--the meaning of his 
creatures, including man, who is called to be the cultivator and guardian 
of the created--remains unaltered. Man, endowed with intelligence 
                                                 
10 This and further quotations from the Bible have been translated into 
English according to King James Bible. Retrieved on July 3rd, 2005,  




thanks to which he is able to understand the sense of things, must 
safeguard the goods of the earth that he has received as a gift. Given  
the capacity to discover causes, laws, and mechanisms which govern 
beings, living and otherwise, and as a consequence capable of 
intervention on them, man must use these capacities to “dress” [i.e., 
tend or till] and not to destroy. To dress means to intervene, to take 
decisions, to take action, not to let the plants grow randomly. To 
cultivate means to improve and to perfect, so that better fruits might 
come, and more abundantly. To cultivate means to order, to clean, to 
take away what destroys and what ruins. To cultivate is the best way to 
safeguard.  
Thank you everybody and work hard! 
 
The passage, from the opening of an international seminar promoted by 
the Vatican, is a straightforward declaration of the principles that guide 
the Church with respect to nature and consequently, as is made explicit, 
with respect to GMOs. The speech can be considered an official stance 
taking on the part of the Vatican.  Values and priorities are spelled out 
and the attitude toward GMOs is presented as derived from the just 
relationship between man and nature, which is in turn prescribed by the 
Bible. Man is put at the centre of the universe and is not only able but 
obliged to intervene and make use of his capacities to change what is 
found in nature, with the instruments of his ingenuity. Man is above 
nature and need not worship her; however he must worship God and His 
laws. Hubris was once man’s sin, and it might be again. But even after 
Original sin man keeps his position as master of all other creatures, even 
if he is a creature himself and never Creator. The sin of hubris--man who 
wants to “be like God”-- is part of the rhetoric found in Rifkin’s 
enormously popular writings on biotechnologies (Rifkin, 1998) and, 
indeed, in that of many detractors of biotechnologies. Often hubris is 
linked with the myth of Frankenstein, conjuring the dreadful 
consequences of man’s arrogance. Cardinal Ruini mentions the sin of 
hubris, {7} echoing these discourses, but he does so only to reassert the 
superiority of man over all other creatures and his right to make use of 





hand, we shall notice that the topic of the seminar and the words of the 
Cardinal refer to the manipulation of the genomes of living beings other 
than humans. However much it might stress man’s God-given dominion 
over other creatures, the Church has expressed strong opposition to gene 
manipulation involving human beings and is fiercely opposed to stem 
cell research which uses embryos (Pontificia Accademia per la vita, X 
Assemblea Generale, 2004).  Martino’s speech offers a representation of 
food biotechnologies derived from exegesis of the Bible. The focus is on 
the compatibility of biotechnologies with the Catholic doctrine, deduced 
from Biblical texts, rather then induced from the many elements which 
characterize the issue. The difference between deduction and induction is 
essential in cognitive terms, and deduction seems a characteristic trait of 
ideological thinking, where assessments of new phenomena are based on 
previously decided criteria. However, this whole exercise could also be 
seen as strictly rhetorical. Invocating the strength of the tradition and of 
the Bible is a powerful rhetorical tool to gain strength for one’s position. 
Further, the Cardinal chooses to restrict his commentary to the scientific 
aspects of gene technology, leaving behind social and economical aspects 
that are controversial even within the Roman Church. Martino addresses 
the technology and its compatibility with the Catholic doctrine, and the 
selection (and restricted scope) of the topic is conditioned by an 
ideological bias (van Dijk, 1995, 1998).  The discourse could be seen as a 
prototypical example of ideological thinking. A new item appears, in this 
case a new technology. In order to assess it and to assign it a place in 
one’s world, previous knowledge and standing principles are consulted. 
The textual passage analyzed shows how such thinking--common to 
everyone whether as conscious or conspicuous as in Martino’s speech--
works. Most of us don’t have a clear exemplar to consult when we try to 
decide how to assess a new item or a new technology, but those who 
accept the authority of the Catholic Church, reading Martono’s rhetoric, 
can be sure that the technology of gene transfer is not in conflict with the 
Bible’s prescriptions. GMOs are inferentially characterized in positive 
terms: gene biotechnology might be a new way for humankind to fulfill 




fruits from humankind’s efforts “to cultivate and to perfect”.  The 
declarations of the Cardinal had repercussions in the press, from both 
critics and supporters of GMOs. The debate on GMOs was ongoing. 
Previous documents from the Vatican provided the sense that the official 
position of the Church might favor GMOs. In fact, the news that the 
Vatican was organizing a seminar on GMOs had already produced debate 
and speculative interpretations about  the Church’s official position on 
the matter.  
7.2.2 “Blessed GMOs” 
I next analyze the translation of an article from Panorama which 
predates the speech by Cardinal Martino. Panorama is a weekly magazine 
with a circulation of about 400.000 copies (Tiratura dei quotidiani e 
settimanali Italiani nel 2003). Despite its covers, which are always 
dedicated to naked women, Panorama hosts the writings of some of the 
most prominent journalists of the country, both from the right and the 
left. The article in question is by Gianni Baget Bozzo (Baget Bozzo, 
2003), a priest and intellectual, and a public figure. Baget Bozzo is very 
freqently the guest of television talk shows and debates. He has a 
declared pro-globalization, pro Italian government, pro-US attitude. He is 
active within Ragionpolitica, the educational branch of Forza Italia, the 
political party of the (then) Prime Minister. Words between square 
brackets are mine, added to clarify the meaning when the reference in the 
translation is unclear. 
Date: August, 14, 2003. 
Headline: {1}Blessed GMOs 
Body of the article: 
{2}The position of the Holy See in favour of GMOs (genetically 
modified organisms) is a fact of great importance. It indicates the favour 
of the Vatican for technological developments and its support for the 






{3}The topic is of major importance because it implies a meaningful 
distance from those ideological positions that hold new technologies 
and the multinationals producing them to be the negative principle of 
history.  
{4}Coming close to many African countries, the Church decides to look 
positively at these possibilities, putting aside the fear that these 
[technologies] might damage the life of man and contribute to the 
deprivation of the planet.  
{5}Thus perishes the idea that between technology and human 
development there is contradiction.  On the contrary, it appears that the 
development of science and technology is exactly what allows 
humankind to face the fundamental problem it faces: winning the 
challenge of hunger in the world.  
{6}The position of Christianity is very different from that of ecologist 
ideologies: all those positions which hold that scientific development 
produces effects detrimental to the human condition.  
{7}At the centre of the Christian vision of life there is the concept that 
what is good for man and his development is also good for the 
conservation and development of physical nature.  
{8}This Vatican position will be contested because it cuts at the very 
roots the idea that there is a connection between Catholicism  and the 
ideological ecologic position; and more than anything (it will cut at the 
roots of the idea that) there is a connection between a negative notion of 
science and a religious position.  
{9}The document that the Holy See will publish on GMOs is a message 
that has to be listened to also by Italian politicians who, like some 
Regional bosses in the north, have decided very rapidly to destroy the 
lands reserved for GMOs. The European Commission has decided that 
it is necessary to stabilize compatibility between GMOs and non GMOs 
but that development has to stand on both these legs [i.e., both 
traditional and genetically modified crops].  
{10}An overly rapid decision to  eliminate GMOs contradicts a 
fundamental assumption of western politics: the possibility of 





The article uses components of the official position of the Church for 
rhetorical aims within an ongoing polemic. The rhetorical strategy of the 
author is to make it harder for ecologists to use the influence of the 
Catholic Church in order to strengthen their standpoints. Green and left 
wing forces in Italy make up a multi-faceted world with important roots 
in the Catholic faith and establishment. Critics of GMOs are very aware 
of the influence that the Church’s position has over a wide spectrum of 
Italian population (Colombo, 2004). At {1}, the headline provides the 
first, baseline topicalization. “Blessed GMOs” focuses on the Church’s 
approval of the GM technology and verbalizes it as a blessing, an 
ecclesiastical “stamp of approval” on GMOs from the Church, something 
not described but rather taken for granted throughout the whole article.  
At the very start of the article at {2} the author triggers a presupposition 
with the use a definitive description “The position of the Holy See in 
favor…” . Thus the favorable position, while being the starting point of 
the whole argument, is not introduced as new information but rather 
offered as a given, something about whose existence there is no 
controversy. In particular, the author takes for granted a contradiction 
between some “ecologic position” and the official policy of the church. 
The argumentative manoeuvre is to “cut at the roots” of potential 
standpoints that would connect Catholicism and ecological ideologies on 
the one hand, or link religion and negative attitudes toward technology 
on the other. The relevance of the argument within the article is evident 
in the reiteration of what appears to be the focus point of the writing.  At 
{3}, {5}, {6} and {8} the author stresses the same point: no connection 
can be made between “ideological ecology” and the position of the 
Church.  One sentence in particular is relevant for its ideological 
components: 
{8}This Vatican position will be contested because it cuts at the very 
roots the idea that there is a connection between Catholicism  and the 
ideological ecologic position; and more than anything (it will cut at the 
roots of the idea that) there is a connection between a negative notion of 





Lexical choice is one of the many devices for expressing  stance. In 
Italian “ideological” is used to mean “biased”, “false”, “not corroborated 
by fact”, in sum as the opposite of “factual”, “scientific”, “rational”. Thus 
naming a position which criticizes GMOs “ecologismo ideologico” 
lexically positions it in a negative way. “Ecologism” is not an English 
word, however it would be a fitting translation of the Italian 
“ecologismo”, as the ending in –ism provides the typical morphological 
costume for movements and ideologies: Communism, Capitalism, and 
Catholicism, for example. “Ecologismo ideologico” is by definition 
against GMOs on ideological grounds. The author also presupposes that 
there exists a (mistaken) idea linking a negative conception of science 
and technology with the religious position  The Vatican’s position in the 
sentence in {8} is the passive subject, target of hypothetical future 
polemics, but the author does not specify who the active force behind the 
polemics will be. The reader might infer that those who would use such a 
polemic might be those who seek to use the authority of the Church for 
advocating “ideological ecology”.  The fact that the position of the 
Vatican “cuts [such an idea] at the roots” (“taglia alla radice l’idea 
che….”) is again presupposed: Baget Bozzo offers it as a datum. It is 
Badget Bozzo who presupposes that the position of the Vatican “cuts at 
the roots” claims of a link between Catholicism and “ecologismo.” 
However, the claim is offered to the reader as a fact through the syntactic 
construction, in particular the use of the passive verb “will be object”, 
and the resulting pragmatic inferences.  The last sentence of the article 
also hints at a polarized worldview. “the possibility of reconciling 
scientific creativity with sustainable development” is presupposed as “a 
fundamental assumption of western politics” within the sentence: “An 
overly rapid decision to  eliminate GMOs contradicts a fundamental 
assumption of western politics: the possibility of reconciling scientific 
creativity with sustainable development”.  Following Baget Bozzo 
western politics are, thus, inherently  interested in sustainable 
development and aim to integrate that with scientific and technological 
creativity. Such a claim is hardly uncontroversial, as many authors 




environment;that there is no real political interest in sustainable 
development; and that science and technology are synonymous with 
hubris and the lust for profit.Another linguistic device that can display 
ideological stance is anaphoric reference (van Dijk, 1995). In this case 
the author bases his argument on the standpoint of the Vatican, which 
expresses the official position of the Roman Catholic church. In {6} and 
{7}, however, he refers anaphorically to the position of the Catholic 
church as that of “Christianity” and of “Christian vision”—a universe 
which encompasses a much wider sphere than simply the Catholic 
Church. In so doing the author through a semantic shift extends the 
position of the Vatican to a much larger community and in so doing 
strengthens rhetorically the Vatican’s authority.  The text by Baget Bozzo 
adopts and promotes several ideologically loaded representations of the 
food biotechnology issue; some are explicit, others are only inferable. 
Here I list some of them: 
• Ecological ideology exists. 
• Someone tries to find/ sees links between Catholicism and 
ecological ideology. 
• Someone tries to find/sees links between a negative conception 
of science and the religious position. 
• The document by the Vatican cuts at the roots of such claims. 
• There is no link between Catholicism and ecological ideology. 
• There is no link between a negative conception of science and 
the (correct) religious position. 
• Science and technology allow humanity to fight world 
starvation 
• At the centre of the Christian vision of life is the concept that 
what is good for man and his development is also good for the 
conservation and development of physical nature. 
• One of the fundamental assumptions of western politics is the 
possibility of reconciling scientific and technological creativity 






The last of these stances appears in {10} which introduces a semantic 
shift into the text, so that to preserve textual coherence the reader must 
activate a set of inferences guided by ideological standpoints. The claim 
is that western politics assume that it is possible to reconcile sustainable 
development with scientific and technological creativity.  In {3} the 
author suggests that critics of biotechnologies target multinational 
corporations (among others), seen as agents of “the negative force of 
history.” These corporations without doubt at the moment embody 
“scientific and technological creativity” in the field of food 
biotechnologies.  One of the best agued critiques of biotechnologies is 
that they have been developed commercially for the profit of a small 
number of corporations. Supporters and detractors both agree upon this 
obvious fact. Still, one of the words that fails to appear in the text in 
question is precisely “profit”. “Scientific and technological creativity” 
might be in this instance a euphemistic way of referring to the impulse 
given to the technology by corporations. Western societies inspired to 
some extent by Adam Smith’s capitalistic principles share the 
assumption that the pursuit of personal profit is not only compatible with 
but enhancing of the public good; the author provides a “profit free” 
version of that claim. Lastly, the author argues for Italian politicians to 
listen to the Church and act accordingly {9}, explicitly calling them to 
accept the standpoint of the moral authority. The sentence is both a 
warning and an exhortation, closing an engaged skirmish in what appears 
to be an ongoing political battle over coexistence between traditional and 
GM crops, and over the future of biotech research in the country. 
Ideological discourse and stance in discourse are characterized not only 
by the claims explicitly and implicitly made but also by rhetorical gaps 
and omissions. Facts contradicting an argument go conveniently 
unmentioned. Baget Bozzo in his writing chooses to underline the 
position of the Holy See, presenting it as compact, official, and 
definitive, while he ignores the many dissenting voices within the Church 
on the matter of GMOs. I will present two examples from within the 





7.2.3 “Can Biotechnologies really be the solution to the 
problem of food famine?” 
The following article comes from Grazia, a weekly magazine 
targeting upper middle class women, which prints about 300.000 copies 
per week (Tiratura dei quotidiani e settimanali italiani nel 2003). The 
magazine is owned by the Mondadori editorial group. The author of the 
article is father Giulio Albanese, a Combonian missionary priest. Father 
Albanese is the chief director of misna.org, the press agency of the 
missionary congregation. The article was published the 19th of August, 
just a week after that written by Baget Bozzo. The article refers to a 
forthcoming document expected from the Pontifical Council of Peace and 
Justice. The document would amount to an official position-taking on the 
matter of food biotechnologies.  Unlike Baget Bozzo, Albanese clearly 
holds that there is a lot to worry about in biotechnologies, and he 
mentions no support, given or probable, on the part of the Church for 
GMOs. I report here fragments of the article (Albanese, 2003): 
  
Headline: 
{1} The GMO issue. Can Biotechnologies really be the solution to the 
problem of food famine? 
Body of the article: 
{2}The Pontifical Council for Peace and Justice has the intention to call 
for a seminar of study on the delicate matter of GMOs in the fall, with 
experts on the topic and interested personalities, a seminar from which 
the office will derive fit conclusions. 
(…)  
{3}In 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States, overturning a 
previous sentence on patenting living organisms, authorized the 
commercial patenting of a bacterium. Then patents followed, on all 
living organisms (man excluded, but not his organs). Since then the 
industries can use the pretext of making an “improving” modification in 





food. As a premise [it should be said that] the modifications are not 
always that “improving”, [and that] the commercial intent is without 
scruples. 
{4} The result of genetic modification in space and time, according to 
many scientists, is never foreseeable, because of the complexity of 
every organism and of the relationships that link genes among 
themselves, and also due to the fluctuation of the elements within the 
genome.  
{5} Meanwhile biotech industries keep defending with a sword the use 
of genetically modified plants: to resolve the alimentary problems of 
poor countries and to reduce the use of noxious chemical substances in 
agriculture. But is there ground for believing them? Imposing the annual 
payment of patents makes transgenic cultigens all the more expensive, 
and they will destroy precious biodiversity, the true wealth of 
developing countries. 
(…) 
{6}God forbid! Biotechnologies, if well governed by politics, could 
with time (but only with time!) be a blessing: only one example, the 
therapeutic banana under study in South Africa, would incorporate a 
vaccine against Cholera. Only, it is to be avoided that from biotech labs 
one goes straight to business, from field trials to viruses and bacteria 
endowed with new and unknown forms of aggressiveness.  
 
The headline already frames the content of the article and sets the topic. 
The question posed in {1} clearly is rhetorical and has an implicit “no” 
answer embedded in it. The author in {2} mentions the meeting called by 
the Pontifical Council Peace and Justice but chooses not to speculate 
about  the likely content of the upcoming declaration of the church.  By 
contrast  Baget Bozzo, the author of the article previously considered 
took for granted that their deliberations would be favorable to 
biotechnologies .  Albanese instead focuses on the patenting of living 
beings and the unscrupulous commercial endeavors of industries {3}, the 
unforeseeable risks of genetic manipulations {4}, and the poverty and 




disclaimer: the author admits that biotechnologies might be a blessing 
but, he emphasizes, only in due time {6}. The “in due time” argumen, in 
its various forms--from advocating a complete moratorium to invoking 
the precautionary principle for biotechnologies—is itself ideological:, a 
blanket argument that could apply to almost any potentially dangerous 
scientific-technological endeavor and is here only applied to 
biotechnologies. The very end of the article shows the attitude of the 
author, who adumbrates not only the commercial exploitation of GMOs 
but also “viruses and bacteria endowed with new and unknown forms of 
aggressiveness”. This last worry about GMOs evokes not only political 
or economic risks but also the frightening vision of monstrosity often 
associated with biotechnologies (Wagner & Kronberger, 2001).“Bisogna 
solo evitare che” (“it must only be avoided that …”) {6} which 
introduces the final clause of the passage cited, is both an appeal and a 
warning. It offers a sort of admonition or call to action against the lurking 
threats of genetically modified foods. This article presents many of the 
features of the ecological activist discourse on GM food: from the 
unforeseeable risks associated with the technology to the illegitimacy of 
patenting living organisms, from business exploitation and social 
injustice, even to characterizing GMOs as monsters. 
7.2.4 GMO flour desecrates the Eucharist” 
The last article I will consider in describing the representations 
offered of GMOs within the Catholic church was not written by a church 
representative. It is a news report of statements uttered by the archbishop 
of Genoa during a public encounter on food biotechnologies (Boero, 
2004). It was printed in a national daily newspaper, La Stampa, which 
belongs to the FIAT financial group. La Stampa prints about 600.000 
copies daily (Tiratura dei quotidiani italiani 2004 e 2005) and has a 
Liberal orientation. 
 






{1}Monsignor Bertone: “The Gospel is clear, the communion is not 
valid” 
{2}The Archbishop of Genoa: GMO flour desecrates the Eucharist 
Body of the article: 
{3}<<If we want to be faithful to the sacrifice of Jesus, I don’t think 
that it is legitimate to use for the holy Mass a “genetically modified” 
Eucharist >>. This is the thought of the Archbishop of Genoa Tarcisio 
Bertone, expressed on Friday evening in Alasso, during an encounter on 
GMOs and biotechnologies (…) 
(…) 
{3}Cardinal Bertone (…) illustrated the position of the Church in 
respect to the debated and very current topic 
(…) 
{4}The Archbishop of Genoa said in Alasso:  <<A genetically modified 
Eucharist? bread of wheat and wine from natural grape, this is what they 
have handed down to us and this is what is prescribed. I am not 
convinced of the legitimacy of (anything) else if we want to be faithful 
to what Jesus did.>> 
{5}GMOs open a delicate ethical question, which for the Catholic 
Church, even if it is ready to contemplate and to analyze various future 
perspectives, at the moment translates into the <<precautionary 
principle>>. 
{6}<<The first thing that should be taken into account should not be the 
economic calculus in the production of GMOs but the solidarity 
principle for poorer and needy countries.>> 
(…) 
{7}Bertone put on the forefront the lack of effective control on possible 
dangers, because <<investments in biotechnology research are largely 
made by the most developed countries and are in the hands of the 
private sector which uses internal systems of control>>and is thus 





My aim in this section is to examine different positions expressed by 
members of the Church. It is thus of interest that the declarations of the 
Archbishop come three months after the  position officially enunciated 
by Cardinal Martino I reported above. If anything, this report  shows that 
the positions within the Church range widely. However, this newspaper 
article is not a transcript of the public encounter. The whole article is 
complexly layered and presents the views of the Archbishop through 
both directly reported quotes and paraphrases. The following layers of 
action (Clark, 1996: 15) are in place: 
Layer 1 in which the Archbishop is talking at the public encounter 
Layer 2 in which the journalist quotes and paraphrases the Archbishop 
Layer 3 in which I am reproduce the article quoting only fragments 
translated into English (the translation itself constituting a further 
passage and occasion for meaning shift). 
For the purpose of my analysis I consider the distilled content of the 
Archbishop’s declarations  because I take the Archbishop to be a highly 
placed member of the church, and thus socially relevant, whose views 
may be shared by others within the Church. However, I have no way to 
know if what the journalist reports corresponds to what the Archbishop 
said. I could perpetrate a fiction and take at face value what has been 
reported by the newspaper. However, the article itself constitutes a 
discourse in its own right, that makes use of the reported event to further 
a certain aim.  It both (a) reports on the event, thus presenting it as 
newsworthy, and (b) tries to be interesting enough to be printed and sold 
in the newspaper. The agenda of the Archbishop while talking was 
different from that of the journalist who reported on his declarations, as it 
is different from mine in this instance. I use the article to make claims 
about representations of GMOs by relevant Church members. I approach 
the authorship and responsibility of the article, or of the quotes within it,  
keeping in mind Goffman’s discussion of participant roles in 
conversation (Goffman, 1992). The writer of the article is sometimes the 
“speaker”, when he only reports verbatim what has been said by the 
Archbishop, at other times the “author” when he rewords the 





that he is responsible for the overall packaging and message of the 
article.  In principle it would be important to isolate the thoughts 
expressed by the archbishop from those expressed by the writer, 
something which is not easy to do. However, the object of my analysis is 
not exactly what happened, nor precisely what the Archbishop said—
which is beyond my access--but rather what the article represents the 
Archbishop to have said. What counts as discourse available to the 
readers is what the article reports, because this is the text that directly 
enters public discourse and has the chance to influence the opinions, 
attitudes, and ultimately become part of the current sets of socially 
available representations of what GMOs are.  Once more, the headline 
{1} provides the focus of the article and sets the focal point of the story.  
The first of the two sentences is rather puzzling, one needs to go to the 
next one in order to understand why “the communion is not valid”. Once 
one has read further one can make the causal link between the two 
expressions and infer that GM flour desecrates the communion. It is 
unlikely that Monsignor Bertone uttered verbatim “La farina OGM 
sconsacra l’ostia” as reported in the headline; however this is what 
readers will most likely remember , as it is written in a bigger font and 
stands as the overall title. The declaration put thus sounds very much like 
an excommunication of GM flour. From the fragments I reported of the 
article we can legitimately gather that: 
• there in no effective control on possible risks (of GMOs) 
because they are in the hands of the private sector {7} 
• the church adopts the precautionary principle {5} 
• These rhetorical positions (unforeseeable risks, appeal to 
precaution, mistrust of management of private corporations) are 
quite common and are often found as part of the standard 
repertoire of critics of biotechnologies. However, here new 
arguments are present, specific to religious discourse just as 
much as the positions adopted by Cardinal Martino in his 
official declaration considered above: 
• from GMOs one cannot produce proper bread, “pane di grano” 




• it is not legitimate to use a genetically modified Eucharist {2}  
The logic of the argument is like that used by Cardinal Martino: it is 
exegetical, finding the answers to new problems in ancient sacred texts. 
In this case the answer is different from the one provided by the Cardinal, 
because the starting assumptions are different. Mons. Bertone focuses on 
the non naturalness of biotechnologies. From {4} it is inferred that GM 
wheat flour would not give “bread of wheat”. So what would it give? the 
inference is left to the reader, but the vagueness encompasses the 
ubiquitous claim that GMOs are other than natural and thus uncanny, 
which in this case translates into a sort of impurity. Monstrous, non 
natural, impure and dangerous—these properties are then by extension 
ascribed to  private corporations, which by definition cannot be trusted---
this is the representation offered of GMOs in this article, at least as read 
through the ever shifting play of authorship between the journalist and 
the quoted Archbishop. One last thing should be said of this article, 
namely that the author claims that Mons. Bertone illustrated the position 
of the Church in respect to the GMOs debate {3}. If one did not know 
about the declarations of Cardinal Martino, reading “La Stampa” one 
might gather that the Archbishop represents the standpoint of the 
Catholic Church, whereas it appears that the Archbishop’s position is in 
conflict with the stance officially taken by the Catholic hierarchy. 
Official or personal, the opinions on GMOs expressed by members of the 
Church clearly differ from one another diametrically. 
7.2.5 Conclusion 
It would be hard to find  a social aggregate that could be more 
legitimately called “a group” than the Italian Catholic Clerics. They share 
values, beliefs and costumes to a considerable extent. Yet, I have shown 
that publicly relevant representations of GMOs offered by members of 
the Italian Catholic Church conflict with one another. Even within what 
might be described as a social group, whose members presumably share 
essential values and practices, there are multiple, transversal sets of 
ideologically controlled beliefs which may play a fundamental part in the 





private business and views of capitalism play an important part in the 
positions taken in the different texts presented. While the alleged impure 
nature of genetically modified wheat seems to worry only Genova’s 
Archibishop, the relationship between private entrepreneurship / human 
agency and GMOs is a key topic in all four texts. At least with respect to 
attitudes toward GMOs, it is clear that more is at play than a single 
authoritative, exegetically appropriate evaluation of GMOs. Different 
dependable members of the Church choose to publicly offer 
representations of food biotechnologies that appeal to transversal and at 
times opposing sets of beliefs. This fact questions any attempt to easily 
associate group belonging with position-taking in the matter. It also 
questions any apparently obvious association between ideological 
positioning and social status. 
7.3 The Paradys research 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this work, during my 
participation in an international study funded by the European 
Commission I collected the case-specific data which I discuss in this 
dissertation.  Participation and dynamics of social positioning: the case 
of biotechnologies, images of self and others in decision-making 
processes (PARADYS) UE -PARADYS HPSE-CT-2001-00050 sought 
to analyze governance practices across Europe regulating experiments 
with genetically modified crops. The study focused on practices of 
democratic participation and comparatively explored citizenship from an 
emic perspective, looking at how politicians, scientists, activists and lay 
people interpret differently the role of the public in regulating open air 
experiments with GM crops.  The research required in depth study of 
national cases from sociological and socio-linguistic perspectives. 
Documenting two field trials proved to be a probe for the analysis of 
several aspects of the GMO issue. In particular we looked at different 
attitudinal standpoints defined as “social positions”. (see Bora, Furcher, 




Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Sweden. 
The final report of the study can be found on the web site of Bielefeld 
University (Bora and Hausendorf, 2004) 
7.4 Description of the experiment 
The Institute of Botanical and Vegetal Genetics of a major Italian 
university obtained authorization for testing herbicide resistant rice in the 
open.  The trial was authorized the 6th of May 2001, and experiments 
lasted to the end of 2005. The experiment was funded by the EU within a 
multinational study aimed at developing crops resistant to parasites. The 
Italian trial focused on cross pollination. Scientists wanted to see to what 
extent the genetically modified traits of the rice would transfer to an 
infesting type of wild rice, called Crodo which grows in the area. The 
GM rice was made resistant to a wide-spectrum pesticide, ammonium 
glyphosate which is marketed by Monsanto as Roundup Ready. The 
experiment procedure was the following: seeds of the glyphosate-
resistant rice were mixed with seeds of the wild variety and planted. 
Once grown, the crop was sprayed with the herbicide so that only the 
herbicide-resistant rice would survive.  In the first two years GM rice was 
planted twice mixed with the infesting variety and periodically sprayed 
with the glyphosate herbicide. In the three following years nothing was 
sown and the plants growing in the plot were monitored so as to detect 
potential passage of the glyphosate-resistance trait to the wild, infesting 
variety of rice. The soil was monitored for possible side effects of the 
growth of GM crops. The trial took place in a rural village of 1500 
inhabitants in the north west of Italy. The territory of the council is 
mostly devoted to rice cultivation. Rice has been planted in the area since 
the late 15th century and is very much ingrained in local food habits and 
social life. Rice cultivation was the main occupation for both men and 
women. Traditional dishes show the importance of this cereal in the diet 





locals are now largely employed in other activities. Only a minority is 
still involved in agriculture. 
7.5 Description and development of the case 
The rice field trial I discuss was that most recently authorized by the 
Health Ministry when the PARADYS research started in June 2001. We 
intended to speak to all the relevant parties, gather narratives and 
documents, and analyze how different actors described the ongoing 
experiment from their particular perspectives. We also hoped to be able 
to follow the development of the trial and any occurrence of public 
communication on the matter. I began by identifying all the relevant 
figures in order to contact them, to explain the purpose of the research, 
and to ask for their cooperation. During this process, I called the mayor 
of the village where the experiment was taking place to arrange an 
interview. It soon became clear that he was not aware that there was a 
GM field trial in his jurisdiction. Because local people were unaware of 
the trial, clearly there had been no talk about it in the village. Subsequent 
enquiries showed that it was commonplace in Italy for mayors and local 
citizens not to receive information about open air GMO experiments. 
This ‘no-information, no-controversy’ standing turned out to be 
representative of the Italian situation. The pattern of data collection in the 
village is heavily influenced by the relationship that developed with the 
mayor, who became interested in our research and started to educate 
himself on GMOs and the relevant legislation. The village mayor was 
thus an influential consultant and a valuable resource for the study. In 
particular, he was determined to make public the ongoing field trial, but 
he did not want to do so in a purely polemic way. The mayor wanted 
local people to receive appropriate information on the experiment from 
the responsible parties. He wanted to have some public illustration and 
explanation from the scientists and also from the politicians who had 
authorized the trial. In addition to establishing contact with the mayor 




the experiment, the civil servant in charge of Regional Agricultural 
development and the field inspectors. The fact that people in the village 
did not know abut the trial became a central feature of the case. All 
parties involved expressed their opinions about the absence of 
information. The topics of food biotechnology, science governance, 
public participation, and democracy were clearly linked in most 
participants’ talk. Everyone not only offered an opinion about food 
biotechnologies but also took a position about the proper role for citizens 
with respect to an experiment with food GMOs.  Faced with our 
curiosity, all the relevant parties cooperated and despite some concerns 
were willing to come forward and talk in public about the field 
experiment. The mayor eventually decided that he would organize a 
public encounter, and we helped him contact some of the key persons 
involved in the trial. With the help of the mayor, Giuseppe Pellegrini and 
I organized a focus group with key actors and a public meeting on the 
following day. The two events took place the 21 and 22 October 2002 in 
the main room of the local council house, almost one year after my first 
interview with the mayor. The public meeting was advertised in the local 
paper and as a result received some media coverage. Three national 
newspaper sent reporters, who produced three strikingly different 
accounts of the meeting. One article in particular published by 
Repubblica (Fazzo, 2002) had such an alarming tone that the Agriculture 
Minister Giovanni Alemanno decided with an unprecedented measure to 
suspend all field trials being run by the research institutes who report to 
the Agriculture Ministry. (Meldolesi, 2002). The scientist in charge of 
the experiment only after repeated requests managed to have his response 
to Fazzo’s article published in Repubblica. The mayor of the village was 
interviewed during a prime time radio program on a national channel and 
in the following days received further requests for interviews which he 
declined. The polemic settled. I remained in touch with the mayor and 
kept him informed of further developments in our research while he in 
turn reported that nothing related to the experiment was happening in the 





help of the mayor, recorded informal conversations with nine lay citizens 
on the topic of the trial and more in general on GMOs in food.  
7.6 Extracts from the data: 
I present here a number of extracts which offer different perspectives 
on biotechnologies. The choice of discussing certain quotes follows the 
overall logic of the study: from the large amount of data transcribed I 
have selected some exemplary pieces of interaction which display 
ideologies about GMOs expressed by the many social actors involved in 
the issue: citizens, scientists, biotech companies, the media. In making 
the selection I have tried to give space to competing discourses which 
emerged during the field study. Besides, I have tried to sort fragments of 
interactions which show the way arguments are constructed and how 
participants are literally “thinking with their mouths” about the GMO 
phenomenon. The field trial is the starting point for the expression of 
wider sets of beliefs about GMOs, which encompass theories of what 
they are, why they have been created, who benefits from them, and why 
people have the opinions they have about them. The discussion shows 
some of the functions the accounts and positions deployed have for the 
protagonists. Particular beliefs serve to preserve a certain identity, 
legitimize a certain state of affair, or to argue for a change in the current 
situation in favor of another more in line with one’s manifest attitudes.  
7.6.1 The scientist in charge: “Italians are terrified” 
During an interview, one of the scientists who is conducting the field 
trial provides his account of why over time Italians are becoming the 
more and more hostile to food biotechnologies. In the transcript “Sci:” 
stands for “Scientist” and “Int:” for “interviewer”. The transcript records 
false starts and cut- offs. 
 
  1 Sci; e quindi, 
  2  per esempio quando mi studiano,e:, 




  4  dell'atteggiamento del po- 
  5  del della popolazione italiana 
  6 o del consumatore nei riguardi dei cibi: 
diciamo = 
  7  =transgenici fra virgolette 
  8 ehh nel corso degli anni noi vediamo che 
e:: i = 
  9  =contrari vanno aumentando, 
Sci: so, for example when they study, 
hmm, the variation of attitudes of the 
ma- of the Italian population or of the 
consumer towards foods, let’s say 
transgenic in inverted commas, hmm, 
over the course of years we see that 
those opposed increase, 
 
 10 Int; infatti 
indeed 
 
 11 Sci; conclusione, 
 12 gli italiani stanno acquisendo 
conoscenza del = 
 13  =problema. 
 14 gli italiano stanno acquisendo 
conoscenza del = 
 15  =problema, 
 16 gli italiani sono gradualmente 
terrorizzati! 
and the conclusion is: Italians are 
acquiring knowledge of the problem. 
Italians are acquiring knowledge of the 
problem... Italians are gradually 
terrorized! 
 
 17 Int; hmm 
 18 Sci; come conoscenza del problema 
 19 quando poi alcune di queste inchieste 
son fatte = 
 20  =molto bene no, 
 21  perchè dopo dopo questa domanda 
 22  chiedono che cos'è il cibo transgenico? 
 23  non lo so. ovviamente. 
 24  addirittura ce n'era una bellissima 
 25  dove la a:: terza o quarta domanda era:: 





 how knowledge of the problem, when 
then some of these researches are done 
very well aren’t they, because after this 
question they ask: what is transgenic 
food? I don’t know. Obviously. There 
was even a really great one where the 
a… the third or forth question was: 
would you like to know more about it? 
no 
 
 27 Int; cioé percentuale alta di gente che dice  
 28  non  m'interessa, 
so there was a high percentage of 
people that say I am not interested? 
 
29 Sci; la maggioranza NON voleva saperne di 
più 
the majority DID NOT want to know 
more  
 
 30 Int; e allora lì non c'è niente da fare 
there is nothing to do then 
 
 31 Sci; per questo io dico che 
 32 se non partimano dalla scuola come fai a 
prendere, 
 33  il a: il cittadino medio, 
 34  e buttargli addosso una notizia 
 35 e pretendere che la per la percepisca con 
equità. 
this is the reason why I say, if we don’t 
start from the school, how can you take 
the a…: the average citizen and dump 
on him a piece of news and insist that 
he, that he receives it with equanimity 
 
 36 Int; ma 
but 
 
 37 Sci; ma questo lo riferisco anche a me 
 38  anch'io posso influire eh in un certo  
 39  mOdo che mi fa comodo, 
 40  e: che ritengo che sia ee corretto, 
but this I refer to myself as well, I too 




suits me, e…: that I judge to be correct  
 
 41  ma non è corretto nei riguardi di chi ha  
 42  ricevuto la mia influenza no 
but it is not correct towards  those who 
were influenced by me isn’t it,  
 
 43  perché non gli ho forniscio nn- fornito  
 44  gli argomenti perché lui sia convinto, 
 45  semplicemente son stato abbastanza  
 46  bravo nell'affrontare e: l'esposizione, 
 47  nel portargli qualche esempio, 
 48  e nell'impressionArlo alla fin fine. 
because I did not provide, did not 
provide the arguments for him to be 
convinced, I simply have been good 
enough in approaching the exposition, 
in giving him some example, in 
impressing him in the end.  
 
49 Cioé stiamo facendo una guerra di 
influenze no, 
 50  non di conoscenza. 
I mean, we are making a war based on 
influence, not on knowledge.  
 
The interviewee provides an explanation for the increased hostility felt 
by Italians toward GMOs based on an analysis of the results of surveys 
measuring the attitudes of citizens toward the issue. The argumentative 
move uses evidential strategies to advance the main point. Surveys that 
claim most Italians are opposed to food biotechnologies threaten 
scientists engaged in such research. The threat is both symbolic and 
concrete. On the one hand, engaging in an activity disapproved by many 
is problematic for the image of one’s work and function within society. 
Scientists in the early nineties faced with dismay the hostile reactions to 
biotechnologies. Many of these biologists, now professors, started 
university when the disastrous consequences of chemicals in agriculture 
were becoming public knowledge through books like Silent Spring 
(Carson, 1994). For many young agronomists the frontier in research 





the soil and destroying the environment (Charles, 2001). Biotechnologies 
seemed to represent the solution. To modify plants making them more 
robust and productive instead of heavily altering the environment seemed 
a revolutionary way to control pests and increase productivity while 
respecting the environment. However, many in the public did not share 
this view. The first victim of public hostility towards biotechnologies is 
the image of scientists within society. The threat for scientists, however, 
is not only symbolic. Research depends on funding, and funding depends 
at least partially on the popularity and support a line of research is 
receiving in the country. In Italy the number of authorizations to run field 
trial per year has decreased from dozens per year to zero (European 
Commission. Biotechnology and GMOs information web site). Both the 
social image and the resources available to scientists are on the line. In 
this instance the interviewee explains why the public does not support 
food biotechnologies. These macro level circumstances are reflected in 
the interviews as ritual face management (Goffman, 1967).The 
interviewee appears to defend himself and his work by proposing an 
explanation for attitudes toward GMOs in poll results.  Because lack of 
support is undeniable, public hostility is either misguided, or scientists 
committed to biotechnologies are somehow to blame. In this instance the 
interviewee blames media, which “terrorize” Italians (line 16 of the 
translation). To describe the public which opposes biotechnologies as 
“being gradually terrified” has several corollaries. If Italians are being 
terrified by wrong information their attitude toward biotechnologies does 
not reflect reason and good judgment, rather it is the product of 
misguided emotions. By using the term “terrified”, metapragmatically the 
scientist offers a picture of the public as emotional. According to the 
scientist’s discourse, public opposition is irrational and based on lack of 
information and thus can be dismissed. The public is constructed not only 
as terrified, but also as ignorant and uninterested in learning more (lines 
18 to 26). The rhetorical strategy of this discourse relies upon an 
apparently factual and rational account. The interviewee quotes a survey, 
framing what he says not as his own personal opinion but rather as 




voicing of an exchange between pollster and responder. That the public is 
ignorant and unwilling to change its ignorant condition is made 
inferentially available; it is a conclusion one gathers from the imaginary 
question and answer between the survey interviewer and the layperson, 
which the professor dramatizes as: “Would you like to know more? No”. 
At lines 3-4 there is an instance of lexicalization symptomatic of the view 
held by the interviewee. The professor uses the expression “del po”, then 
interrupts himself and self repairs (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977) 
with “della popolazione”; the content of the repaired expression can be 
inferred also by the change of article from masculine, used with 
“popolo”, to feminine, used with “popolazione”. “Po” is the first syllabi 
of “popolo”, the masses, an expression (with masculine gender, hence in 
agreement with il) heavily loaded with ideological connotations. Masses 
are by definition characterized by blindness and ignorance. The term is 
so charged with inter textual meaning that by itself evokes an elitist 
political standpoint. Describing those surveyed as the “masses” 
undermines the authority of the poll because the respondents of the 
survey are categorized in a disparaging way. Following the rhetoric of 
the interviewee, results don’t suggest that Italians have come to a well 
reasoned assessment of food biotechnologies, but that an ignorant and 
fearful populace cannot possibly formulate adequate judgments. Who 
would trust what “the masses” believe? The interviewee must have 
realized half way through that he was not using an appropriate 
designation and self corrects himself with “popolazione”, a more neutral 
term (of feminine gender, hence agreeing with the article la) for referring 
to the many people who, over time, have developed a strong distaste for 
biotechnologies. Towards the end of the fragment, at lines 37-48, the 
interviewee explicitly attributes the result of the surveys to 
misinformation, but also produces an account of the discussion over 
biotechnologies in which he shares responsibility for the poor quality of 
the debate in the country. “We are making a war based on influence not 
on knowledge,” the scientist says. Such a general statement, declined 
with the first person plural pronoun, is an admission that scientists, too, 





contradictory that while defending himself and his colleagues the 
scientist would also spontaneously take some blame for the results of the 
polls. However, the discursive move is reasonable when seen in the 
context of the interview. Participants in social encounters have several 
agendas in place all the time. While attempting to achieve any goal, 
maintaining a positive image remains an essential element during any 
interaction (Goffman, 1967). Displaying balance and good judgment in 
the discussion is not only socially desirable; it is also fundamental for 
being believable.  Having a personal investment in the matter under 
discussion can diminish the credibility of anyone making a point.  Taking 
some responsibility for the poor understanding the public has of GMOs 
in this context can amount to the rhetorical downplaying of his own 
interest in the matter, what within DP is called stake management.  By 
accepting some responsibility the interviewee shows himself to be 
reasonable and humble. As a consequence his claims are strengthened 
because he portrays himself as balanced and impartial, able to judge 
above the interests of his own vested interest as a scientist.  
The following extract comes from the same interview. The topic is how 
to include the public in the decision-making process that leads to the 
authorization of experiments like the one carried out by the scientist.  
 
  1 Int; e noi anche ci ci occuperemo proprio 
  2  di come la gente partecipa alla decisione. 
  3  Ha senso come si può far partecipare la  
  4  gente se l'informazione è così specifica 
  5  è così per addetti ai lavori: 
and indeed we will deal with how people 
participate in the decision. How is it 
possible to have people participate if 
information is so specific, so much for 
insiders  
 
  6 Sci; ecco io: ha ha 
  7  io lo vedo molto diffcile 
  8  eh cioé  h mh idealmente son  
  9  perfettamente d'accordo 
 10  non vorrei che niente avvenisse senza il  
 11  consenso d di tutti 




well, I, I think it is very hard., I mean 
ideally I perfectly agree, I would prefer 
that nothing happened without the 
consensus of everybody, or the 
consensus of the majority  
 
 13  MA come fai, 
 14  a: a raggiungere il consenso. 
BUT how do you reach consensus.  
 
 15  Io direi che ci sono due strade, 
 16  Una è quella dell'educazione 
I would say there are two ways. One is 
education  
 
 17  ma è molto lunga e difficile 
 18  perché è un'educazione vEra, 
 19  è qualcosa che parte dalla scuOla dove, 
 20  uno impara la biologia, 
 21  per esempio, 
 22  visto che siamo in questo campo, 
 23  la impara anche abbastanza, 
 24  in modo approfondito, 
 25  è in grado di capire i fenomeni, 
 26  di valutare che cosa vuol dire  
 27  un'interferenza in questi fenomeni. 
but it is a very long and hard one, 
because it is a real education, it is 
something that starts from the school 
where one learns biology for example, 
as we are talking about this field, and 
one learns it well, in depth, one is able 
to understand phenomena, to assess 
what it means to interfere with these 
phenomena.  
 
 28  e: ci possiamo chiedere questo. 
 29  altrimenti intendiamo, 
 30  hmm che e: l'informazione segua::: le  
 31  comune strade. 
hmm we can ask this. Otherwise we 
mean that information comes the normal 
ways,  
 





but the normal way, who manages it, uh  
 
33 potremmo chiedercelo anche della 
scuola però, 
 34  insomma la scuola è rappresentata da  
 35  una molteplicità di docenti che: 
 36 sperabilmente hanno una loro 
preparaziOne, 
 37  e quindi trAsferiscono il loro sapere e:  
 38  agli studenti. 
we could ask the same question about 
school, but in the end the school is 
represented by a multiplicity of teachers 
that, hopefully, have their own 
competence and thus transfer their own 
knowledge to their student,  
 
 39  con gli alti e bassi che possono esserci, 
 40  comunque nell'insieme noi avremo, 
 41  un trasferimento di conoscenza. 
there can be ups and downs, but overall 
we will have a transfer of knowledge.  
 
 42  e:: ma se: usciamo da questa strada 
 43  chi è che ci fa l'informazione  
but if we leave this road then, who 
provides us with information  
 
 44 Int; i giornali:, 
the newspapers  
 
 45 Sci; i giornali. 
the newspapers.  
 
 




In the above fragment the expression of stance is modulated using what 
Edwards calls counterdispositional constructions (Edwards, 2005: 265). 
While providing an answer in line with his own view of the situation, the 




inclination (lines 8-12).What the scientist argues for is presented as 
determined by external circumstances, which make it impossible to have 
things as he would like them to be. The scientist posits a distinction 
between the position he officially expresses - that the public should not 
be included - and his more authentic self, which would like to include the 
public in the decision making process. The disjunction allows the speaker 
to display that he is being democratic and at the same time argue against 
public participation. He argues that public participation in decisions 
concerning field trials cannot be implemented because the population is 
not ready for it. We are inferentially provided with the implicit axiom 
that in order to be fit for participating in the debate the public should be 
educated. From this perspective it is only fair to exclude the public 
because the public is unfit to take part decisions that depend on science . 
The discourse of the interviewee has a further  corollary: that if people 
had a better understanding of the natural biological processes consensus 
would be reached. He implicitly equates knowledge and consensus. 
Education is offered as the main way to increase knowledge and as a 
logical consequence to achieve consensus. The rhetorical construction of 
arguments for excluding the public from the decision making process has 
another aspect, namely the trivialization of the way in which such 
participation might be carried out. The following extract is from the same 
interview: 
 
  1 Sci; perché quando la commissione esamina  
  2  le domande,di di sperimentazione, 
  3  comincia a vedere 
  4  ma che cosa hanno introdotto 
  5  da dove l'hanno preso, 
  6  in che specie, 
  7  che scopi ha come si esprime 
  8  cosa dice la bibliografia 
because when the commission examines 
the applications for doing experiments, 
it starts looking at:  what have you 
introduced, where did you get it from, in 
which species, what are the aims, how is 







9 e alla fine dice si la prova la fate non la 
fate. 
and in the end ((the commission)) says 
yes you can or you cannot do the trial.  
 
 10  E invece qui, 
 11  noi di e: se si dovrà dire semplicemente 
 12  guardate che si vorrebbe fare una prova 
 13  con un organismo geneticamente  
 14  modificato la volete o non la volete 
 15  eh in sostanza è questo 
instead here, we, we will have to simply 
say: look we would like to make a trial 
with a genetically modified organism do 
you want it or not, uh, in the end this is 
the thing. 
 
The argument here clearly opposes one acceptable way of making a 
decision, which implies understanding of the processes and consequences 
of a field trial, (lines 1-9) to a bad way of making a decision, which is 
here described as a decision based on popular plebiscite (“do you want it 
or not?”). The interlocutor is left to infer how best to assess if a field trial 
should be run or not. Here as in the previous example the speaker 
trivializes the suggested alternative course of action as obviously so bad 
that anyone with good judgement would agree with him that public 
participation in the decision-making process would be disastrous. The 
argument is further developed to its obvious consequences: 
 
  1 Sci; e domani 
  2 affronteremo in un modo: più 
democratico le cose. 
and tomorrow we will approach things 
in a more democratic way.  
 
  3  per adesso io:: ritengo, 
  4  che, 
  5  se esistono commissioni di esperti con, 
  6  che già, 




but for now I think that, if there are 
commissions of experts which, that 
already have, they have their own 
varied composition, 
 
8 variegata non è che siano tutti i: 
ricercatori 
  9  che si governano da soli no? 
 it is not that they ((are composed)) by 
all researchers that rule themselves, 
isn’t it, 
 
 10  se c'e' una commissione che e- da  
 11  esprime e: il suo parere 
 12  da o non da l'autorizzazione 
 13  mi pare più che sufficiente. 
If there is a commission that provides its 
opinion, give or does not give the 
authorization, this to me is more than 
enough .  
 
 14  si potrà studiare come: allargare  
 15  ovviamente questa base 
 16 o o come diversamente e costituirla  
hmm 
obviously one may study a way of 
enlarging this base ((of decision 
makers)) or  ((one may study)) how to 
construct ((this base)) differently,  
 
 17  ma io non penso che si possa hmm dare  
 18  uun peso rilevante, 
 19  a: l'impressione di chi non possiede:: = 
 20  =l'argomento. 
 21  ecco 
but I don’t think that one can attribute a 
much  weight to the impressions of those 
who don’t master the subject 
 
 22 int; sembra molto chiaro 
well it is very clear  
 
 23 sci; forse non è molto bello ma, 






maybe it is not very nice, but it is of no 
use that I tell you something else, that’s 
it 
 
In this last extract from the interview a particular lexicalization offers a 
window onto the ideological standpoint of the interviewee. The scientist 
uses the term “impressione” to describe whatever grasp the public 
would/could have of the key features of a field trial. Impressions are by 
definition the result of a superficial appraisal of a phenomenon and thus 
are unreliable. The scientist thus positions the public rhetorically as 
incompetent to participate by inferentially constructing it as able to have 
only “impressions” about the topic, and thus rightfully excluded from the 
decision making process, at least for the moment. Remarkably, the 
expression involves a fairly straightforward manipulation of the 
interlocutor, who is left to either accept the scientist’s term or openly 
challenge it.  The speaker is aware that what he says might sound elitist 
and, following my comment on line 22, he acknowledges that his 
position might be “not very nice”; but he is also ready to stand by his 
point, claiming to be frank. The scientist points out that the Commission 
which takes decisions about field experiments has a varied political 
composition. The plural composition of the deciding board is argued to 
guarantee the appropriate level of democratic decision making. The 
scientist seems to imply that the arguments of those more critical or 
cautious are already given a voice within the decision-making process.  
7.7 From the public debate 
The following extracts come from the public debate organized by the 
village mayor. The mayor chose the following title for the public 
encounter: “Public debate: food experiments; participatory tools of 
citizens.” As the title already makes clear, the explicit focus was on 
democratic aspects in experimentation. During the debate there was 
much discussion about the features of GMOs, but the topics shifted to a 




to capacity with about 70 people. There were 14 invited participants: the 
scientist in charge of the trial, one appointed scientist responsible for 
monitoring the safety of the experiment, farmer union representatives, 
customer union representatives and several local politicians. Invited 
speakers sat at a U shaped table facing the public. Digital audio recorders 
picked up sound across the room while a standing videocamera focused 
on the invited speakers. A public debate is a situation in which displays 
of ritual face are particularly relevant. I refer to the notion of “ritual face” 
as the ensemble of positive social attributes participants will think a 
person has claimed for him/herself during a social encounter (Goffman, 
1967). Attributes of competence, honesty, and worthiness are always 
implicitly claimed. They can be confirmed or called into question during 
social encounters. In controversies, ritual faces are particularly exposed 
and subject to challenge. The possibility of gaining or losing face was 
clear to the invited speakers, as the meeting was potentially an occasion 
for laying blame mounting and protest. It was essential for all 
protagonists to represent themselves as worthy of trust and esteem. One 
can guess that everybody attending the meeting had a particular agenda 
for the evening. The scientist came to explain the trial, but also ultimately 
to defend his work and persuade a sceptical audience that the experiment 
was safe and worthwhile. He was aware that he could be criticized for his 
work, and indeed he became the object of criticism and polemic at the 
meeting and in a newspaper article in the following days. The scientist 
was not the only one likely to be criticized. Noticeably, the invited 
politicians all emphasized that they had no idea that the trial was being 
carried out. They claimed to have been caught by surprise by the news. 
Unsurprisingly, politicians advocated that the public be informed and that 
great caution be exercised with biotechnologies. The village mayor was 
in the favorable position of having uncovered a potentially problematic 
situation. As we shall see, during his introductory speech he made very 
clear his intention to share information and empower his citizens. Still, 
he, too, was subject to criticism. Citizens might approve his initiative, but 
they might potentially blame him for not having informed them earlier; 





for being insufficiently well informed. The meeting represented much 
more than a locus for the exchange of information between scientists and  
citizens of course. Many social rituals occurred: reciprocal 
congratulations and declarations of esteem, evaluation of the situation 
and of the conduct of those present and absent. Rights and duties were 
negotiated. The meeting is an exemplary social situation in which the 
expression of attitudes and beliefs goes hand in hand with the voicing of 
social and strategic concerns. In sum, it is a good setting for researching 
how systems of Social Representations are displayed and how persuasive 
discourses collide with one another in the slippery, dangerous terrain of a 
public debate. Here, even more than in interviews, I see persons arguing 
for setting particular views of food biotechnologies against each other in 
order to defend both their personal views and their social personae. 
Exchanged and challenged are both visions of GMOs and views of the 
protagonists, all in the context of a debate which purports to advance 
different perspectives and to win over a sceptical audience. Beliefs and 
polemics are tightly linked with identity and social worth. My analysis of  
the content and functions of the text does not, therefore, ignore  the aims 
and purposes of the participants. 
7.7.1 “It is a matter of democracy” 
The following fragment comes from the village mayor’s introductory 
speech at the beginning of the encounter. I have made an effort to 
preserve in the translation some features of the speaker’s style (the 
subject of the sentence is often left implicit, and there is loose 
concordance between subject and verb).  
 
  1 Sindaco; e direi che contemporaneamente bisognerebbe  
  2  anche aderire 
  3  a un appello che è rimasto invece un po'  
  4  più defilato e nascosti 
and I would say that at the same time we 
should also adhere to an appeal which 
has remained a little more hidden,  
 




  6  strada, uno straccio per la pace, 
which is the appeal of emergency and of 
Gino Strada; a sheet for peace,  
 
  7  e::: appello con cui invitava a:, 
  8  esporre e può darsi lo faremo anche noi 
  9  giovedì abbiamo consiglio comunale  
 10  decideremo insieme e:, 
an appeal  with which he was inviting to 
lay out, and it is possible that we will do 
it as well on Thursday,[when] we have 
the council meeting and we will decide  
 
 11  cosa fare se prendere iniziative, 
 12  e: di qualche tipo 
 13  magari anche soltanto appendendo una  
 14  bandiera bianca 
what to do if take the initiative of some 
kind maybe even only waving a white 
flag  
 
 15  per aderire anche noi a queste iniziative 
 16  con cui si cerca di mantenere ancora una  
 17  volta la pace 
to join us  as well to this initiative with 
which once again one attempts to keep 
the peace  
 
 18  e lasciare che siano le diplomazie a  
 19  parlare e non le armi. 
and let diplomacies not weapons do the 
talking. 
 
Opening the meeting the mayor informs the audience about the fact that 
he is supporting a pacifist campaign. He does so using a deontic modality 
(“bisognerebbe”) which expresses the moral opportunity of joining the 
initiative. It was the end of October 2002, and in Italy there was fierce  
debate about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Supporting the pacifist 
campaign mentioned by the mayor involved hanging a white flag.outside 
the council offices The initiative had been promoted by a medical doctor 
who became famous in Italy for his pacifist stancet. Doctor Strada is the 





the globe. Doctor Strada accepted the description of “absolute pacifism” 
for his position (Gannini, 2003) and declared that he considered the 
current U.S. President the new Hitler (Giannini, 2003). The introduction 
of the mayor has little to do with the theme of the public encounter. 
However, it works as a positioning device and identity marker before 
both local and “foreign” audiences. The mayor has a clear political 
affiliation; he belongs to the left political party (PDS11). By declaring 
support for the campaign of a radical pacifist, the moderator presented 
himself to the public as an engaged “dove.” This and other details of the 
mayor’s self presentation probably are the reasons why he was labeled “a 
bit of a no-global mayor” in a newspaper article in the following days 
(Fazzo, 2002).  Being the host, the mayor informs participants about the 
rules to be followed during the encounter: 
 
  1 Sindaco; vi spiego intanto come, 
  2  e::: funzionerà il dibattito, 
meanwhile I explain to you how the 
debate will work.  
 
  3  io sarò il moderatore, 
I will chair  
 
  4  e::: e direi di attenerci 
  5  se siete d'accordo tutti quanti, 
  6 ed una regola non scritta ma 
semplicissima, 
and I would say that we should follow, if 
you all agree, anon-written but very 
easy  rule, 
 
  7  che è la regola hm:::: h, 
  8  che c'è e c'è sempre stata 
  9  da quando io sono presente 
 10  in questa sala consiliare 
which is the rule that is in place and 
which has always been in place since 
the beginning of my presence in this 
                                                 




council room  
 
 11  una regola di democrazia, di civiltà, 
a rule of democracy and politeness  
 
 12  chi deve parlare, 
 13  è sufficiente che faccia un cenno, 
 14  e verrà data la parola. 
whoever has to speak, it is sufficient to 
make a little sign and the floor will be 
given. 
 
The speaker makes an appeal to democracy in allocating turns for the 
debate. He also at least in principle  formally acknowledges the 
audience’s opinion about the rules, (“if you all agree” at line 5). This is 
another feature of self presentation which makes no reference to the 
GMO issue but indicates the values this mayor appreciates and 
personally defends, as the parenthetic “since I have been  present in this 
council room” at lines 9 - 10 shows. 
7.7.2 “A much bigger force” 
After having explained why the encounter had been organized, the 
mayor reads a speech that contains his personal statement on the theme 
under discussion. He gave us a copy of his speech afterwards and asked 
us to bring it to the Biotechnologies Interdepartmental Commission. We 
did so a few days later when we met with the Commission in Rome. I 
present here a fragment of the introductory speech. The mayor recounts 
how during our first interview he came to know about the rice 
experiment occurring in his council territory. He then moves on to what 
in his view is “the problem” with biotechnologies.  
 
  1 Sindaco; fu allora che seppi 
  2  che anche sul nostro territorio, 
  3  ((omissis)) 
  4  si svolgono tali esperimenti. 
it was at that time that I came to know 





these experiments were taking place.  
 
  5  va detto subito per chiarezza ed onestà, 
  6  esperimenti regolarmente autorizzati dal  
  7  ministero, 
  8  e di conseguenza perfettamente  
  9  organizzati e sotto controllo. 
This must be said immediately for 
fairness and clarity, ((these are)) 
experiments that have been authorized 
by the ministry and thus are  perfectly 
organized and under control.  
 
 10  il problema non è quindi per noi questa  
 11  sera,dove e quali esperimenti, 
 12  cioé scatenare una sorta di curiosità  
 13  locale,anche perché ripeto, 
 14 questi esperimenti sono regolarmente 
autorizzati. 
thus the problem for us tonight  is not 
where and which experiments, that is, to 
stir up a sort of local curiosity, also 
because, I repeatt, these experiments 
are officially authorized.  
 
 15  il problema è invece di altra natura. 
 16  ((2 secondi)) 
The problem is of different kind  
((2 seconds pause)) 
 
17 hhh ciao((a delle persone appena 
entrate)) 
hello (to some people who just arrived)) 
18 ?; sera 
good evening  
 
 
 19  sera ((la gente risponde)) 
good evening ((people reply))  
 
 20 Sindaco; sappiamo e o riteniamo di sapere, 
 21  che i percorsi delle biotecnologie 
 22  e::hhh possono dare forma ad = 




we know or we think we know that the 
paths of biotechnologies can give shape 
to innovations that affect an epoch, ,  
 
 24  e questo lo dico, 
 25  da incompetente, 
 26  da incompetente, 
and this I say as incompetent, as 
incompetent  
 
 27  non sappiamo se in bene o in male, 
 28  o un pò tutte e due le cose. 
we don’t know if for the better or for the 
worse, or perhaps both things 
 
 29  nel senso che vi sono molte prospettive 
anc- 
 30  a noi ancora sconosciute. 
I mean that there are many perspectives 
still unknown to us.  
 
 31  hh vi sono molte posizioni 
 32  possiamo dire le più disparate, 
 33  riguardo al tema degli ogiemme, 
on the subject of GMOs there are many 
positions, we can say the most diverse 
ones,  
 
34 hh alcune di esse sono perfettamente 
scientifiche 
 35  vale a dire quelle degli scienziati 
 36  o di chi vi lavora da vicino. 
some of them are perfectly scientific, 
that is, those of scientists, or of those 
who work close to them 
((biotechnologies))  
 
 37  altre sono comunque tecniche, 
 38  ad esempio le posizioni, 
 39  degli ambientalisti. 
other ((positions)) are also technical, 
for instance environmentalist positions.   
 
 40  hh poi ci sono tutte le altre 





 42  che io definisco del cuore. 
and ultimately there are all the 
other((positions)) like mine for example, 
that I define of the heart,  
 
 43  e si badi bene non dico, 
 44  e::: della testa ma del cuore. 
and take good note I don’t say of the 
head but of the heart.  
 
45 l'unico ragionamento che saprei fare è 
questo, 
 46  speriamo che le biotecnologie possano  
 47  cambiare il mondo, 
the only reasoning which I could make 
is the following: let’s hope that 
biotechnologies can change the world,  
 
 48  (.) 
 49  che possano far crescere il frumento nel  
 50  deserto o in mezzo al ghiaccio, 
 51  che possano guarire da malattie 
 52  ed altro ancora. 
that can make wheat grow in the desert 
or on  ice, that they can heal illnesses 
and other things.  
 
 53  ma la storia ci ha insegnato come 
 54  molte volte al dilà delle scoperte, 
 55  degli scienziati della scienza, 
 56  alla fine di ogni ragionamento 
 57 possa subentrare una forza ben più 
grande, 
but history taught us how, often times, 
ahead of discoveries of scientists, of 
science, in the end of every reasoning a 
much bigger force can intervene,  
 
 58  hh che bandendo anche solo alcuni degli  
 59  aspetti etici 
 60  che sono importantissimi, 
 61 possa prendere il sopravvento su tutto e 
su tutti. 
((a force)) that excluding even some of 




important, can overpower everything 
and everyone:  
 
 62  vale a dire, 
 63  l'economia. 
I mean economy  
 
 64  e questo credo sia il rischio più grosso. 
and this I think is the biggest risk  
 
 65  è un pò come la globalizzazione, 
 66  quella buona, 
 67 quella che ci dicono essere buona 
(omissis) 
it is a bit like globalization, the good 
one, the one they tell us is good 
(omissis) 
 
This long stretch of talk offers a series of features, some at the micro 
level and others at the macro level, which show how the GMO issue is 
framed. It is reasonable to expect that not everybody in the audience 
knew about the experiment in the area. The mayor delivers to his 
community the information that experiments with GMOs are taking place 
in the area in an indirect way. The information is inferable from the 
presupposition “I came to know that” at lines 1 and 2. “To know that q” 
presupposes “q”. The mayor clarifies that for him the problem is not the 
ongoing experiment, which he pointed out had been duly authorized and 
so should not unsettle anyone. I know that he was concerned about the 
audience’s reactions and that he pondered for a long time--for months in 
fact--whether and how to organize a public encounter so as to be fair both 
to his citizens and also to the scientist, who might suffer undesirable 
consequences. Several field trials have been destroyed in Italy; given the 
concerns expressed by scientists and by the authorizing authorities the 
mayor was afraid of episodes of vandalism that might affect the 
experiment. The fact that the speaker poses emphasis on how he came to 






“The problem is not” (line 10) presupposes the implicit information that 
“there is a problem”. “The problem is another one” introduces the heart 
of the mayor’s argument, introducing a link between biotechnologies and 
globalized capitalism.  The latter is characterized by a ruthless search for 
profit, a blind force which overwhelms even the best intentions. 
According to this discourse, biotechnologies are understood in the terms 
of a powerful scientific discovery which can be turned to bad purposes 
by the rules of the market. The details of the speech are important to get 
to the main point of the argument. At line 20 the speaker self corrects, 
hedging his words and thus changing  the meaning of his statement. He 
says “we know or we think we know that”, in which the difference 
between the first and the second version of the sentence is the level of 
epistemic engagement that the speaker displays with the rest of the 
clause. While “we know that” presupposes a fact, “we think that we 
know that” provides an oppositional stance to the underlying 
proposition.. “We think we know” means that “we” are most likely 
wrong.  The belief so hedged refers to the positive potential of 
biotechnologies.  Later talking about globalization the speaker uses a 
similar distancing strategy.  He says “la globalizzazione, quella buona, 
quella che ci dicono essere buona”. With the same strategy the speaker 
self corrects one expression, transforming it  into another with rather 
opposite meaning. In the first case he seems to imply that he believes in 
the existence of a good globalization, while the self correction makes it 
clear that a “good globalization” is part of somebody else’s discourse 
which claims, perhaps wrongly, that “good globalization” exists. The 
level of epistemic adherence to the statement is skillfully hedged so that 
it now does not represent the belief of the speaker but rather mentions the 
claims of some undefined other to which the speaker potentially opposes 
his own discourse. “I say this as incompetent, as incompetent” (lines 24-
26), provides a further element of self presentation which implies 
humility and modesty. This self positioning goes along with the “position 
of the heart” which the mayor later advocates for himself over the 
biotechnology issue. The adversative conjunction “but” (line 53) 




The problem is not biotechnology; the problem is economy. The 
syntactic structure polarizes the opposition and focuses attention on the 
“economy” side, the key element of the speech.  The desiderative “let’s 
hope that” (“speriamo”) at line 46 works as a “counterdispositional” 
device (Edwards, 2005). The speaker rhetorically seems to wish for 
something which in fact goes against his own best judgment. The mayor 
would like things to be in one way but contrary to his own hopes they are 
not so.  The argument is developed with the use of evidential devices. “ 
“History” is used here as the proof that biotechnologies will not in fact 
turn out to make major improvements for humankind. Once again the 
point is made via presupposition: “History has taught us that” introduces 
a factual reality, namely that the forces of economy, banning ethical 
concerns, can overcome all and everybody. The speaker defines his own 
position as that “of the heart”, setting himself apart from both scientific 
and environmentalists standpoints. He claims for himself a pure 
perspective, beyond stance, retorically putting himself outside the 
arguing circus of interested parties. His self positiong frames his 
representation as the uninterested judgment of an honest, good hearted 
person. The ideological load of the speech resides in the analogy between 
GMOs and “good” globalization.  The analogy is part of one specific 
stance about biotechnologies, which describes them as the product of the 
same imperialistic, tentacle-like economy which oppresses a large part of 
the world by condemning it to poverty and exploitation.   
7.7.3 “J’accuse” 
In this last fragment the speaker develops further the theme of 
globalization, an argument intertwined with the way in which he 
constructs himself and the audience via his discourse. The mayor is 
talking about the current meeting (the pronoun “l’”, which stands for “lo” 
on line 2 refers to the meeting). 
 
  1 Sindaco; io mi sono domandato 
  2  perché l'abbiamo fatto noi, 
  3  noi piccoli in questo piccolo pezzo di  





  5  in questo angolo di mondo. 
I asked myself why is it that we have 
organized it, we that are small, in this 
little piece of Italian land, in this remote 
corner of the world.  
 
  6  alla fine però qualche risposta, 
  7  l'ho trovata. 
in the end though I have found an 
answer.  
 
  8  esistono le biotecnologie 
  9  e ci arrivano dall'alto. 
 10  materiale pronto, 
 11 dalle televisioni e dai mass midia in 
generale, 
biotechnologies exist, and they come to 
us from above. ((they are)) ready-made 
material, ((coming))from televisions and 
mass media in general  
 
12 in realtà nessuno di noi ne sa più di 
tanto, 
 13  e forse si è più preoccupati 
 14  hm hm si è preoccupati della questione. 
In fact none of us knows a much about 
it, and maybe ((none of us)) ever 
worried much about it.  
 
 15  hhh d'altronde non si può immaginare 
 16  che la gente si incontri per la strada, 
 17  e si metta a parlare di bioteconologie 
 18  anziché dell'ultima partita di calcio. 
after all, we cannot imagine that, when 
meeting in the street, people would start 
talking about biotechnologies instead of 
talking about the latest football match.  
 
 19  hh un altro motivo per cui ritengo utile 
 20  hh che la gente ne parli, 
 21  è che bisogna evitare che che accada, 
 22  e questo è un riferimentolocale, 
 23  e::: semplice e::: 
 24  che si può avvicinare alle posizioni 




 26  come ad esempio, 
 27  per la ripetizione dei segnali della  
 28  telefonia cellulare. 
((but))another reason why I believe it is 
useful to have people talking about it  is 
that we have to avoid that, and I am 
referring to some local issue here, 
((a))simple ((example)), that can be 
close to the to the ideas of people, like 
for example what happened with mobile 
phone antennas.  
 
 29  prima abbiamo fatto gli impianti 
 30  e poi i poveri amministratori locali, 
 31  cioé i più vicini alla gente, 
 32  si sono trovati s 
 33  enza conoscenze e senza mezzi, 
 34  ad affrontare le paure, 
 35  della popolazione. 
first we built the antennas, and then 
poor local administrators, the ones 
closer to people, found themselves 
without knowledge and without means, 
facing the fears of population.  
 
36 hmmm hmm questo è ovviamente un 
giaccus 
 37  che io personalmente rivolgo alla  
 38  che ha, 
 39  legislazione,e::: estraniato la conoscenza 
 40  nei piccoli luoghi. 
this is obviously an accusation  that I 
lodge against the legislation, that cut off 
knowledge from small places.  
 
 41  he::: questo soprattutto 
 42 non per rendere tutti edotti 
scientificamente, 
 43  ma per eliminare dalle nostra menti e dai  
 44   
 45 nostri cuori una sorta di paura e 
preoccupazione. 
((I say)) this especially, not to make 
everybody scientifically informed, but in 





worry from our head and our hearts.  
 
 46  hhhh un'ultima osservazione, 
 47  ho trovato in alcuni documenti 
 48  la conferma che quello che stiamo  
 49  facendo,è sì pionieristico, 
 
 50  ma reale 
 51  e nello stesso tempo importante. 
((I make)) a last observation. I have 
found in some documents the 
corroboration that what we are doing is 
pioneering but real and at the same time 
important.  
 
 52  sono dei documenti c 
 53  he ho hh scaricato da internet, 
 54  (omissis) 
they are documents which I have 
downloaded from the  internet. 
 
 
The speech sounds almost mawkish when written down, but was quite 
effective when spoken in a tone without sentimentalism. Clearly a multi-
faceted dichotomy is set in place through a polarization which relies 
qualifiers: on one side we find the good, genuine things, “small people” 
and “small places” in “a corner of the world” and “poor local 
administrators” like himself that are “closer to people”. On the other side 
are blind forces at play: economy and globalization. Biotechnologies are 
qualified in turn as “ready made material”, which “comes from above”, 
through the mass media. They are described as something alien and 
distant from the lives of normal people who cannot be expected to 
approach them easily or spontaneously interest themselves in them. The 
speaker seems to express the concern that a whole little world might be 
ignored or eventually swept away by these overwhelming forces.  He 
constructs himself as a sort of hero bringing light where there is only 
obscurity, in order to eliminate “from our minds and from our hearts a 
sort of fear and worry”. From his narrative he - along with the 




something “pioneering but real and at the same time important”. The 
mayor evidently takes pride in having organized the meeting. He also 
metapragmatically defines his own speech as a “J’accuse” against the 
legislation which does not provide for information to the public. The 
expression “J’accuse”, commonly used in Italy, by whoever knows about 
Emile Zola and the Affair Dreyfus, spells courage and honesty against 
general hypocrisy. It also pictures the actor as willing to risk 
unpopularity while fighting injustice. Overall, it evokes civic heroism. 
The mayor is clearly offering a picture of himself as good and admirable; 
his talk expresses not only the self-description of an estimable mayor, but 
a view of the world. 
7.7.4 “Nobody knows which effects they can produce” 
 
In the following fragment, a citizen--a woman in this case--argues 
about the safety of GM foods with the scientist in charge of the field trial. 
The dialogue includes the topical line “Americans have been eating 
GMOs since nineteen eighty six” which in the fragment analyzed aboce 
is polemically challenged. Here ‘S1’ is the citizen, ‘Scienziato’ is the 
scientist in charge of the trial, ‘Pubblico’ is the audience. 
 
  1 S1; io volevo domandare, 
  2  e:: visto che siamo nel campo della = 
  3  =sperimentazione, 
  4  in realtà 
  5  sugli ogm non si sa poi 
  6  quali effetti possano ave:re:, 
  7  non solo dal punto di vista ecologico 
  8  <sulla natura,> 
  9  ma ancora: per esempio come alimenti, 
 10  no non si sa. 
I wanted to ask, given the fact that we 
are in the domain of experimentation, in 
truth nobody knows what affects GMOs 
can produce, not only from an 
ecological point of view, about nature, 








 11  n- non penso che non ci sia nessuno ecco  
 12  oggi:,che dica: va tutto bene: 
  [ 
 
I think that today there is no one that 
says it is all ok,  
 
 13 Scienziato; hmm hh be:: :no. sono:, è dall'ottantasei, 
  [ 
 14  che:, 
 15  negli stati uniti:, 
 16  milioni di persone mangiano ogm.= 
hmm well no. Millions of people in the 
United States have been eating GMOs 
since nineteen eighty-six 
 
 
 17 S1; =si si: ma infatti:, 
yes yes but that’s what I mean((laughs)) 
 
 
 18  ((ride )) 
 19 Pubblico; ((risate generali))   
((Everybody laughs)) 
  [                      ] 
 20 S1; non non so vedremo, cioè 
 21  voglio dire siccome non è no 
 22  la prima sperimentazione utilizzo di he:: 
 23  di materie che poi dopo anni si dimostra 
che 
 24  forse non devono essere non dovevano  
 25  essere utilizzate:, 
I don’t know, I don’t know, we shall see, 
I mean considering that this is not the 
first experimentation, use of substances 
and then, later on, there is proof that 
they should not have been used, 
 
 
 26  no: ma, 
 27  la domanda che volevo fare è perché, 
 28  (.) questa sera, 




 30  vengo a sapere che si sta facendo una = 
 31  =sperimentazione 
but the question I wanted to ask is, why 
is it the case that only tonight I, who live 
in XXXXX, come to know that there is 
an experiment taking place  
 
 
 32  che io non sono una, 
 33  non ho riso:, 
 34  quindi no è una cosa non non è che mi  
 35  interessa personalmente 
I I am not a, I don’t grow rice so it does 
not interest me personally 
 
 
 36  però dico visto che abito a XXXXX 
 37 come mai solo questa sera vengo a 
sapere che, 
 38  (.)nel territorio del comune di XXXXX, 
but because I live in XXXXX why do I 
come to know only tonight that in the 
territory of the council ((omissis)) 
 
 
 39  ((omissis)) 
 
 
 40  ((two minutes gap)) 
 
 
 41  io penso che quello sia, 
 42  sia una una pecca ecco e mi fa, 
 43  aumentare i miei dubbi, 
 44  (.) aumentano i miei dubbi 
 45  di cittadina 
 
 46  nel momento in cui mi si informa, 
 47  (.) due anni dopo, 
 48  (.) invece che, 
 49  (.) prima. 
I think that this is a a fault, that’s it, and 
it increases my doubts as a citizen, my 










 50  perché la cosa colpisce 
 51  fa dei sospetti 
 52  fa diventare sospettosi 
 53 siamo diventati sospettosi viste le 
esperienze, 
 54  (.) passate no di altre: di altri:, 
 55  di altre materie eccetera:, 
because the thing is striking, it creates 
suspicions, it makes one become 
suspicious, we have become suspicious 





 56 Scienziato; he::: e::: e:: 
  [ 
 57 Sindaco; io: posso? scusi ((allo scienziato)) 
I, can I? sorry ((to the scientist)) 
 58 Scienziato; prego prego 
please, please  
 
 59  ((omissis)) 
 
In this exchange ideology is expressed via humor. The citizen voices a 
common argument against biotechnologies: they present “unforseenable” 
risks which cannot even be imagined by scientists. Nobody knows the 
consequences of using biotechnologies. The scientist objects to the claim 
that “nobody knows”. He does so deploying what he clearly believes to 
be a good piece of evidence, at least for the current circumstances. If GM 
foods have been used in the U.S. for years with no adverse effects, we 
may infer that they are not harmful. The reaction of the citizen, and 
above all the burst of laughter from the public which follows her remark, 
tells us that the audience thinks otherwise. What to the scientist is a good 
argument, rather than putting a dent in the position of his opponents,  




what I mean” at line 17 is not reducible to any specific reference. The 
citizen jokingly argues that contrary to what the professor declared, the 
negative effects of GMOs are indeed showing in America. She is 
referring to some negative character of Americans, which is left 
unspecified. Everybody in the audience reacts with a loud laugh. They 
seem to agree with the citizen.  
7.7.5 “Leukemia, tumors and so on and so forth” 
 
  1 sindaco; io mi auguro che , 
  2  nel corso degli anni 
  3  poi ci siano tutti degli sviluppi 
  4  per cui le biotecnologie, 
  5 hh possano diventare il toccasana 
dell'umanità, 
I wish that, with the passing of years 
there will be all the developments for 
which biotechnologies will be able to 
become the panacea of humankind 
 
  6  però, 
  7  oggi come oggi, 
  8  hmmmmm diciamo che noi, 
  9  hmm da comuni mortali 
 10  non abbiamo certezze e:: scientifiche: 
however, as of today, let’s say that we, 
common mortals don’t have scientific 
certitudes, 
 
 11  e: da scienziati ma abbiamo:, 
 12  qualche preoccupazione 
 13  qualche paura quindi:, 
but from scientists, instead we have 
some worries, some fears and so on 
 
 
 14  ((omissis)) 
 
 
 15  a livello di alimentazione 
 16  non sappiamo se queste cose faranno  





at the level of foods, we don’t know if 
these things will be good or will be bad 
 
 
 18  ((omissis)) 
 19  altrimenti ripeto 
 20  come ho detto prima 
 21  corriamo il rischio di ritrovarci, 
 22  come per tante altre cose, 
 23  abbiam lasciato costruir le case 
 24  sotto i tralicci dell'alta tensione, 
 25  hh e poi abbiamo scoperto 
 26  che forse provocano le leucemie 
 27  i tumori eccetera eccetera, 
otherwise, I repeat what I said earlier 
on, we run the risk of finding ourselves 
in the same situation we found ourselves 
in with other things; we have allowed 
building houses under the electricity 
power lines, and then we have 
discovered that maybe they produce 
leukemia, tumors and so on and so 
forth, 
 
In this fragment the mayor reasserts the lack of certainty about the 
consequences of biotechnologies. The passage follows the previous 
extract. The mayor is still responding to the scientist’s claims that there is 
reassuring evidence about food biotechnologies. The mayor opposes 
“scientists” to “common mortals”, where the former have “scientific 
certitudes” and the latter have “fears” and “worries”. The discourse 
positions scientists as the ones who hold certainties. Scientists are 
constructed in opposition to ‘normal’ people who instead have worries. 
What results from the oppositional characterization is a representation of 
scientists as bold and arrogant in the face of legitimate concerns.  
Probably no scientist would subscribe to such a representation of the 
category. Rather, scientists are cautious with certainties and hold findings 
to be provisional. Again, the mayor states that “we don’t know if these 
things will be good or bad”. He then anchors biotechnologies to another 




tumors and the potential effects of food biotechnologies is clearly bound 
to sustain a negative representation of food biotechnologies. 
7.7.6 “I am a citizen”  
In the following fragment two standpoints are enacted in opposition 
to each other. The conflicting discourses construct different worlds. The 
exchange occurred at the public meeting between a citizen (a woman) in 
the audience and a biotechnology professor. The professor represented 
the biotech industries in Italy (AssoBiotec).  The citizen involved in the 
exchange was very active during the encounter. She questioned the 
invited speakers and engaged in the discussion. She was one of the few 
people in the public to take the floor several times. She became the 
designated interlocutor for many of the invited speakers. The interaction 
has the features of a conflictual conversation, characterized by the 
expression of disagreement, interruptions and overlaps. The professor 
proposes a view in which responsibilities are assigned by law and, 
accordingly, citizens have nothing to do with the matter of field trials. 
The citizen instead holds that she has a right to be involved in decisions 
that have potential impact on her life. Furthermore, she states that, in the 
light of past experience, she has little faith in the assessments of decision 
makers. Lack of trust in decision-makers is a core point in the debate 
over food biotechnologies (Bucchi & Neresini, 2000; Bucchi, Neresini & 
Pellegrini, 2002; Bucchi, Neresini & Pellegrini, 2003, Bucchi & 
Neresini, 2004). In this example, the professor also invites the citizen to 
agree on the principles which govern his own view. The attempt fails. 
The citizen instead offers her own view of how things are, and how they 
should be, based on an altogether different set of expectations. The 
professor takes the floor after complaints have been voiced that local 
people had not been informed about the experiment. He asserts that 
people should not complain for not having been informed. The legal 
authorities are responsible people, and everything is under control. PRA 
is the biotechnologies professor, S1 is the citizen, SCI is the scientist in 






  1 PRA; esiste un grado di responsabilità 
  2  diverso in funzione della:, 
  3  diciamo delle funzioni, 
  4  h che uno ha nello stato, 
  5  nel nell'amministrazione 
  6  e via di seguito quindi, 
  7  hh non si deve far dipendere tutto, 
  8  h dall'informazione dei cittadini., 
there is a different degree of 
responsibility depending on the function 
one has let’s say in the country, in the 
administration and so on, and as a 
consequence we should not have 




  9  h io vorrei chiedere alla signora, 
 10  lei non si sente, 
 11  h (.) 
 12  rassicurata, 
 13  dalle spiegazioni del professor SCI? 
 14  da quelle date dal: 
h I would like to ask the madam, don't 
you feel reassured by the explanations 
of professor SCI? by those given by 
 
 
                   [ 
 15 SA1;                  avrei preferito che me le = 
 16  =dessero prima, 
[I would have preferred that they had 
given them to me before, 
 
 
 17  ((incomprensibile)) 
 18  perché io sono: ((incomprensibile)) 
((incomprehensible)) because I am 
[((incomprehensible)) 
 
                  [ 
 19 PRA;                 l l'ho l'ho capito signora, 
 20  ma diciamo un medico non può  
21 consultare tutto:paziente per paziente 




 22  uno:, 
 23  i responsabili, 
 24  devono prendere le loro responsabilità, 
I I understand madam, but let's say a 
doctor cannot consult with all patients, 
all the population, one, the responsible 




 25  (.) 
 26  se no cominciamo:, 
otherwise we would 
 
 
  [ 
 27 SA1; si si: ma non vorrei che si verificasse 
 28  la stessa cosa che si sta verificando sull' 
= 
 29  =amianto,. 
 30  c'è un processo in corso, 
 31  nel quale appunto questi illustri:, 
 32  responsabili hanno detto, 
 33  h che siccome negli anni settanta 
 34 non si sapeva e quindi nessuno ha 
responsabilità,. 
yes yes but I wouldn’t like it to happen 
what is now happening with asbestos, 
there is a trial going on in which indeed 
these illustrious persons in charge said 
that as in the seventies we didn't know 
and so nobody bears responsibility,  
 
 
 35  quelli che sono morti sono morti, 
 36  h(.) 
 37  per colpa loro, 
 38 perché non si sa <nessuno  è 
responsabile> 
those who died, died for their own fault, 









 40  sicco:me abbiamo delle esperienze alle  
 41  spalle,io non ho la:: 
 42  non voglio paragonare l'amianto:, 
 43  ((omissis)) 
 44  però, 
 45  voglio essere informata, 
 46  quando succede qualcosa prima, 
 47  (.) 
 48  perché, 
 49  è una sperimentazione 
 50  e quindi voglio sapere, 
 51  sono una cittadina, 
thus, I don’t want to compare asbestos 
with this experiment ((omissis)) but I 
want to be informed when something 
happens because it is an experiment and 
thus I want to know, I am a citizen 
 52  (.) 
 53  non solo, 
 54  ma aldilà degli scienziati 
 55  o dei tecnici che controllano e   
 56  verificano,io penso che anche i cittadini, 
 57  quando avviene qualcosa sul loro  
 58  territorio,abbiano il diritto di verificare, 
 59  e controllare quello che è stato = 
 60  =((incomprensibile)) 
 61  nel loro territorio. 
and this is not all. Besides scientists and 
technicians who control and verify, I 
think that also citizens, when something 
happens in their territory, have the right 
to verify and to control what has been 
((incomprehensible)) in their territory. 
 
The representative of biotech companies (PRA) says that “one should not 
let everything depend on information to citizens”. Given the sequential 
context the above statement seems both a judgment and an exhortation. 
Immediately afterwards, PRA asks the citizen (SA1) to state that she 
feels reassured. A question like “don’t you feel reassured?” in the context 
counts as an exhortation with a deontic flavor: “you should feel 




competent people reassure worried people, and he seems to assume that 
the previous contribution of the scientist was reassuring. The attempt of 
the professor to summon a statement of “being reassured” is met by a 
quick, overlapping, interrupting and smart reply, followed by an 
interchange in which deep skepticism toward both science and the 
legislative system (see the antiphrastic “illustrious”) is displayed. The 
interrupted professor in turn interrupts the citizen and once more states 
his position: people in charge have to take their responsibility. The 
professor uses a simile; he chooses to compare the situation - field trial 
setting, relationship between persons in charge and lay persons - to the 
asymmetrical doctor-patient relationship, in which generally speaking the 
doctor has the knowledge and the patient is in need of help. At lines 27 to 
38 the citizen refers to a trial about compensation for cancer caused by 
asbestos exposure in dozens of workers in Italian factories. The sentence 
of that trial was in the news at the time the public encounter took place. 
The sentence provoked public outrage in Italy because no responsibility 
was assigned to the corresponding CEOs even though the danger of 
asbestos had been recognized for a long time (Medicina Democratica, 
n.d.).  At line 42 the speaker closes more tightly her analogy between 
asbestos and GMOs. In a classic move of denial (the speaker does exactly 
what she explicitly claims she does not want to do) the citizen associates 
the consequences of asbestos use with the dire picture of irresponsible 
authorities and food biotechnologies. Asbestos is mentioned along with 
the BSA, Thalidomide, the Bhopal disaster and drugs.  
7.7.7 “GMOs are like drugs” 
 
  1 Presidente;  noi sappiamo che, 
  2  h gran parte della soia che viene  
  3  utilizzata per fare i mangimi degli  
  4  animali proviene dagli Stati Uniti e sono  
  5  cibi transgenici, 
  6  e questa è una grande carenza 
  7  grave lacuna h che non so fino a che   punto  
  8  non sia voluta da ( ) 





 10  potentati economici, 
we know that the vast majority of soy 
used for animal feed comes from the 
United States, and it is transgenic, and 
this is a serious fault which perhaps is 
wanted by certain powerful economic 
actors, 
 
 11  no ma sopratutto 
 12  il fatto è che i cibi transgenici 
 13  le sostanze transgeniche 
 14  sono come la droga 
but the worst is that transgenic foods, 
transgenic substances are like drugs, 
 
 15  nel senso che. 
 16  (.) 
 17  quando si incominciano ad usare 
 18  si devono poi usare perche 
 19  hem un prodotto transgenico hm si può  
 20  produr:,si può produrre solo, 
 21  con una semente transgenica 
 22  che viene he::: prodotta solo da, 
 23  certe cose 
 24  è un po' diciamo un circolo vizioso 
in the sense that, when one starts using 
them then you have to use them, because 
a transgenic product can be produced 
only with a transgenic seed, which is 
produced only by  certain things , it is a 
bit of vicious circle 
 
Here the president of the province makes a point that is frequently heard 
in discussions over food biotechnologies, namely that certain “powerful 
economic actors” are playing a dirty game in order to force everyone to 
adopt their products. Rhetorically the allegation is made in a subtle way, 
so that the epistemic commitment to the claim is appropriately modulated 
with respect to the public occasion and the role of the speaker, a local 
politician.  The relative clause at lines 7-10 (“which perhaps is wanted by 
certain powerful actors”) uses the subjunctive and double negation (non 




overall effect is to hedge or mitigate (Caffi, 1999) the epistemic 
commitment of the speaker to what he says.  The speaker then enunciates 
a simile connecting drugs and GMOs. Drug use produces dependency on 
the drug itself and usually, as a consequence, also dependency on some 
less then amiable drug pusher. It is often said that drugs put people in a 
condition of servitude, again a point made frequently when it comes to 
food GMOs. In turn this syndrome of dependency is linked with the 
notion that GMOs are being imposed on the Italian market almost 
surreptitiously. The terms of the analogy characterize negatively not only 
GMOs but also the overall process, economic and historical, that leads to 
their diffusion and use. The discourse implicitly criticizes those powerful 
actors that are pushing GMOs in Italy and around the world. 
7.7.8 “A solution to the problem of world hunger” 
Here a representative of Italian farmers offers a different view of 
food biotechnologies: 
 
  1 Rappresentan; gli stati uniti, 
  2  e qui passi, 
  3  gli stati uniti 
  4  possono essere guidati 
  5  da un interesse economico superiore, 
the United States, fine, the United States 
can be driven by a larger economic 
interest, 
 
  6  ma anche, 
  7  il programma di sviluppo dell'onu, 
  8  le dichiarazioni del e: segretario generale  
  9  della fao, 
 10 hh ma e anche di altri paesi testimoniano 
come, 
however, even the United Nations 
developing program, the declarations of 
the general secretary of FAO and of 
other countries prove that, 
 
 11  eh:: e::: caro sindaco, 





hmm dear mayor, one also has to 
consider these things, 
 
 13  per, 
 14  e::: atr- per queste affermazioni, 
 15  le biotecnologie, 
 16  rappresentano un:: a: (.) 
 17  una soluzione,:  (.) al problema, 
 18  (.) della sottoalimentazione, 
 19  al problema della fame nel mondo, 
 20  eh 
according to these statements, 
biotechnologies are a solution to the 
problem of underfeeding, to the problem 
of world hunger, 
 
 
The vast majority of speakers during the encounter expressed the idea 
that GMOs are dangerous and suspect. The farmers’ representative 
clearly espouses a different view. He attributes the controversial claim 
that “GMOs represent a solution to the problem of underfeeding” to 
international agencies like the United Nations and the FAO. The speaker 
thus strategically shifts from being author and principal (Goffman, 1992) 
to the role of “talking machine.” That is, he quotes the positions 
(allegedly) taken by two entities implicitly endorsed as authoritative. 
There is a polemic aspect to the contribution. The speaker calls the mayor 
to considering the reported claims when he says “dear mayor one also 
has to consider these things” implicitly chiding the mayor for apparentlyy 
having ignored them. The careful management of commitment expressed 
by the speaker testifies to the difficulty he has in proposing such a view 
in the current context.  
7.7.9 “Our underpants are transgenic” 
In the following fragment a citizen takes the floor and argues that 
GMOs are part of everyday life, even in Italy. His contribution is lively 
and bold. The speaker argues in favor of a ‘realistic’ and ‘progress-




biotechnologies. He offers a representation of food biotechnologies as a 
technological advancement within a continuum of radical changes faced 
by Italian agriculture. Economic forces are here depicted in terms 
radically different from those used by the mayor. Rather than being a 
blind and violent force which ignores ethical issues, in this speech 
economy drives progress and frees people from the servitude of intensive 
labor. The speaker, a distinguished elder gentleman, introduces himself 
as an agronomist. His science-related identity is clearly relevant. He 
replies to the mayor, who had stated that people have justified concerns 
about the potential negative consequences of GMOs. The citizen peppers 
his speech with long pauses in an emphatic staccato. In the transcript, 
“Ber” is the citizen (his name has been changed), and “Pub” is the 
audience. 
 
  1 Ber; posso? hmm sono Berlocchi 
  2  e sono un agronomo. 
  3  io credo che: lei abbia toccato 
  4  un tasto molto, 
  5  molto giusto molto delicato. 
may I (speak)? I am Berlocchi and I am 
an agronomist. I think that you have 
touched a point very, very correct very 
delicate. 
  6  (.) 
  7  è la paura e 
  8   la paura nasce dall'ignoranza. 
It is fear and fear is born from 
ignorance. 
  9  io credo, 
 10  che bisogna dare una dimensione, 
 11  (.) 
 12  a questo fenomeno. 
I believe that one has to give the right 
dimension to this phenomenon. 
 13  ci sono milioni di ettari, 
 14  io non lo so quanti sono (.) 
 15  io so però che quasi tutto il cotone, 





there are millions of hectares, I don’t 
know how many they are, I know though 
that almost all the cotton is transgenic. 
 17  io so (.) 
 18  che la, 
 19  l'europa non produce soia, 
 20  ma mangia soia, 
 21  (.) 
 22  e frigge le sue cose, 
 23  (.) 
 24  nell'olio, 
 25  (.) 
 26  di semi vari, 
 27  compresa la soia, 
 28  e compreso la colza, 
I know that Europe does not produce 
soy but eats soy and fries her things in 
mixed seed oil including soy and 
rapeseed, 
 29  io credo che ognuno di noi, 
 30  abbia masticato 
 31  chili di roba transgenica, 
I believe that every one of us has 
munched kilos of transgenic stuff 
 32  (.) 
 33  e credo che ognuno di noi abbia 
 34  le mutande transgeniche, 
 35  perchè se sono di puro 
and I believe that every one of us has 
transgenic underpants because if they 
are pure cotton 
  [ 
 36 Pub; ((risate)) 
((everybody laughs)) 
  [ 
 37 Ber; cotone sicuramente c'è una . 
 38  percentuale, 
 39  alta di transgenico, 
surely there is a high percentage of 
transgenic (materials). 
 40  ( ) 
 41  detta così, 
 42  (.) 




now what I said can appear to be said 
by an imbecile 
 44  invece è è la verità, 
but it is the truth 
 45   e noi ci preoccupiamo di cose, 
 46  di cui ormai, 
 47  (.) 
 48  siamo, 
 49  non invasi, 
 50  ma noi siamo partecipi di questo  
 51  fenomeno,siamo partecipi (.) 
and we are worrying about things that 
at this point we are not invaded by, but 
we are part of this phenomenon, we are 
part of it 
 52  quello che bisogna chiarire 
 53  è la pericolosità, 
 54  vera o falsa 
what has to be clarified is the danger, 
true or false 
 55  però milioni di persone, 
 56  miliardi di persone, 
 57  perchè c'è la cina e l'india 
 58  cioè metà del mondo 
 59  c'è tutta l'america, 
 60  del nord e del sud 
 61  compreso il canada 
 62  che è tutto transgene. 
but millions of people, billions of people 
because there is China and India which 
means half of the world, there is all 
America, north and south including 
Canada which is all transgenic. 
 63  (.) 
 64  allora, 
 65  (.) 
 66  noi dobbiamo dare, 
 67  una dimensione, 
 68  chiara per cacciare la paura 
so we need to give the right dimension 
in order to chase fear away  
 69  non dobbiamo riempirci di timore 
 70  dobbiamo dire la verità (.) 
we don’t have to be full of fear, we have 





 71  e questa è la verità, 
 72 ma è semplice e l'economia non è un bau 
bau, 
and this is the truth, it is simple, and 
economy is not the boogie man 
 73  non è un bau bau l'economia è un fatto, 
 74  per la quale noi oggi siamo qui, 
 75  tutti riuniti e, 
 76  (.) 
 77  il cinquanta per cento non è a casa, 
 78  a zappare. 
 79  (.)  
it is not the boogie man, the economy is 
the fact for which tonight we are all 
here united. and fifty percent ((of 
us))are not at home howling. 
80 noi abbiamo avuto negli ultimi 
cinquant'anni, 
 81  (.) 
 82  uno sviluppo tale, 
 83 che dal cinquanta per cento di 
agricoltori, 
 84  (.) 
 85  che faceva l'Italia, 
 86  siamo arrivati al quattro per cento. 
in the last fifty years we have had such a 
development that from and Italy that 
was fifty percent farmers, now we have 
four percent. 
 87  la metà di noi doveva andare a zappare, 
 88  o era troppo stanco adesso per  
 89  partecipare ad una riunione di questo  
90 genere informativo di cui io la 
ringrazio,((al sindaco)) 
half of us should  have gone howling or 
would have been too tired now to 
participate in a meeting like this, 
informative, and I thank you for this ((to 
the mayor)) 
 91  è una cosa bellissima che lei ha fatto, 
it is a wonderful thing you have done. 
 92  credo però che biogna avere 
 93  il coraggio della chiarezza (.) 
However I think that one has to have the 





One particular feature of this speech is its emphatic invocation of truth. 
After the contribution of the mayor and of many politicians, who in turn 
have expressed their perplexities and their concerns and declared 
emphatically that they had no idea that an experiment with GMOs was 
taking place, this contribution seems to want to achieve an affect similar 
to the fairy-tale cry “the emperor has no clothes!”.  Berlocchi speaks as if 
he knows the truth and declares it with emphasis. The enphaisi on truth 
has of course a polemic undertone. It is a reply to the many expressions 
of suspicion and doubt voiced against GMOs, particularly by the mayor. 
The target of his rebuttal is largely implicit, but as he ends Berlocchi 
makes it explicit. Tthe speaker impersonally calls for “the courage of 
clarity,” but he directs his criticism at the mayor. Berlocchi describes the 
relation between “us” and GMOs in positive, active terms. We are not 
invaded, he asserts, we are “part of it”. Berlocchi uses an Italian ditto “la 
paura e’ figlia dell’ignoranza” - fear is born from ignorance - and he does 
so from his position as agronomist, that here seems to coincide with 
someone cognizant of facts and scientific explanations. Berlocchi’s 
interpretation of the forces of economy is particularly poignant. In Italy 
after the Second World War more then half of the population was 
employed in agriculture. In the last 60 years everything changed. 
Berlocchi reminds the assembled public that such radical changes also 
means that “we” can have a nice evening discussing GMOs rather then  
staying home exhausted after a hard day handof manual labor in the 
fields. The point opposes the romantic vision of agriculture which one so 
often hears in discussions of GMOs. According to Berlocchi’s discourse, 
“we” are not victims of external forces, and the economy is not “the 
boogie man”. Rather, “we” are part of this system, sharing its benefits 
and risks.  Very much like in the interview of the scientist discussed on 
paragraph 7.6, concern is understood as fear, and fear is assumed to come 
from ignorance. This extract represents a vision of agriculture and of 
economy that I call Illuminist. It encompasses trust in science, the future, 
and the laws governing the world. The citizen seems to believe that with 





phenomena for the common good, overcoming fear and the ignorance 
which generates it. There is here a view of progress as linear 
improvement, which contrasts with the dystopian scenarios frequently 
envisioned in arguments about GMOs.  
7.7.10 “We have managed to have antibiotics…” 
Some of the people I talked with described prejudices and 
misrepresentations over GMO as the most recent in a long history of 
obscurantism and hostility against science. Such an argument is often 
brought forward by scientists (Miller, 2003). The history of science, from 
Galileo to Pasteur, is peppered with persecutory receptions of scientific 
discoveries. The arrogance of authoritarianism at the top of society and 
the resistance of prejudices at its bottom have many a time come to clash 
with scientific arguments. Scientists often mention how several 
prejudices eventually have been overcome by overwhelming evidence 
provided by science.  Here the argument is made very clearly. The 
following fragment comes from a multi-party conversation between 
agriculture experts, who are also citizens of the same local village where 
the rice experiment is taking place. I recorded the conversation almost 
one year after the public encounter. There are five participants: the 
village mayor, three citizens and myself. The three citizens are all 
involved in the farming business, and they have expressed unreserved 
support for food biotechnologies during the conversation. The first 
speaker is here concluding a series of remarks about the common opinion 
among lay people that GMOs are monstrous. He speaks in a joking way, 
mocking the ignorant persons who think GMOs must necessarily be 
bigger then their normal counterpart. In the transcript “Int” is the 
interviewer, “Cit 1”, “Cit 2” and “Cit 3” are the interviewees.  
 
  1 Cit 3; guarda che è così! 
  2  Se tu vai a parlare con uno 
  3  che trova un pomodoro grosso, 




listen this is how it is! If you talk with 
somebody who finds a big tomato, he 
tells you that it is done with GMO! 
  5 Cit 1; eh ma ormai:: 
yes but at this point… 
  6 Cit 3; ormai è così! 
  7  Se vede una cosa più grossa, 
  8  è perché c'è l'OGM dentro. 
  9  E' fatto apposta per farlo più grosso. 
at this point that’s how it is! If one sees 
something bigger, it is because there is 
GMO inside. It is made on purpose to 
make it bigger. 
 10  ((tutti ridono)) 
((everybody laughs)) 
 11  sul serio! 
 12  Ho visto un giorno in televisione:: 
 13  al mattino la fragola era così 
 14  ((tutti ridono)) 
 15  ((parte incomprensibile)) 
really! I have seen it on television:: in 
the morning the strawberry was like this 
((he gestures something like a small 
strawberry size with his hands)) 
 16  e alla sera era COSI', 
 17  pronta da raccogliere. 
((everybody laughs)) 
and in the evening it was like that!  
((gestures something very large opening 
his arms)) 
Ready to pick 
 18 Int; o::: che orrore! 
what a horror! 
 19 Cit 1; OGM? 
GMO? 
 20 Cit 3; No! Siringata! 
 21  Ma sì come alcuni pomodori da 
 22  ((incomprensibile)) a Bologna, 
 23  un chilo due etti 
No! Injected! Just like those tomatoes 
((incomprehensible))in Bologna, a kilo 
and two hundred grams  
 24 Cit 1; Sì ma quello è letame eh!? 
yes but that is manure really! 





 26 Cit 3; ormai l'opinione della gente è questa! 
 27  qualunque cosa ci sia 
 28  che è più grossa del normale::, 
these days people’s opinion is this! 
Anything that is bigger then normal, 
 29 Cit 1; comunque insomma:: si:: vabbeh, 
 30  tutto sommato passano anche sti periodi. 
 31  Se pensate rispetto alla ricerca 
 32  cosa è stata la chiesa, 
 33  cosa è stato il medioevo, 
 34  siamo arrivati agli antibiotici quindi 
 35  passeremo anche sto momento insomma. 
yes but in the end, after all, after all 
these things come to an end. If you think 
about what the church has done to 
science, what happened in the middle 
ages, we have managed to have 
antibiotics, and so even these phases 
will pass in the end. 
 
This fragment shows the features of a relaxed multiparty spontaneous 
communication in which interlocutors chime in adding jokes and further 
comments to the turns of the previous speakers. Citizen 3 ridicules the 
ignorance of the many people who believe GMOs are bigger than 
normal. His point is that the image that links GMOs with monstrosity is 
hard to eradicate.  Even phenomena which have nothing to do with 
GMO’s, namely the “injection” of hormones into fruit to make it grow 
fast and very big, are nowadays understood as genetic engineering. 
Citizen 1 at lines 27-28 even jokes that big tomatoes are really obtained 
with manure, not with GMOs or “injections”. At lines 29-35 Citizen 1 
voices the view that people’s mistaken fear of GMOs is just the last in a 
long series of prejudices which have beset scientists and hindered the 
progress of science. The hostility engrained in the belief that GMOs are 
always bigger than normal vegetables is trivial compared with the 
obstacle that the Catholic Church has posed to science over the centuries. 
The mention of antibiotics, perhaps the most consequential achievement 
of medical science, positions science (and by implication GMOs 
themselves) in very positive terms. Science is described as both a force 




Middle Ages, an emblem of obscurantism. The speaker proposes an 
obvious polarization which  represents science as rational and 
enlightening. Like an insider talking with his peers, the speaker also 
mocks people’s fears of GMOs when he refers to the way bigger fruit, 
which the average customer prefers, is obtained with “injections”. 
According to the speaker, the vegetables we buy have been tampered 
with, and not from genetic modification. There are many other things to 
worry about other than GMOs when it comes to food safety and quality. 
This argument, here only barely echoed, is constantly mentioned among 
agriculture experts. Many have told me that food quality and food safety 
have enemies much bigger than GMOs, ranging from fraud to natural 
illnesses and the many toxins that grow naturally in foods. Citzen 1 
expresses an illuminist view similar to that of Berlocchi. He argues that 
the enlightening forces of science will eventually overcome ignorance 
and prejudice.  
7.7.11 Conclusion 
All the extracts I presented in this session are snapshots of the 
representations of food biotechnologies that emerge from the 
ethnography of the rice field trial. I have chosen to illustrate some that 
represent recurrent positions and their conceptual repertoires which 
encompass particular sets of key terms: “fear”, “democracy”, 
“participation”, “reassurance”, “economy” and “progress”. Each snippet 
of text can be understood within a certain discursive frame. Opposing 
representations of science, progress and of the role of the economy in 
shaping our lives are dictated by wider sets of socially shared 
representations. These arguably constitute the unspoken frame of 
reference for the conversations analyzed. Participants voice discourses 
which stem from wide-reaching perspectives. The illuminist depiction of 
the unstoppable progress of science fits into one ideological frame. The 
view of economy as a powerful and positive force that drives social and 
economical growth is perhaps another tenet of the same ideological 
frame. The description of capitalism (again called “economy”) as brute 





the previous one. Other perspectives are derivative from these wider 
ones. The notion that lay persons are gullible and that therefore decisions 
should be made by experts collides with the claim of democratic 
participation for everybody. And so on. Each argument may be reduced 
to a set of prototypical repertoires that fit into the logic of one far 
reaching take on reality.  However, each interchange in the data is 
intrinsically indexical. By indexical I mean that each conversation 
responds to the immediate needs of the specific situation and that it 
receives its meaning partially by virtue of the context in which the 
interchange takes place. Speakers offer their opinions in a 
characteristically complex and intertextual way, quoting other’s 
discourses to make their points, supporting or challenging claims heard 
there and elsewhere, making use of the commonly available images and 
words but also building up new ones - think of the image of GMOs 
compared to drugs, or of transgenic underpants - that incorporate the 
features and attributes into food biotechnologies in a lively way.  In other 
words, participants display their views creatively and strategically. They 
try to persuade others, to defend themselves, and to test their own 








In this final chapter I reflect more broadly on the representations of 
GMOs in Italy. My conclusions follow from the data I have discussed in 
detail in previous chapters, supplemented by statements of key figures in 
the Italian agricultural economy. In this chapter I will return to the 
theoretical thrust of the thesis, about the basic philosophical principles of 
SRT and DP and the notion and analysis of representations. 
8.1 The three focal aspects of the GMO 
debate in Italy 
When social scientists began to study the reception of biotechnologies, 
the topic was really new to the public. The answers that subjects would 
give to survey and interviews were necessarily superficial, standardized 
and dependent on a limited number of images available from the mass 
media and in limited public discourse. My data show that at this moment 
in time some lay people have their own well developed theories of 
GMOs and that those theories have come to be part of their wider 
organized ideological frame, encompassing matters of power relations, 
justice, culture and identity. The debates surrounding GM foods in Italy 
revolve around three interconnected focal points. The first is a concern 
that GMOs may have negative consequences for health and for the 
environment. Under this core topic are subsumed discussions over risk 
assessment: the specter of “unforeseeable risks”, is a corollary of the 
argument that under the present state of knowledge scientists cannot 
assess the true risks of biotechnologies. Virtually every discourse about 
food biotechnology touches upon the matter of potential dangers both for 
the environment (loss of biodiversity, worldwide plant illness, invasion 





poisoning, genetic illnesses, generalized loss of immune defenses, 
cancer). The second core point, very prominent in the data I have 
collected, has to do with justice and the rights of civil society in the 
context of the development and use of GMOs. This can be called the 
“citizenship” facet of the debate. Discourses focus on the logic that 
should govern how technology-related decisions with large scale impact 
on society are made. In general terms, experts argue for elitist forms of 
decision-making. Interchanges between experts and lay persons show 
how participants adopt different rationales for deciding whether or not an 
experiment should be carried out. The adversarial interactions between 
the representative of the Italian Association of biotech companies and 
local citizens during one public debate are exemplary (see sections 6.1 
and 7.7.6). While local citizens argue that they should be involved and 
consulted, the expert argues that “those responsible” should be left to do 
their job without having to consult lay people. The scientist interviewed 
in section 7.6.1 expressed the same view: let the designated responsible 
agents decide. In the Italian data, many discussions focus on how 
decisions are made about whether to develop and use GMOs, and who 
benefits from food biotechnologies. Such discourse partially overlaps 
with the expression of “social values” (Gaskell & Others, 2005:1908) 
which correlate with lay people’s assessment of the appropriate way to 
govern science. In my data, respondents implicitly propose competing 
“principles of governance” which assign more or less importance to 
scientific competence and institutional decision-making on the one hand, 
and to assessments by lay people on the other. As it happens, 
furthermore, in everyday discussions how to govern is seldom 
dissociated from what is to be governed. Because GM foods are a 
particularly controversial topic, the decision-making process that might 
bring them to our tables becomes itself contentious. In the data I present, 
advocated forms of governance are transparently associated with 
position-taking toward GMOs. Broadly speaking, those in favor of 
GMOS are inclined to delegate decisions to the experts; those against 
express concern with the decision-making criteria and largely argue for 




be, making the decisions. The impression among critics is that global-
scale financial systems, rather than democratic principles (or even 
scientific ones), rule. In the words of some participants, GMOs epitomize 
the negative aspects of globalization: cultural standardization, destruction 
of local ways of life and of traditional forms of agriculture, and, above 
all, submission to the forces of western capitalistic imperialism, 
prototypically embodied by the Unites States. GMOs are in that context 
associated with the worst effects of capitalism, which the mayor of the 
town where the field trial was going on describes as a brutal force blind 
to ethical concerns (see sections 7.7.2 and 7.7.3). According to some, the 
diffusion of GMOs violates the rights of peoples and countries. “Food 
sovereignty” is a concept used to claim that a country has a right to 
choose what to grow and how to provide food for its citizens, according 
to its own best interests and traditions (Food sovereignty and trade, n.d.).  
A perceived right to food sovereignty connects to the third and last key 
facet of the debate: many express the view that GMOs are incompatible 
with and in fact threaten Italian food culture. The notion of food 
sovereignty is linked with fear of cultural impoverishment and loss of 
tradition, in Italy and elsewhere. Ultimately, GMOs are rejected as in 
conflict with Italian ‘identity’, an identity which evidently includes great 
attachment to “genuine” and “traditional” foods. Italy markets its 
products worldwide as high quality foods. Losing a universally 
recognized claim to producing and eating good, “traditional” food 
threatens both the Italian economy and Italian identity. Fear of economic 
loss in the agricultural sector is not the main concern of lay people. Many 
protagonists in the discourses I have documented express the view that 
GMOs are a threat to the Italian way of farming and eating. They propose 
metaphors of invasion of the country by foreign seeds and foods 
(Quaglia, 2002). A participant paired GMOs with drugs (section 7.7.7). 
The comparison encompasses both the idea that GMOs would make 
Italians dependent on others and the undesirable quality of the products. 
The Bubbio declaration (section 7.1) neatly sums up the main tenets of 
this particular perspective on food biotechnologies, namely that they are 





GMOs are thus dangerous, undemocratic and problematic for how Italians 
conceive of their way of farming and eating. Participants sometimes seem 
to refuse GMOs on matters of principle. Transgenesis is represented as an 
unwarrantable tampering with nature. Such arguments of principle are 
frequently joined to arguments about the inutility of food biotechnologies. 
Eurobarometer surveys have shown that people are willing to accept 
“tampering with nature” in proportion to the perceived utility of the 
scientific practice in question. Growing organs in transgenic animals in 
order to use them for transplants is more acceptable to respondents than 
growing transgenic plants for food (Eurobarometer, 2000; 2002). In my 
data, objections based on “nature” (vs. “unnaturalness”) are not the most 
salient. Perhaps the closest to such objection is the opposition expressed 
by the archbishop of Genoa, who argues that GM wheat would not be fit 
for the Eucharist (Boero, 2004). However, as the analysis of the article 
shows, the argument of principle is immediately followed by others more 
political (see section 7.2.4).  
8.1.1 Key actors and the Italian battle against GMOs 
As I have just described, there is one aspect of the debate around food 
biotechnologies in Italy which seems associated with a blanket rejection 
of any profit driven technological product coming from the west. 
Someone has found a catchy definition for this kind of refusal. Among 
scientists circulates the “watermelon theory” of rejection of 
biotechnologies. The theory goes that committed anti–biotech 
campaigners are “green outside and red inside” (Chrispeels, personal 
communication). The “theory” is well grounded in the historical link 
between green and left political stances (Dobson, 2000), and it might 
explain many of the arguments against biotechnologies I heard over the 
years in Italy. However, refusal in Italy runs across the whole 
parliamentary spectrum. The “theory” fails to explain the agreement 




biotechnologies out.  A better explanation of refusal must look at the 
cultural and economic forces at play. While I focus on Italy, the books of 
Indian Vandana Shiva (2000) and the writings and actions of French 
farmer activist Jose Bové (Bové, 2001) show that cultural and economic 
issues generally have an important part in the debate over plant 
biotechnologies. Both aspects neatly surface in a passage of a television 
debate where the Italian agriculture minister, a former agriculture 
minister, scientists and farmer representatives are debating GMOs. The 
program, entitled “Videocamere”, was transmitted on December, 2nd, 
2003 over the second channel of Italian national television (RAI DUE)12.  
The interaction during the program is characterized by mutualexpressions 
of strong disagreement between politicians and scientists. In a key 
passage, while the scientist Giorgio Poli is trying to make the point that 
inserting an alien gene in an organism cannot be considered to be like 
mating two organisms of different species, Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio, 
who was minister of agriculture in the previous Italian government, 
interrupts  to say that “the logic of GMOs is opposed to the logic of 
typical foods”. In a classic Conversation Analysis style we can ask of his 
utterance: “why that now?”   Pecoraro Scanio’s contribution follows in 
sequence that of Giorgio Poli; thus we must assume that it is related to 
it.However, he does not reply to the issue of how one should think of the 
insertion of one alien gene in an organism. Pecoraro Scanio instead shifts 
the topic onto what he appears to consider a more relevant problem 
within the GMO debate, and he does so interrupting Poli half way 
through his attempt to provide a reassuring account of the insertion of the 
gene of one organism into another organism of a different species. The 
real problem , as it is described by Pecoraro Scanio and Massimo Pacetti 
in the interchange, is not so much the danger or uncanny nature of 
GMOs. Rather it is that their logic is opposed to what Italian farmers and 
agricultural policy makers are trying to do, namely develop, safeguard 
and promote a certain kind of agriculture, which relies on the image of 
typical foods, high quality and traditional farming practices. This effort, 
which has relevant economic components, in the words of participants, 
                                                 





needs to fight external pressures from the worldwide economic giants. 
Later in the program, natural opponents Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio, 
(representative of the green party), and Gianni Alemanno, (from the right 
wing party Alleanza Nazionale, at the time Minister of Agriculture), 
mutually agree that GMOs are bad for Italian agriculture, thus offering a 
rare bipartisan duet.Other key actors put great emphasis on the role Italy 
has for winning what is defined, with great rhetorical awareness, as a 
“battle of cultures”. Simone Vieri is the president of the National 
Institute of Economic Agriculture (INEA). He is the person officially 
responsible to represent the economic interests of Italian agriculture. 
Speaking at the “Science and Society” conference, organized by the 
Consiglio dei Diritti Genetici on October 2004, he articulates the 
explanation in clear terms, rooted in the economical reality of EU 
agricultural policies that have been subsidizing the Italian and European 
economies (Della Vedova, 2002). In his speech he said:  
Our development model is based on the strong ties between agriculture 
and the environment, it is based on traditions, on traditions that are not 
only food traditions, but that are cultural traditions. There is a strong 
link that keeps the country linked to its agriculture” 
(omissis)  
here then there is a battle which is much larger than the one hundred 
billions of seeds or seventy-five hectares to be cultivated in Italy13. 
There is a cultural battle, a historical battle, because I am convinced that 
if the multinationals enter in Italy, and they are pressing like hell to 
enter in Italy , they don’t really care about, I don’t know, those one 
hundred billion.. They are interested in the symbolic value of a victory, 
over that productive model which is most of all a cultural and a 
territorial model. It is, the moment the Italian dyke breaks down, and the 
moment in which then they enter in Europe, because in the end we are 
                                                 
13 Vieri had in the course of his speech made a calculation of what the 
Italian market is worth for multinational seed producers, and comes to 
the conclusion that the pressure for “entering Italy and Europe” cannot 




the dyke in this battle because who is negotiating coexistence, 
coexistence is been negotiated in Italy. 
 (omissis).  
The battle over GMOs is being fought in Italy because it is there that 
they want to enter, because by proving that one can enter in Italy and 
that one can make GMOs in the Italian agricultural  productive system, 
one puts in crisis a model of agricultural development which is first of 
all a model of cultural development (omissis).  
(Vieri, 2004) 
Once more, the discourse is framed in the terms of a battle between us 
and them. Vieri closes his goosebump-producing speech warning that the 
global control of food supplies might mean that famine could strike 
again, just as it did sixty years ago, when his own father, he says, 
suffered hunger. This discourse incorporates very important points of the 
debate around food, and it does so from the perspective of the insider, the 
Agriculture expert. The themes that surface again and again in the data 
are related to Italy’s cultural patrimony of quality foods, which is 
considered an economic resource to defend and a marker of identity to 
preserve.  
8.2 Theoretical conclusions: SRT, DP and 
modes of representing food biotechnologies in 
Italy. 
 
To conclude, I return to the theoretical question with which I began, 
and the sort of answer I propose. The scholars I refer to in this work 
operate either from what could be called a realist position - Moscovici 
(1988a), van Dijk (1998) - or an anti-realist one - Wetherell & Potter, 
(1992), Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter (1995),  However, there is 
agreement among them that socially interpreted reality is the only reality 





constituted, reproduced and modified in the course of social life. Further, 
all the above scholars have made clear that they consider discourse - 
understood as language in use - to play an essential part in the 
construction and modification of social reality. These are my starting 
points. Accordingly, as I made clear in the introduction, I set out to 
explore what GMOs are  - as part of a socially constituted reality - 
according to different discourses in Italy. Social Representations Theory 
provides a framework for describing how it happens that, given the 
emergence of a new phenomenon in the public sphere, different groups 
understand it according to their socially shared representations. In SRT, 
the question would be: how do different groups anchor the new item to 
their already formed wealth of organized knowledge? Different 
representations would fit in group-dependent cognitive structures and 
would fulfill the function of explaining a new phenomenon in the 
reassuring terms of what is already accepted within the social group. For 
instance, subjects whose frame of mind is anti corporate and anti 
capitalist understand GMOs as the last in a series of useless and 
dangerous undertakings on the part of multi national profit-driven 
companies. On the other hand, technology-buffs or those who 
sympathize with entrepreneurial endeavors would perhaps welcome food 
biotechnologies. While there is a very large corpus of studies which 
focus on public opinion and biotechnologies, including studies which use 
Social Representations Theory, what has not been fully described yet is if 
and how different discourses related to food biotechnologies take a 
logical place according to principle-generating standpoints relevant to 
matters of power and justice. This is where I have aimed my 
contribution.Given the importance that communication has in the 
constitution and diffusion of social reality, I decided that the detailed 
analysis of discourse was a promising route to pursue such an endeavor.  
A challenging aspect of my work has been my attempt to combine Social 
Representations theory and Discursive Psychology in the study of Italian 
modes of representing food biotechnologies. Following Discursive 
Psychology, I have reformulated the question of how people understand 




Rather than focusing on cognition and enquiring how people make sense 
of food biotechnologies, I consider the discursive embodiment of a 
representation as the “thing” which can be studied, pushed around, pulled 
apart by the analysis, and ask what people do with such a discourse. 
Within the discourse analysis tradition it has been pointed out that 
discourses not only depict a certain world, but also provide arguments for 
how things should be (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; van Dijk, 1998). 
Discourses are performative as much as descriptive; they change things 
and ‘push in one direction’ (or another).  
One last example may make my argument clear. Over the last six years I 
have spoken with several scientists doing research on food 
biotechnologies. Many of them describe the insertion of genes in a plant 
in the terms of traditional breeding practices, something humankind has 
engaged in for the last 10.000 years (Hubbell, 2001). Researchers told me 
several times: “we are just doing what we have always done, only better: 
with more precision and faster results. ” This type of discourse is very 
common among biotech specialists (Hubbell, 2001; Charles, 2001) and it 
constitutes one particular interpretative repertoire (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987) often used by scientists. We can call it “Transgenesis as breeding”. 
Talking of transgenesis as ‘traditional breeding’ clearly cannot represent 
the full picture of how scientists strictly speaking understand GMOs. 
Talking with them one realizes that they do not even think of genes as 
things - as a lay person might do - but rather as sequences of bases, as 
information. However, geneticists might talk of genes as if they were 
things when it seems appropriate for the context. Anchoring GMOs in 
traditional breeding techniques is just one of the ways of talking and 
thinking available to the speaker. There is a further aspect to this 
metaphor. The choice one makes to use a specific expression has 
rhetorical consequences. Linking GMOs to old time farming practices 
has also a strategic aspect. Talking of GMOs as yet another form of 
breeding  new plants is, as Billig would put it (Billig, 1987b; 1991a), not 
so much the expression of an opinion in a vacuum but a partisan volley in 
a field of controversy. The comparison between GMOs and traditional 





continuity, even of tradition, on a practice that others vociferously 
describe as unnatural, disruptive and terribly dangerous. It claims “we 
have always done this”. When faced with a social researcher who is 
asking questions about food biotechnologies, scientists tend to give this 
type of representation of GMOs, and implicitly also of themselves. I do 
not claim that scientists lie when they express themselves in these terms. 
On the contrary, I claim that there is more to say about what words, 
expression, and arguments one uses to talk and think about a certain 
phenomenon than linking it to previous knowledge. There is a project 
implicitly called upon, a plan in which a given representation might fit. 
Such a plan is social (in the sense that a scientist is a member of a certain 
community) as much as individual (it is about that scientist who is 
presenting herself or himself as a certain kind of person in that particular 
interaction with me). Lastly, the development of such a plan acquires its 
force and particular thrust in every instance of its occurrence depending 
on the immediate (discursive) context. My interest is less in similarities 
between representations than in differences. It might be that all Italians 
share the same representations of food biotechnologies at some very 
basic level (Mc Combs, 1994); on the whole they all watch the same 
television channels, they all are immersed in the same discourses. 
Persons less involved or interested in the issue all might come up with 
similar sets of images if asked what comes to their mind when they think 
of food biotechnologies. However, what I find more interesting is the 
different function these images fulfill for the worldviews of individuals; 
we can discover this by attending to what individuals do with these 
arguments during a given discussion. I have sought to show how these 
discourses display ideological components in their complex textures. 
How participants use arguments for and against food biotechnologies is 
similar to what players do in a game of cards. Players have in their hands 
a certain set of cards; each move puts a card on the table. There are a 
finite number of cards which are played against each other. Similarly, in 
a discussion there is usually a limited set of things that one can say 
before a topic like food GMOs is exhausted. What can reveal the thread 




and how different participants chime in the discussion contributing new 
elements or underlining certain aspects of the discussion as opposed to 
others. The allegory of a card game fosters the impression that a relevant 
aspect in any debate is strategic. While “what participants think” is the 
essential presupposed element of any interaction, it remains indeed 
presupposed.  The only thing we have is the interaction. The modalities 
and specific unfolding of the discussion display the richness and 
complexity of how ideas, beliefs, are found in the real world, not in the 
minds.  I do not presume to have exhausted all the representations of 
food biotechnologies one can find in Italian society. However, I hope I 
have managed to show the threads that recur in representations of food 
biotechnologies, some of which may specifically characterize the Italian 
context.  
8.3 Conclusion 
The intended contributions of my work can be summed up as 
follows. Firstly, I have offered a description of the various discourses 
over food biotechnologies in Italy that, I hope, does justice to the 
richness, creativity and articulation of the arguments proposed by 
participants. While the transcription process inevitably implies a great 
loss of the freshness and complexity of interactional nuance (Ochs, 
1979), I am convinced that my presentation has preserved for the reader 
at least some of the strategic perspicacity of many participants. Rather 
than flattening participants’ discourses in order to fit them into a closed 
set of categories, I have preferred to let the interactions stand on their 
own as much as possible.Secondly, I argue for the use of naturally 
occurring data in social psychology research. In the midst of real day to 
day interaction the complex ways representations are constructed and 
delivered, exchanged and built, are made available in all their 
complexity. The data I offer show the multi layered way participants 
express their representations. Socially shared cognition insists that rather 





and developed in the social situation. As I have extensively argued while 
discussing theoretical matters, few social psychological studies take 
stock of this fact. Most instead rely on standardized questionnaires which 
obscure the role of naturally occurring interaction in the exchange of 
representations. I intend my thesis as a push towards shifting social 
psychological studies towards naturally occurring verbal data. Thirdly 
and last: perhaps the most theoretically challenging aspect of this work is 
the discussion of the basic tenets of SRT and DP. I discussed how the 
two disciplines rely on two different concepts of the communicative 
process which are rooted in linguistic philosophy. Ultimately, the 
question between the two approaches seems to have roots in different 
notions of “meaning”. My aim has been to move beyond the apparent 
clash between ‘cognition’ and ‘action’. While researchers in DP have 
emphasized the irresolvable differences between what they hold to be a 
mentalist approach and their own, I have tried to point to the essential 
link between cognition and action and the necessity to reflect on the 
mental aspect of representations. Metaphors and images that anchor 
biotechnologies to well known phenomena are both a way of thinking 
and acting. While one approach might focus on one of the two aspects 
and downplay the other, there is a need to keep alive both notions. I am 
sure I have not fully reconciled the contradictions between the SRT 
perspective on representations - the notion that they are structured sets of 
beliefs - and the DP notion - that they are strategically motivated 
individual actions. However, I hope that in the course of the thesis I have 
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10.1 List of data of the field trial  
In the following I list all the data collected and analyzed during the 
ethnographic study I discuss. E.C. and G.P. stand for Elena Collavin and 
Giuseppe Pellegrini and indicate the researcher who collected the data. 
Documents from the official procedure for the authorization of the field 
trial:  
SNIF: Summary Notification Information File, which is the request of 
authorization filed by the applying university to the authorizing body (the 
Health Ministry in Rome), in which the purpose and details of the 
experiment are described. 
Authorization to conduct the experiment, sent by the competent 
authority, the Health Ministry, to the applicant. 
Two letters from the Health Ministry which notify that an authorization 
has been given for the field trial: one letter was sent to the Regional 
competent Authority of Agriculture Development, one to the Regional 
President. 
Interview with the civil servant head of the Health Ministry office in 
Rome, in charge of the applications for obtaining authorizations to carry 
out a field trial (E.C., 65 minutes, recorded) 
Interview with the scientist in charge of the experiment (E.C., 50 
minutes, recorded) 
Telephone interview with the seed dealer who provided the GM seeds for 
the trial (E.C., about 40 minutes, not recorded, field notes) 
Interview with the civil servant in charge of Agriculture development in 
the region, who received information that a field trial had been 
authorized on his territory;  he was in charge of appointing inspectors 




Interview with the two ARPA (Regional Agency for Environment 
Protection) experts in charge of the safety of the field trial, who 
conducted several inspections at the site (E.C., G.P., 70 minutes, 
recorded)  
Interview with the mayor of the council where the trial takes place (E.C., 
45 minutes, recorded) 
On the day of an inspection before the harvest also the following data 
were collected literally in the field or while driving to the field: 
Conversation with the Regional civil servant in charge and with two field 
inspectors in the car on the way to the field (E.C., about 50 minutes, 
recorded) 
Interview with a second scientist in charge of the experiment (E.C., G.P., 
25 minutes, recorded) 
Interview with the agronomist responsible for the cultivation of the field 
(E.C., G.P., 18 minutes, recorded)  
Interview with the farmer who lent his land to the university for the trial 
(E.C., G.P., 4 minutes, recorded) 
Conversation with the mayor of the village on the opportunity of 
organizing a public encounter about the experiment (E.C., G. P., 70 
minutes, recorded) 
Public encounter on the topic of the field trial (E.C.. G.P., 143 minutes, 
recorded) 
Focus group with stakeholders on the topic of the trial (E.C., G. P., 138 
minutes, recorded) 
Four national newspaper articles reporting on the public meeting 
Recording of an interview to the mayor on a national public radio 
channel (8 minutes) 
Meeting with the Inter Ministerial Commission for Biotechnologies, the 
responsible decision-making body charged with advising the executive 
authority (Health Ministry) on the authorizations for GMOs experiments 
(E.C., G. P., about 45 minutes, not recorded)  
Conversations with nine citizens of the village and the mayor ( E.C., a 





Field notes documenting the whole process of data collection and 
research progress (7 copybooks) 
About 80% of all the recordings have been transcribed. Data have been 
organized and analyzed using Scientific Software’s Atlas-Ti.  
 
10.2 Transcription conventions 
Sindaco; at the beginning of each turn identifies 
the speaker 
= latching in the same or contiguous turns 
across lines 
:   extension of a sound  
.  a fall in tone, not necessarily the end of a 
sentence 
,  a continuous intonation, not necessarily 
between clauses of sentences 
?  rising inflection, not necessarily a 
question mark 
- self or other repair. For instance “del po- 
della popolazione” 
[     ]   the line above and the one below within  
  parentheses are uttered in  
  overlap 
> <   talk is faster then surrounding talk 
< >   talk is slower then surrounding talk 
hh  audible exhalation 
.hh  audible inhalation 
devono sapere  emphasis 




ALLORA   a stretch of talk louder then the s
  urrounding talk 
(.)   a short silence, untimed 
(1,5)   a timed silence, in seconds 
(( looking at her hand))  paralinguistic features of importance and 
comments of the analyst 
((omissis)) signals that a part of the talk has been 
omitted 
 
Transcription conventions are an adaptation from Gail Jefferson’s 
notation in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) and Atkinson and 
Heritage (1984). 
10.3 The “anti-transgenic” declaration of  
Bubbio Council, 13 August 1999 
 
COMUNE DI BUBBIO 
Provincia di Asti 
COMUNE ANTITRANSGENICO 
La Giunta Comunale 
PRESO ATTO che l'introduzione in agricoltura degli Organismi 
Geneticamente Modificati (OGM) ha sollevato notevoli dubbi e 
perplessità nell'opinione pubblica 
per motivi etici 
per le conseguenze sulla salute dei cittadini 
per i rischi di danni irreversibili all'ecosistema 






CONSIDERATO che il nuovo modello di agricoltura proposto è in 
netta contrapposizione con quello oggi attuato nella nostra zona 
fortemente legata alle tradizioni e alle caratteristiche del territorio; 
RITENUTO pertanto, alla luce di quanto sopra, di prendere posizione 
contraria, per quanto di competenza, all'introduzione in agricoltura degli 
Organismi Geneticamente Modificati; 
PRESO ATTO del parere favorevole del Segretario Comunale ai sensi 
dell'art. 53 della Legge 142/90 in ordine alla regolarità tecnico-
amministrativa del presente provvedimento; 
CON VOTI unanimi e concordi espressi per alzata di mano; 
 DELIBERA 
di dichiarare il Comune di Bubbio "Comune Antitransgenico" 
di affiggere sotto i cartelli di ingresso del paese la scritta "Comune 
Antitransgenico" 
di vietare su tutto il territorio comunale la sperimentazione,la 
coltivazionee l'allevamento di Organismi Viventi, sia vegetali sia 
animali, ottenutu mediante manipolazione genetica 
di creare un'apposita commissione comunale composta inizialmente dal 
Vice sindaco e da due consiglieri e che potrà essere in futuro allargata 
ad altre figure per perseguire i seguenti obiettivi: 
informare attraverso incontri, manifesti e comunicazioni scritte i 
produttori presenti sul territorio comunale (Vitivinicoltori, Salumifici, 
Pasticcerie, Pastifici, ecc.) sui rischi di utilizzo di prodotti 
geneticamente modificati nella catena produttiva (es. uova di galline 
allevati con mangimi derivati da OGM, lieviti selezionati, enzimi, 
batteri, acido ascorbico ottenuti con metodi che prevedono l'utilizzo di 
OGM, ecc) 
informare attraverso incontri, manifesti e comunicazioni scritte i 
rivenditori presenti sul territorio comunale sui rischi di vendita di 
alimenti di case accusate di utilizzare prodotti geneticamente modificati 




informare attraverso incontri, manifesti e comunicazioni scritte i 
cittadini sui rischi legati al consumo di prodotti ottenuti con OGM ed 
avviare una seria campagna di educazione alimentare legata al consumo 
di prodotti tradizionali di qualità 
prevedere durante le manifestazioni organizzate dalla Pro-Loco di 
Bubbio un'efficace promozione dei prodotti locali divulgando nel modo 
più efficace il messaggio contro i prodotti geneticamente modificati. 
Dal Decreto Legislativo 224/Agosto 2003 
L'autorità di cui al comma 1, rilascia il provvedimento di autorizzazione 
sulla base: 
a) delle verifiche effettuate dalla Commissione di cui all'articolo 6 per 
accertare che le autorizzazioni all'emissione deliberata nell'ambiente a 
scopo sperimentale e alla immissione sul mercato siano conformi alle 
disposizioni del presente decreto; 
b) delle valutazioni di possibili effetti sulla salute umana, animale e 
sull'ambiente con particolare attenzione agli ecosistemi naturali; 
c) della compatibilità dell'emissione deliberata nell'ambiente o 
dell'immissione sul mercato con l'esigenza di tutela 
dell'agrobiodiversità, dei sistemi agrari e della filiera agroalimentare, 
con particolare riferimento ai prodotti tipici, biologici e di qualità. 
 
10.4 The introductory speech of Cardinal 
Raffaele Martino at the conference: “GMOs: 
threat or hope” 
 
PONTIFICIO CONSIGLIO DELLA GIUSTIZIA E DELLA PACE 
SEMINARIO DI STUDIO SUL TEMA: 
"OGM: MINACCIA O SPERANZA?" 
INTERVENTO DEL CARD. RENATO RAFFAELE MARTINO 
Palazzo san Calisto 





Saluto e ringrazio sentitamente tutti i partecipanti di aver accolto, con 
generosa disponibilità, l'invito a portare a questo Seminario il loro 
qualificato contributo di scienza e di esperienza, che sarà utilissimo nel 
chiarire e illuminare le complesse questioni riguardanti gli OGM. Spero 
che questa occasione di incontro e di studio diventi per tutti noi uno 
stimolo alla crescita personale e, nello stesso tempo, un'opportunità di 
esercizio di una comune e condivisa responsabilità.  
Il Pontificio Consiglio della Giustizia e della Pace ha organizzato e 
promosso questo incontro nell'intento di raccogliere il maggior numero 
di dati informativi sugli OGM, che, in seguito, potranno servire a 
sussidiare un discernimento etico e pastorale, giorno dopo giorno 
sempre più necessario e indilazionabile. Al di là delle pressioni - 
provenienti da molteplici fonti e portatrici di esigenze diversificate e, in 
qualche modo, incompatibili a cui anche la Santa Sede è sottoposta - 
vorremmo che questo Seminario si svolgesse in un clima di serenità e di 
compostezza, sì da favorire lo scambio fruttuoso, il dialogo 
approfondito e la ricerca disinteressata.  
Il titolo del nostro Seminario, "OGM: minaccia o speranza?", riassume 
bene i differenti approcci che, a diversi livelli, si stabiliscono con gli 
OGM. Da parte nostra, siamo pienamente consapevoli che la posta in 
gioco è alta e delicata, per le polarizzazioni che dividono l'opinione 
pubblica, per i contenziosi commerciali che esistono a livello 
internazionale, per la difficoltà a definire, a livello scientifico, una 
materia che è oggetto di una ricerca in rapida evoluzione, per le 
complesse implicazioni etico-culturali ed etico-politiche. Da parte di 
questo Pontificio Consiglio si avverte tutta la responsabilità di dover 
affrontare una problematica tanto complicata, che ripropone, per certi 
versi, la domanda relativa al rapporto tra fede e scienza; questo 
Dicastero se ne vuole anzi fare carico pienamente, facendo tesoro della 
vostra scienza ed esperienza e, nello stesso tempo, appoggiandosi alla 
secolare sapienza della Chiesa e alla sua dottrina, che gli permetteranno 
di trovare, con equilibrio e nella verità, un punto di sintesi utile e 





Dal programma dei lavori si può facilmente vedere che il Seminario è 
stato strutturato in quattro sessioni di lavoro:  OGM e ricerca scientifica; 
OGM, alimentazione e commercio; OGM e sicurezza ambientale e 
sanitaria; OGM e implicazioni morali.  
Dal punto di vista metodologico, il cuore dei nostri lavori sarà il 
dibattito in comune dei temi che saranno brevemente introdotti da 
alcuni relatori. Il dibattito dovrà essere svolto in libertà, nel rispetto 
delle diverse posizioni e reso ricco dalle straordinarie competenze 
presenti in questa sala. 
Tra i partecipanti al nostro Seminario figurano anche alcuni Ministri del 
Governo italiano, la cui presenza merita una parola di giustificazione:  è 
sembrato quantomai opportuno invitarli in ragione del fatto che l'Italia 
detiene in questo semestre del 2003 la Presidenza del Consiglio 
dell'Unione Europea. Desidero ringraziarli di aver accettato l'invito e del 
contribuito che offriranno ai nostri lavori. Al termine di ogni sessione è 
previsto un incontro con la stampa per fornire ai giornalisti 
un'informazione puntuale e adeguata.  
Molti hanno manifestato un po' di stupore e di meraviglia di fronte a 
questa iniziativa del Pontificio Consiglio, chiedendosi quale fosse la 
ragione che la giustificasse. Si tratta, anche in questo caso, di dare 
seguito a un'esigenza profonda ed essenziale della missione religiosa e 
morale della Chiesa, quella di illuminare con la luce del Vangelo quanto 
riguarda la promozione dell'uomo e l'affermazione della sua dignità. La 
Chiesa lo fa, rispettando la legge naturale, mettendo a frutto i risultati 
della ricerca scientifica, attualizzando il messaggio delle Sacre Scritture 
e applicando i principi della sua dottrina sociale.  
A tale proposito, e a conclusione di questa mia breve introduzione, 
permettetemi di condividere con voi la lezione, molto pertinente e 
istruttiva, che ci viene dai primi capitoli della Bibbia dove si parla della 
creazione. Nel disegno del Creatore, infatti, le realtà create, buone in se 
stesse, esistono in funzione dell'uomo. Creandolo a sua immagine e 
somiglianza, Egli vuole che "domini sui pesci del mare e sugli uccelli 
del cielo, sul bestiame, su tutte le bestie selvatiche e su tutti i rettili che 





Lo stupore davanti al mistero della grandezza dell'uomo fa esclamare il 
salmista: "Che cosa è l'uomo perché te ne ricordi e il figlio dell'uomo 
perché te ne curi? Eppure l'hai fatto poco meno degli angeli, di gloria e 
di onore lo hai coronato; gli hai dato potere sulle opere delle tue mani, 
tutto hai posto sotto i suoi piedi" (Sal 8, 5-7).  
Il dominio dell'uomo sugli altri esseri viventi, tuttavia, non deve essere 
un dominio dispotico e dissennato; al contrario, egli deve "coltivare e 
custodire" i beni creati da Dio. Beni che l'uomo ha ricevuti come un 
dono prezioso, posto dal Creatore sotto la sua responsabilità.  
La proibizione di mangiare "dell'albero della conoscenza del bene e del 
male" (Gen 2, 17) ricorda all'uomo che egli ha ricevuto tutto come dono 
gratuito e che continua ad essere una creatura, e non sarà mai il 
Creatore. Il peccato dei nostri padri fu provocato proprio da questa 
tentazione:  "diventereste come Dio" (Gen 3, 5). Adamo ed Eva vollero 
avere il dominio assoluto su tutte le cose, senza sottomettersi alla 
volontà del Creatore. Da allora l'uomo dovrà trarre il cibo dal suolo con 
dolore e con il sudore del suo volto mangiare il pane (Gen 3, 17-19).  
Nonostante il peccato, il disegno del Creatore, il senso delle sue creature 
e, tra queste, dell'uomo, chiamato ad essere coltivatore e custode del 
creato, rimangono inalterati. L'uomo, dotato di un'intelligenza grazie 
alla quale è capace di cogliere il senso delle cose, deve custodire i beni 
della terra, da lui ricevuti come dono. Dotato della capacità di scoprire 
le cause, le leggi e i meccanismi che governano gli esseri, viventi e non, 
e conseguentemente capace di intervenire su di essi, deve utilizzare 
queste capacità per "coltivare" e non per distruggere. Coltivare significa 
intervenire, decidere, fare, non lasciare che le piante crescano a caso. 
Coltivare significa potenziare e perfezionare, affinché vengano frutti 
migliori e più abbondanti. Coltivare significa ordinare, pulire, eliminare 
ciò che distrugge e rovina. Coltivare è il miglior modo di custodire.  
Grazie a tutti e buon lavoro!  
 
